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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN DISTRICT COURT

All parties in the district court are listed on the caption of this case.
~
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-l 03(2)G) and the
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3. The Court of Appeals does not have original
appellate jurisdiction,. but this appeal was transferred to the Court from the Utah Supreme
Court pursuant to Rule 42, Ut. R. App. Pro. The district court entered its final order in

Federated Capital Corp. v. Nazar, Case No. 129909968, on May 12, 2014, and Federated
Capital Corporation ("Federated") filed a Notice of Appeal on June 10, 2014.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federated appeals the district court's grant of summary Judgment. Summary judgment
is appropriate when the evidence shows that there is no genuine dispute as t? any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Federated Capital Corp.

v. Libby, 2016 UT 41, 17,384 P.3d 221. Because a summary judgment challenge presents
only legal issues, the court reviews the grant of summary judgment for correctness. Id. This
case also presents issues of statutory interpretation which are also reviewed for correctness.·

Id. There are two parts to Federated's appeal. Each part raises its own issues.
Issue No. One - Waiver. The first issue before the Court is did the trial court commit
plain error when it granted Ms. Nazar's motion for summary judgment dismissing
Federated's case when: 1) the application of the Pennsylvania four year statute oflimitations

7
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~

was the basis of the court's decision and this issue was fully briefed and argued by the parties
in the summary judgment proceedings; and 2) at no time during the proceedings did
Federated argue or bring to the court's attention that Ms. Nazar did not specifically cite the
exact limitation statute in her answer but pied generally that Federated's claims were barred
by the statute of limitations? Encompassed in this issue are the following sub-issues:
1.

Could Ms. Nazar raise the identity of the specific limitation statute by motion?

2.

Did Federated have notice of the basis of her defense and was it given the opportunity
to defend?

3.

Did Federated take full advantage of the opportunity and consent to litigation of the
issue on the merits?

4.

Did Federated fail to preserve its argument made in this appeal?

5.

Did the trial court commit plain error by not reviewing all of the pleadings in this
matter including Ms. Nazar's answer, and in light of the fact that Federated's counsel
failed to mention in any ofFederated's pleadings or at oral argument the defense to
the statute of limitations it now raises on appeal?

6.

Did Federated's counsel invite error by the trial court by making no mention of the
defense that Federated now makes on appeal?

~

The standard of review for these issues is correctness, but since most of the issues are
"highly fact sensitive" the trial court is granted a "fairly broad measure of discretion" in
making the determination under the facts in this case. Fibro ·Trust, Inc. v. Brahman

Financial, Inc., 1999 UT 13,if8, 974 P.2d 288.
Issue No. Two - Where cause of action arises.
This case presents the issue of whether the Court should rule consistent with over 100

8
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~

years of Utah Supreme Court precedent that, for purposes of interpreting the Utah borrowing
statute, the cause of action arises where performance under the contract was to be made.
Federated did not argue to the trial court that the choice oflaw provision required that
I.Ji>

its cause of action arise in Utah. It, thereby, waived the argument and failed to preserve the
argument which is now made for the first time on appeal. By not considering Federated's
argument, the trial court did not commit plain error and Federated's counsel invited error by

~

failing to make the argument. The standard of review for these issues is correctness.

Libby, at il 7.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations are
determinative of this appeal or of central importance to the appeal:

Issue No. One - Waiver.

vJ

1.

Rule 8(b), ( c) & (f) URCP;

2.

Rule 9(1) URCP;

3.

Rule 12(b) & (h) URCP;

4.

Rule l 5(b) URCP;

Issue No. Two - Where the cause of action arises.

I.

Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-10~.

2.

42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5525(a)(8).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

9
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I.

Nature of the case.
Federated sued Ms. Nazar alleging that she owed Advanta Bank Corporation

("Advanta") on a credit card account. (R. at 1-4.) Federated alleged that Advanta assigned
the account to it. Id. Ms. Nazar answered Federated's complaint alleging generally that the
suit was barred by the statute of limitations, but did not cite a specific statute of limitation
code section. (R. at 34-36.) Ms. Nazar alleged that the contract attached to the complaint was
unreadable and no answer could be formulated as to it. Application of the borrowing statute
could not be identified until a legible copy of the agreement was provided by Federated. (R.
at 34.) A readable copy was provided by disclosures. (R. at 42.) Ms. Nazar then moved for
summary judgment. (R. at 58.) She argued that the Pennsylvania four year limitation period
controlled and it barredFederated~s suit. (R. at 62-70.) Federated fully defended this motion,
arguing that the Utah six year limitation period applied. Federated' s pleadings and argument
were detailed and comprehensive. (R. at 104-196, primarily R. 175-185.) Never once did
Federated argue or mention to the trial court in its pleadings, at oral argument or after the
judgment dismissing its suit was entered that Ms. Nazar waived her statute of limitations
defense because she failed to identify the specific statute upon which her defense was based.

Id. 1 Federated makes that argument only now, on appeal. Never once did Federated argue
or mention to the trial court in its pleadings, at oral argument or after the judgment

1

The summary judgment pleadings upon which this appeal turns are attached within the
Addendum as Exhibit "A". The transcript ofFederated's argument is attached within the
Addendum as Exhibit "B".
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dismissing its suit was entered that the choice of law clause required the cause of action to
have arisen in Utah making the borrowing statute inapplicable. Id. Federated also makes that
argument only now, on appeal.
II.

The course of proceedings and disposition in the court below.
Federated filed its lawsuit on July 10, 2012. (R. at 1.) This was six years to the day of

Ms. Nazar's last payment (R. 198-199.) and over five years after Federated allegedly
purchased Ms. Nazar's account from Advanta.

(R. at 196.) Ms. Nazar answered the

complaint. (R. at 34.) Ms. Nazar moved for summary judgment in July, 2013. (R. at 58.)
Federated opposed the summary judgment. (R. at 104-196, particularly R. at 168- 186.) Ms.
Nazar filed a reply memorandum. (R. at 211.) In order to block the trial court from ruling on
vl

Ms. Nazar's summary judgment, Federated filed a motion to stay the case and submit it to
arbitration under the alleged arbitration provision of the credit card agreement. (R. at 275.)
Ms. Nazar opposed the motion to compel arbitration. (R. at293.) On March 7, 2014, the trial

@

court heard argument on the pending motions and from the bench denied Federated' s motion
to compel arbitration and granted Ms.Nazar' s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the
case as being barred by the Pennsylvania four year statute of limitations. (R. at 354.) After
two months of bickering over the provisions of the Court's written order and judgment, the
0iP

trial court entered its final order on May 12, 2014. (R. at 449.) The trial court entered its
memorandum decision concerning an award of attorney's fees to Ms. Nazar on May 13,

11
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2014. (R. at 489.) 2 Federated appealed on June 10, 2014. (R. at 492.)

III.

Statement of facts.
Federated sued Ms. Nazar alleging that she owed Advanta on a credit card account.

(R. at 1-4.) Federated alleged that Advanta assigned the account to it. Id. Ms. Nazar answered
Federated' s complaint alleging generally that the suit was ban-ed by the statute oflimitations,
but did not cite a specific statute oflimitation code section. (R. at 34-36.) Ms. Nazar alleged
that the contract attached to the complaint was unreadable· and no answer could be
formulated as to it. Application of the bon-owing statute could not be identified until a
legible copy of the agreement was provided by Federated. (R. at 34.) A readable copy was
provided by disclosures. (R. at 42.) Ms. Nazar then moved for summaryjudgment. (R. at 58.)
She argued that the Pennsylvania four year limitation period controlled and it barred
Federated's suit. (R. at 62-70.) Federated fully defended this motion, arguing that the Utah
six year limitation period applied. Federated's pleadings and argument·were detailed and
comprehensive. (R. at 104- 196, primarily R. 175-185.) Never once did Federated argue or
mention to the trial court in its pleadings, at oral argument or after the judgment dismissing
its suit was entered that Ms. Nazar waived her statute of limitations defense because she
failed to identify the specific statute upon which her defense was based. Id.

3

Federated

makes that argument only now, on appeal. Never once did Federated argue or mention to the

2

The trial court's summary judgment is attached in the Addendum as Exhibit "C".

3

See Addendum, Exhibits "A" and "B".
12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

trial court in its pleadings, at oral argument or after the judgment dismissing its suit was
entered that the choice of law clause required the cause of action to have arisen in Utah
making the borrowing statute inapplicable. Id. Federated also makes that argument only now,
(.J)

on appeal.
The account was allegedly governed by a written contract entitled "Advanta Business
Card Agreement" (the "Agreement" herein). (R. at 72.). A copy of the Agreement is
attached to the Addendum as Exhibit "D". The monthly credit card statements produced
by the plaintiff in its initial disclosures show that the last payment was made to Advanta on
July 10, 2006. (R. at 79.) The plaintiff is not a citizen of Utah, but is a Michigan corporation
with its place of business in Farmington Hills Michigan. (R. at 196.)
The Agreement attached to the plaintiffs Complaint and attached to the Addendum
as Exhibit "D", states the following at 1 6.
"You agree to make all payments in US dollars payable through
a US Financial Institution, either by check or money order
payableto us at the location and in the manner specified on your
periodic billing statement or in any other manner (such as by
electronic fund transfer or wire transfer) that we agree to and
provide procedures .for."
In the ne~t to the last paragraph-of16, the Agreement also states:

Gj

"Account payments are to be mailed to the address for payments
shown on your periodic billing statement. Payment must be
received by us at that address onor before the specified time on
the Payment Due Date stated on your periodic billing statement,
and must conform to any specific requirements for making
payment which appear with or in your billing statement."

13
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The next sentence of ,I 6 states:
" Payments tendered to and accepted by us or our agent at a
location other than the address stated on your periodic billing
statement are not effective until received by us at the address
specified."
[Emphasis added.] (R. at 73 & 74.)
Advanta selected Philadelphia, Pennsylvania as the place that payments were to be
sent on each and every monthly account statement. (R. at 79.) See statement in Addendum
as Exhibit "E".
This case was filed on July 10, 2012. (R. at 1.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Issue No. One - Waiver.
Federated argues that Ms. Nazar failed to identify the specific statute of limitations
barring its claims in her answer, affirmatively alleging only generally that the claims were
barred by the statute of limitations. Federated feels that Ms. Nazar thereby waived the
defense and that the trial court should have picked up on this failure. Federated concludes
that the trial court committed "plain error" by not doing so, even though Federated never
mentioned one word about this issue to the trial court in its pleadings, at oral argument or
after the judgment was entered.
The Court of Appeals already faced the exact issue now argued by Federated. It did
so in In re Estate ofLeFevre, 2009 UT App 286, iJ 29, 220 P.3d 476. The party making the
same argument that Federated makes in the present case lost that argument. In LeFevre, two
14
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~

sets of children from two different women who were married to the same man (the second
wife after the first wife had passed away) were fighting over the estate of the husband. The
first set were known as the "Lefevre children" and the second set of children were
~

represented by one of them known as "Stout." Stout contended that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for summary judgment because the LeFevre children's petition was timebarred. On appeal, the Lefevre children countered that Stout waived a statute oflim.itations
defense because he did not assert the defense in a responsive pleading as required by Rule
12(h) URCP. The Court of Appeals held that:

~

"the Lefevre children failed to object to Stout's assertion of an unpreserved
statute of limitations defense in responding to his motion for summary
judgment~ Rather, they addressed his defense on the merits, arguing that their
claims were not time-barred because the statute oflim.itations was tolled by the
equitable discovery rule. Accordingly, the Lefevre children waived the right
to object to an unpreserved defense on appeal. .. noting that by not objecting
to an unpreserved affirmative defense, the plaintiff waived the defect ... any
objection to a defect of parties is waived, if not asserted by a party as provided
in Rule 12(h) ... " [Internal quotes and citations omitted.]
Like the LeFevere children, Federated failed to raise any objection whatsoever to Ms.
Nazar' s failure to identify the specific statute oflim.itations in her answer. It raised this issue
. for the first time on appeal.
Ms. Nazar, however, must fully address the following arguments.
1.

She could raise the identity of the specific limitation statute by motion.

2.

Federated had notice of the basis of her defense and was given the opportunity to
defend.

3.

Federated took full advantage of the opportunity and consented to litigation of the
15

\id
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issue on the merits.
4.

Federated failed to preserve its argument made in this appeal.

5.

The trial court did not commit plain error when it granted Ms. Nazar's motion for
summary judgment dismissing Federated's case when: 1) the application of the
Pennsylvania four year statute oflimitations was the basis of the court's decision and
this issue was fully briefed and argued by the parties in the summary judgment
proceedings; and 2) at no time during the proceedings did Federated argue or bring
to the court's attention that Ms. Nazar did not specifically cite the exact limitation
statute in her answer but pied generally that Federated's claims were barred by the
statute of limitations.

6.

Federated's counsel invited error by the trial court by making no mention of the
argument that Federated now makes on appeal.
~

Issue No. Two - Where the cause of action arose.

Federated did not argue to the trial court that the choice oflaw provision required that
its cause of action arise in Utah. It, thereby, waived the argument and failed to preserve the
argument which is made for the first time on appeal. By not considering Federated's
argument, the trial court did not commit plain error and Federated' s counsel invited error by
failing to make the argument.
The Court should rule consistent with over I 00 years of Utah Supreme Court
precedent that, for purposes of interpreting the Utah borrowing statute, the cause of action
arises where performance under the contract was to be made. It should do so because there
is no compelling reason to overturn that precedent. The majority in Libby did not comment
on whether the precedent should be overturned. Justice Lee in his concurring opinion was
not convinced that the subject rule should be overturned. He even questioned his own
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speculation about a different rule. He simply presented no compelling reason for overturning
the precedent which reason is required by Utah law for doing so. In its brief, Federated failed
to point out any compelling reason for overturning the century oflaw. It simply failed to meet
~

its substantial burden of persuasion that this precedent should be overturned.
Justice Lee merely speculated in Libby that a test might be considered. In his
speculation, he even questioned whether a new test should be considered. Such speculation
provides no guidance to this Court and should not be considered.
Finally, Federated's analysis of the issue of where the cause of action arises under the
borrowing statute is not supported by Utah case law, including the cases cited by it.
ARGUMENT -ISSUE NO. ONE - WAIVER

I.

Ms. Nazar could raise the identity of the specific limitation statute by motion.
She did so and Federated, thereby, had notice of the basis of her defense and was
given the opportunity to defend which was all that was required under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Federated took full advantage of the opportunity and
consented to litigation of.the issue on the merits without ever raising the defense
it now asserts for the first time on appeal.

Federated's entire argument is premised on the belief that Ms. Nazar could only raise
the affirmative defense of the statute oflimitations by alleging it in her answer. Since she did
not allege the specific statute upon which the defense was based, but only generally alleged
that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations, Federated concludes that Ms.
Nazar was barred from maintaining the defense. It does so even though the parties fully
litigated the merits ofMs. Nazar's defense in summary judgment proceedings and Federated
I.@

lost.
17
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An affirmative defense "must be raised by way of answer, motion or demand so as to
(\L)

put the issue before the trial court... " [Emphasis added.] Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter
Financial Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979). This position of the Utah Supreme Court

was affirmed 26 years later by the Utah Court of Appeals in Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp.,
2005 UT App 82, ,I 7, n. 2, 109 P.3d 393. Citing Royal Resources Inc., the Court stated that
an affirmative defense "must be raised by way of answer, motion or demand so as to but the
issue before the trial court ... " [Emphasis added.] Id.
In Cheney v. Rucker, 3 81 P .2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963 ), the defendants failed to plead a
subsequent agreement as an affirmative defense in their answer. Id. The plaintiff argued that
the defendants should not, therefore, be allowed to rely on the affirmative defense. Id. The
Utah Supreme Court stated that the trial judge "not only did not abuse his discretion in
allowing the issue to be raised and receiving the contract in evidence, but he would have
failed the plain mandate of justice had he refused to do so."ld. The Court noted that the
plaintiff did not request a continuance so it could investigate the newly raised affirmative
defense and did not express any prejudice or disadvantage in having to meet that issue. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court reasoned:
"It is true, as plaintiff insists, that Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P ., requires that affirmative
defenses be pleaded. It is a good rule whose purpose is to have the issues to be
tried clearly framed. But it is not the only rule in the book of Rules of Civil
Procedure. They must all be looked to in the light of their even more
fundamental purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the end
that the parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute. What they are entitled to is
notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. When this is
18
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accomplished, that is all that is required. Our rules provide for liberality to
allow examination into and settlement of all issues bearing upon the
controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other party to have a reasonable
time to meet a new issue if he so requests. Rule 15(b), U.R.C.P., so states. It
further allows for an amendment to conform to the proof after trial or even
after judgment, and indicates that if the ends of justice so require, 'failure so
to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.' This idea is
confirmed by Rule 54(c)(l), U.R.C.P.: '[E]very finaljudgment shall grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the
party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. "'4
In the present case, Ms. Nazar pled the affirmative defense of the statute of
limitations. She then moved the trial court for summary judgment dismissing Federated's
case based on the running of the Pennsylvania four year limitations period. Federated had
notice of the basis of Ms. Nazar's defense and the opportunity to confront it. Federated fully
argued the merits of the motion without once objecting to the fact that Ms. Nazar failed to
allege the express statute in her answer. The requirement of notice and opportunity to defend
found by the Utah Supreme Court to be the fundamental requirements of the Utah Rules of
~

Civil Procedure were clearly met. Federated ignored the fact that Ms. Nazar did not cite a
specific statute in her answer and raised this defense only in this appeal. Federated, therefore,
consented to the trial court's consideration of the limitations defense. In Shinkoskey v.

Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44, 16, n.2, 19 P.3d 1005, this Court held that it will "affirm a
trial court's determination that an issue was fully tried if it is apparent from the record that
In Crowley v. Porter, 2005 UT App 518, ,r,r 36-39, 127 P.3d 1224, the Utah Court of Appeals
cited with approval the specific language of Cheney set forth above. It further set forth a digest of
cases where the failure to plead affirmative defenses under Rule 8 and the failure to allege with
particularity under Rule 9 was no bar to assertion of these defenses where the plaintiff had notice
of the defenses and the opportunity to defend them. Id. at ,r 37.

4
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the opposing party had notice of the claim and a fair opportunity to defend." [Internal quotes
~

deleted.] Accord, Guss v. Cheryl, Inc. 2010 UT App 249, ,r 10,240 P.3d 1142. A review of
the summary judgment pleadings, particularly Federated' s opposition memorandum Exhibit

"A" to the Addendum hereto, clearly shows that Federated fully tried the statute of

~

limitations defense without ever complaining that Ms. Nazar did not identify a specific
limitations statute in her answer. Likewise, Federated did not raise the issue at the hearing.

~

See transcript of hearing, Exhibit "B" to the Addendum.

II.

Federated did not preserve its argument that Ms. Nazar waived her right to
assert the statute of limitations because she did not allege a specific limitations
statute in her answer.
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ,r 15, 164 P.3d 366:
"Generally, in order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented
to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on
that issue. We have set forth three factors that help determine whether the trial
court had such an opportunity: ( 1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion;
(2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority. In short, a party may not claim
to have preserved an issue for appeal by merely mentioning an issue without
introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority. Ultimately, the
preservation requirement is based on the premise that, in the interest of orderly
procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed
error and, if appropriate, correct it." [Internal quotes and citations omitted.]5
Federated did not raise before the trial court the issue of Ms. Nazar's failure to allege

a specific limitations statute in her answer, only alleging generally the statute oflimitations.
Although the issue of the statute of limitations was fully litigated in the summary judgment
See also, Mitchell v. ReconTrust Co. NA, 2016 UT App 88, ,r,r 36 & 37,373 P.3d 189; and
Allen v. Allen, 2014 UT App 27, iJ 19,319 P.3d 770.
5
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~

proceedings, it made no mention of this argument. Its opposition memorandum is silent on
~

the issue. No mention of it was made at the hearing. It raises the argument for the first time
on appeal. Federated did not preserve the argument. It simply waived the argument.

III.

The trial court did not commit plain error and Federated 's counsel invited error
by the trial court if counsel really believed that Federated had the defense for
which it now argues.
Federated argues that the trial court committed plain error by not considering Ms.

Nazar's failure to allege a specific limitations statute in her answer. Federated's argument
fails the test of plain error. In Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ,r 16, the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
"In cases where a party raises an issue on appeal, but the party did not properly
preserve the issue below, we review it under the manifest injustice or plain
error standard. Under plain error review, we may reverse the lower co~ on an
issue not properly preserved for appeal when a party can show the following:
(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and
(iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood
of a more favorable outcome for the party, or phrased differently, our
confidence in the verdict is undermined. Nevertheless, under the invited error
doctrine, we have declined to engage in even plain error review when counsel,
either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the trial court that he or
she had no objection to the proceedings."
.Federated's argument fails the first test of plain error. No error was made. As set forth
. in detail above, Ms. Nazar moved the.trial court to dismiss the suit under the Pennsylvania
four year statute oflimitations. She alleged the statute oflimitations as an affirmative defense
in her answer and specifically moved under the Pennsylvania statute. She had the right to
bring the issue before the trial court by motion. Rule 12(h). Federated tried that issue by
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express consent when it defended the motion on the merits without raising the issue it now
makes on appeal. Rule 15(b). Indeed, Federated waived the right to assert its new argument
by not raising it before the trial court. Rule 12(h).
Federated's argument fails the second test of plain error. In order for an error to be
committed, the trial court must be advised of the issue and given the opportunity to rule.

Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ,r 16. Federated never raised the issue of Ms. Nazar's failure
to cite a specific limitation statute in her answer. The Court never had an opportunity to rule
on the issue. Federated' s argument is basically that the Court should have searched all of the
pleadings filed by the parties and advocated on its behalf even though the issue was not
obvious to its counsel. If it was so obvious, Federated must ask itself why its counsel did not
make the argument.
By failing to raise the issue with the ,trial court, Federated's counsel affirmatively
represented to the court that he had no objection to the proceeding based on the argument that
Federated now makes on-appeal. He invited error by the trial court and now seeks to take
advantage of that perceived invited error. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Pratt,
"Our invited error doctrine arises from the principle that a party cannot take
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error. By precluding appellate review, the doctrine furthers this
principle by discouraging parties from intentionally misleading the trial court
so as to preserve a·hidden ground for reversal on appeal. Further, parties are
not entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the benefit of
objecting on anneal. Thus, encouraging counsel to actively participate in all
proceedings and to raise any possible error at the time of its occurrence
fortifies our long-established policy that the trial court should have the first
opportunity to address a claim of error." Id. at ,r 17. [Emphasis added.]
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(iliJ)

IV.

The cases cited by Federated do not support its argument.
Federated cites the case of Pepperwood Homeowners Ass 'n v. Mitchell, 2015 UT App

137, 351 P.3d 844, for the proposition that 1) Ms. Nazar failed to establish in her summary
~

judgment pleadings that she had the right to dismissal of Federated's case; and 2) even
though Ms. Nazar fully presented all necessary facts in her summary judgment pleadings, the
trial court judge had a duty to search all of the previously filed pleadings for any possible
defense that Federated had against the summary judgment even though Federated did not
raise the defense that it now maintains for the first time on appeal.
The first problem withFederated's argument is that it places upon the trial courtjudge
the duty to advocate on behalf of Federated and argue an issue thatFederated's own counsel

~

did not deem important to raise in his opposition to the summary judgment. The second
problem with citing Pepperwood is that the moving party therein failed to place before the
court the very contract upon which it relied in a breach of contract claim. A judge faced with
such a motion would have naturally looked in the summary judgment pleadings for the
contact upon which he or she was asked to base judgment. It did not exist in Pepperwood and
was an obvious error.
In Pepperwood, the Court of Appeals stated that "the district court must still

~

detennine whether the moving party's pleadings, discovery, and affidavits demonstrate its
entitlement to judgment as a matter oflaw." [Emphasis added and quotation omitted.] Id. at

,r 6. Ms. Nazar presented every fact in her pleadings, discovery and declarations necessary
~
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~

to show that Federated's claim was not filed within the operative four year period of the
Pennsylvania limitations period. The key facts, admitted by Federated, were that almost six
years had passed between Ms. Nazar's last payment and Federated's suit, and that the subject
credit card agreement submitted to the court controlled the contractual relationship (also
admitted by Federated). See Federated Opp. Mem. Exhibit "A", Addendum. The key legal
issue argued by Ms. Nazar and detailed to the trial court in the Utah Supreme Court and
Court of Appeal opinions cited by her was that the Utah Borrowing Statute required
application of the Pennsylvania four year limitation period See Nazar Mem. and Reply Mem.
(R. 65-69 & 213-220.) Federated lost that argument before the trial court and it did not
appeal that issue.
As the Pepperwood court stated "[g]enerally, we will not consider an issue unless it
has been preserved for appeal by first presenting the issue to the district court in such a way
that the district court has the opportunity to rule upon it." Id. at ,III. The Court went on to
hold that in a summary judgment based on a contract that was not supplied to the trial court
in the pleadings, the error was so obvious that the court committed plain error. The trial court
did not need to search prior pleadings filed within the case to come up with any defense that
the defending party forgot to make. In the present case, Federated asked to trial court to
advocate on its behalf and search for any possible defenses. Federated simply did not present
the issue it now argues for the first time on appeal in such a way that the trial court had an
opportunity to rule on it. Federated cannot be saved by the plain error doctrine and simply
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~

created an "invited error."
Federated claims that the case of Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 177 P.3 600, supports
the same argument that it made about the Pepperwood case. Again, this decision does not
I@

support Federated's position. Johnson testified that he had no ownership interests in limited
partnerships or limited liability companies at a supplemental proceeding brought by the Small
Business Administration ("SBA") to collect a judgment from Johnson. In a different and
subsequent lawsuit between Johnson and Orvis, Orvis filed a motion for summary judgment
seeking an order that Johnson was judicially estopped from claiming an ownership interest
in a limited partnership with Orvis because of his testimony before the SBA. The trial court
agreed with Orvis and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court overturned the
decision based on Utah law regarding judicial estoppel that required Johnson's testimony
before the SBA to have been in a case also involving Orvis and that Orvis relied on the prior
testimony and changed his position based thereon. Id. at ,r,r 6 & 7. Orvis failed to submit facts
in his summary judgment pleadings showing any of these facts. The Supreme Court held that
Orvis failed to meet all of the elements of judicial estoppel and his summary judgment did
not establish the facts necessary to support each element. Id. at ,r 13.
The Supreme Court noted that "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,

(Jj

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." [Emphasis added.] Id. Ms. Nazar set forth all
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facts necessary to support her motion for summary judgment and supported them with
citations to pleadings, discovery and declarations which facts were admitted by Federated.
She argued the Borrowing Statute and Utah case law which supported her position. Neither
she nor the trial court were under any obligation to search all pleadings previously filed in
the case to come up with a defense for Federated which was ignored by its counsel and never
raised until this appeal.
Federated cites Conder v. Hunt, 2000 UT App 105, I P .3d 558, to support its
argument that Ms. Nazar waived her affirmative defense of the statute of limitations.
Conder, however, does not support that argument. In that case, the defendants moved for
summary judgment dismissing Conder's claims based upon the statute of limitations for
fraud. The Court of Appeals found that Conder never sued for fraud and concluded that the
defendants' statute oflimitations defense based on fraud failed. Important to the present case,
the. Court noted "in their motions for summary judgment, aside from a single passing
reference, defendants argued only the statute applicable to fraud actions." [Emphasis added.]
Id. at ,r 13. The Court recognized that the defendants' summary judgment pleadings failed
~

to properly allege the statute oflimitations. Ms. Nazar's summary judgment ple~dings fully;
and correctly alleged all facts and law supporting the statute of limitations, a .position that
even Federated admits.
Federated cites Bernard & Burk Group, Inc. v. Labor Com 'n, 2005 UT App 401, 122
P.3d 700. In that case, the Court of Appeals determined that Bernard & Burk had not
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sufficiently alleged the statute oflimitations in its answer. The case went to trial without any
pretrial motion fully addressing the statute of limitations issue as in the case at bar. The
Labor Commission ruled that under the facts of that case, i.e. going to trial with a failure to
~

specifically set forth the express statute was a waiver of the statute of limitations. That case
has no application to the facts of the present case. Federated and Ms. Nazar fully litigated the
statute oflimitations issue in a summary judgment proceeding long before a trial would have
been necessary. Federated had full notice of Ms. Nazar's argument and an opportunity to
address it. Indeed, Federated took advantage of the opportunity and fully briefed and litigated
the application of the Pennsylvania four year limitation period. Federated also chose to not
raise the issue of whether Ms. Nazar sufficiently pled the limitations defense in her answer. 6
Federated cites Wasatch Mines Co. V. Hopkinson, 465 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1970). In that

~

case, the trial court held a trial on competing claims in the complaint and a counterclaim. Id.
at 1007. Among the several rulings after the trial, the district court ruled that the plaintiffs
claims were barred by the statute oflimitations. Id. On cross appeal, the plaintiff asserted that
its claims should not have been barred by the statute of limitations because the defendant
failed t9 allege the specific statute which applied, alleging only generally the statute of
limitations~ From the discussion, it is unknown whether the plaintiff raised this issue during
6

It appears that Federated argues that the Barnard and Burk case is precedent that the Court
could consider as a separate ground, gleaned from the record, for overturning the trial court's
order that Ms. Nazar waived the statute oflimitations defense. See page 11 of brief. Appellate
courts, however, may carefully affirm on other grounds apparent on the record. They cannot
reverse on other grounds, for which Federated appears to be arguing. Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT
58, iJ 13, n. 3, 52 P.3d 1158.
27
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the trial. A majority of the Cami ruled that Rule 9(h) required the defendant to plead the
specific statute prior to trial and overruled the district court. Id. at 1010.
Like Federated's other cited cases, this case fails to address the situation presented to
the Court of Appeals in the present case. Ms. Nazar set forth in detail in her summary
judgment pleadings the grounds for dismissal based on the Pennsylvania four year limitations
period. (R. at 65-69 & 213-220.) Federated fully defended that issue in its opposition
memorandum and at the hearing. Id. Federated never once raised an objection to the general
allegation of the statute of limitations filed earlier in Ms. Nazar's answer.
Judge Crockett's dissent in Wasatch Mines should be noted. He would have allowed
the statue of limitations defense, citing Rule I that pleadings "shall be liberally construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." He continued that
under Rule 8(f) "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." He further
noted that Rule 54(c)( 1) provided that"[ e ]very final judgment shall grant the relief to which
the-party ... is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings ..."
[Ellipse in the original.] Id. at 1012. He recognized that Rule 9(h) was not the only rule in
the Rules of Civil Procedure. Judge Crockett then hit the nail on the head when ·he stated
"[w ]hat the plaintiff was entitled to was to be informed in clear and understandable language
the issue raised and the defense relied upon. This it had in the answer which set forth
expressly as an affirmative defense that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations."
[Citations and internal quotes omitted.] Id.

28
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

ARGUMENT - ISSUE NO. TWO - WHERE THE CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE

I.

Federated did not argue to the trial court that the choice of law provision
required that its cause of action arise in Utah. It, thereby, waived the argument
and failed to preserve the argument which is now made for the first time on
appeal.
Federated lost its appeal in Libby based on an opposition memorandum and oral

argument virtually identical to the opposition memorandum and oral argument made by
Federated in the present case. See Nazar opposition memorandum (R. at 175-185.),
Addendum Exhibit "A"; transcript of Nazar oral argument (R. at 583-613), Addendum
Exhibit "B", and Libby opposition memorandum, Addendum Exhibit "F". Federated never

intended to raise any additional argument in defense of Ms. Nazar's motion for summary
judgment other than the arguments raised in Libby and Chapa. This intent is evidenced by
Federated's "Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Stay Enforcement of
Judgment and Approval of Amount for Supersedeas Bond" ("Stay Mem.") filed herein See
Addendum Exhibit "G". As pointed out above in the argument regarding the first issue, the
Stay Mem. asked the trial court to limit a supersedeas bond to a low amount. It argued to the
court that a low amount was justified because issues, legal research and argument would be
"virtually identical" to the issues presented in Libby and Chapa. It is clear from this statement
to the trial court and from the fact that Federated's Opposition Memorandum to Ms. Nazar's
summary judgment is "virtually identical" to the Libby and Chapa Opposition
Memorandums, that it never intended to raise additional arguments in this appeal that it did
~

not make in Libby and Chapa.
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~

Federated now makes a new argument before this appellate court, hoping for a
different outcome than achieved in Libby. This argument is that the language" [a] cause of
action which arises in another jurisdiction" in Utah's borrowing statute must fall to
Federated's choice of Utah law provision in the credit card agreement. Yet, Federated never

WJ

once made this argument at the trial court level in this case or in any of the six cases that it
appealed. It simply did not preserve this argument for appeal.

~

Federated tells this Court to look to the Record at pages 172-184, 190-194 and 593595 for its preservation of this issue. The first cite is a portion ofFederated's Memorandum
in Opposition to Ms. Nazar's summary judgment ("Fed. Opp. Mem.). Attached within

Exhibit "A" to the Addendum is the entire opposition memorandum. Federated only argues
at length that the "forum selection clause" of the agreement "governs this case." (R. 175184.) This concept was clearly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in Libby at ,I 8.
Federated next argues in its opposition memorandum that the most significant relationship
test should govern. (R. at 179 .) That test was not adopted by the majority in Libby and was
expressly rejected by Justice Lee's concurring opinion. Id. at ,I 34.
Federated also failed to argue at the trial court hearing the issue that it presents for the
first time on appeal. It cites the transcript of the hearing at the Record, pages 593-595. No
where in those pages, or at any other point in its argument, does Federated mention that the
choice of law provision should control where the cause of action arose. See transcript

Exhibit "B" of the Addendum. Federated's counsel only argues the forum selection clause,
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fuJ

the issue on which it lost the Libby appeal. (R. at 585 - 597 .)
Justice Lee states that the Libby case should not foreclose consideration of the choice
of law issue "in a future case." Libby at
I.db

iJ

33. However, this is not "the future case."

Federated never once raised that issue before the trial court. It, thereby, waived and failed to
preserve the issue. It also indicated in its Stay Mem. that it believed that this case, and the

Abraham and Deutsch cases, were bound by the decision in their identical cases of Libby and
Chapa. Federated lost the consolidated Libby decision. It loses here.
As pointed out above in the argument on the first issue - waiver, the Utah Supreme
Court stated in Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ,r 15, 164 P.3d 366 set out the requirements for
preservation of an issue on appeal: (1) raised in a timely fashion; (2) specifically raised; (3)
and introduction of evidence and legal authority. The Court stated:
"In short, a party may not claim to have preserved an issue for appeal by
merely mentioning an issue without introducing supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority. Ultimately, the preservation requirement is based on
the premise that, in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be
given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it."
[Internal quotes and citations omitted.] Id. 7
Federated did not raise the issue presented to this Court today. It failed to introduce
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority. It failed to even mention the issue in any
fashion. It failed the test of preservation, committed a waiver and is judicially estopped from
raising the issue today.

~

See also, Mztchell v. ReconTrust Co. NA, 2016 UT App 88, ,r,r 36 & 37,373 P.3d 189; and
Allen v. Allen, 2014 UT App 27, ,r 19,319 P.3d 770.
7
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II.

The trial court did not commit plain error and Federated's counsel invited error
by the trial court if counsel really believed that Federated had the defense for
which it now argues.

As pointed out above in the argument regarding the first issue- waiver, Federated may
try to argue another issue in its reply brief; that the trial court committed plain error by not
advocating on behalf of Federated and coming up with the argument that it now makes in this
appeal. Such an argument should be summarily rejected because it was not raised in its initial
brief. Further, the argument will fail on its merits. In Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ,r 16, the
Utah Supreme Court stated:
"In cases where a party raises an issue on appeal, but the party did not properly
preserve the issue below, we review it under the manifest injustice or plain
error standard. Under plain error review, we may reverse the lower court on an
issue not properly preserved for appeal when a party can show the following:
(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and
(iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood
of a more favorable outcome for the party, or phrased differently, our
confidence in the verdict is undermined. Nevertheless, under the invited error
doctrine, we have declined to engage in even plain error review when counsel,
either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the trial court that he or
she had no objection to the proceedings."
Federated's argument fails the first test of plain error. No error was made. As
discussed at length below, this court should not upset more than I 00 years ofprecedent based
on Justice Lee's concurring opinion that provides no guidance whatsoever in support of a
new test for "where the cause of action arises." Second, any error was not obvious to the trial
court. It ruled consistent with over 100 years of precedent. Indeed, Federated' s own counsel
failed to recognize or make the argument. Federated simply failed to advise the trial court of
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the argument that it makes today and give it an opportunity to rule. Finally, the trial court had
no duty to advocate on behalf of Federated and make such a fresh argument on its behalf.
By failing to raise the issue with the trial court, Federated's counsel would have
id>

affirmatively represented to the court that he had no objection to the proceeding based on the
argument that Federated now makes on appeal. He would have invited error by the trial court
and would seek to take advantage of that perceived invited error. As the Utah Supreme Court
stated in Pratt,
"Our invited error doctrine arises from the principle that a party cannot take
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error. By precluding appellate review, the doctrine furthers this
principle by discouraging parties from intentionally misleading the trial court
so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal. Further, parties are
not entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the benefit of
objecting on aweal. Thus, encouraging counsel to actively participate in all
proceedings and to raise any possible error at the time of its occurrence
fortifies our long-established policy that the trial court should have the first
opportunity to address a claim of error." Id. at ,r 17. [Emphasis added.]

III.

The Court should rule consistent with over 100 years of Utah Supreme Court
precedent because there is no compelling reason to overturn that precedent.
Utah has over I 00 years of precedent that holds that a cause of action for breach of

contract arises where the parties determined that the contract was to be performed. That
precedent should not be disturbed, especially in light of Justice Lee's concurring opinion in
t..i)

Libby. As set forth below, Justice Lee could not come up with any compelling reason to
overturn that precedent and no such reason exists in the present case or is argued by
Federated.
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Statutes oflimitations are procedural laws. Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864,870 (Ut.
Ct. App. I 994), citing Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1993). Matters of procedure
are governed by the law of the forum, i.e. the law of the state in which the lawsuit is brought.

Trillium USA, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm ofBroward County, Florida, 2001 UT 101,

,r 14,

37 P.3d 1093, citing Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681,684 n. 3 (Utah 1981). As a general rule,
Utah's statutes of limitations apply to actions brought in Utah. Financial Bancorp, Inc. v.

Pingree and Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 17 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994); the Utah statutes oflimitations
govern suit on a note or loan in an action brought in Utah.
Federated brought this suit in Utah. Thus, the statutes oflimitations of Utah apply to
this lawsuit. These statutes include the Utah borrowing statute. Libby at ,r 9; and Financial

Bancorp, Inc. at

,r 17. This statute, Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-103, which is attached within

Exhibit "H" of the Addendum, provides:
"A cause of action which aries in another jurisdiction, and which is not
actionable in the other jurisdiction by reason of the lapse of time, may not be
pursued in this state, unless the cause of action is held by a citizen of this state
who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued." 8

~

A cause of action for breach of contract arises in the state in which the parties
determine that performance was to be performed. Brown v. Bach, 17 Utah 435, 53 P. 991
(1898), overruled on other grounds, Sanipoli v. Pleasant Valley Coal, Co., 31 Utah 114

8

The exception in the last phrase of the statute does not apply to Federated. The cause of action
in the present lawsuit is not held by a citizen of Utah. Federated is a Michigan corporation with
its primary place of business in that state. Even if Federated were a citizen of Utah, it received
the account after it was in default and after the cause of action had already accrued.
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G.v

( 1906), a cause of action for non-payment of a note or breach of a contract arises where the
~

note was to be paid or the contract performed. See also, Lawson v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28, 95 P.
520 ( 1908), when the parties stipulate to performance of a contract in a certain state, the

@

cause of action for breach of that contract arises in that stipulated state, adopting the rule of

Brown; Hecla Gold-min.Co. v. Gisborn, 21 Utah 68, 59 P. 518 (1900); and Financial
Bancorp. Inc. V. Pingree and Dahle, Inc. at 17; unless the contract states otherwise, a cause
l.i)

of action for breach of contract generally arises where the parties determined that the contract
was to be performed. 9
The credit card agreement and monthly statements required that payment be made in
Pennsylvania. In fact, the agreement stated that any payment made in other states was not
~

"effective" until it was received in Federated's offices in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania has a
four year statute of limitations for beach of contract. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5525(a)(8), a copy of
which is Exhibit "I" of the Addendum. See also, Cooper v. Sirota, 37 Fed.Appx. 46 (3 rd Cir.
(Pa.) 2002); Pennsylvania statute oflimitations for breach of written contracts is four years.
Federated sued Ms Nazar well after five years had passed from the date of any breach and
from the date of her last payment.
The Utah Supreme Court stated in WolfMountain Resorts, L.C. v. ACS, 2010 UT 65,

iJ 23,245 P.3d:

Justice Lee acknowledged in his concurring opinion in Libby at iJ 37, that this is the current
state of law in Utah.

9
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"[L Jong standing precedent should not be overruled except for the most
compelling reasons. Any party asking a court to overturn prior precedent has
a substantial burden of persuasion. This burden is mandated by the doctrine of
stare decisis. A court will follow the rule of law which it has established in
earlier cases, unless clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous
or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than
harm will come by departing from precedent." [Internal quotes and citations
omitted.]
Justice Lee joined a unanimous Court in Vorher v. Henroid, 2013 UT 10, ,r 13,297
P.3d 614. In that opinion, the Court wrote:
"Under the doctrine of stare decisis, a party asking us to overturn prior
precedent has a substantial burden of persuasion. Long standing precedent
should not be overruled except for the most compelling reasons. Specifically,
we may overturn our precedent ifwe are clearly convinced that the rule was
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and
that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent." [Internal
citations and quotes omitted.] Id.

A.

The Utah Supreme Court was not "clearly convinced" that the subject
rule should be overturned and presented no compelling reason for doing
so.

In Libby, the Supreme Court was not "clearly convinced" that it should overturn the
common law rule that a cause of action in a contract case arises where the contract was to be
perform. The majority opinion did not discuss the issue and Justice Lee in his concurring
opinion was not committed to overturning this precedent that has stood for well over I 00
years. He stated:
"I see arguments going both ways on this question. Our precedent, after all,
long ago interpreted the borrowing statute as incorporating the place of
performance test. See Lawson v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28, 95 P .520, 522-23 (1908).
And it is certainly possible to view the statute as retaining that test going
forward .... But it also seems possible to interpret the statute as embracing
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whatever evolving standard our law has adopted for choosing the governing
law. If so, a claim arising under a contract with an enforceable choice-of-law
clause would arise in the state whose law governs its disposition." Id. at iJ 37.
Neither the majority in Libby, nor Justice Lee in his concurring opinion set forth a
(i:P

"compelling reason" for overturning the precedent. The majority does not mention any reason
for doing so. Neither does Justice Lee. He only states that it is "at least arguable" that the
precedent should be overturned. But, in the same breath, he states that "it is certainly possible
to view the statute as retaining that test [the 100 years of precedent] going forward." This
position hardly meets the compelling reason standard necessary for overturning long standing
precedent. Nor does it give this Court any guidance on the test to be used or facts and issues
to be considered in overturning the precedent..

B.

Federated has not met its "substantial burden of persuasion" that this
precedent should be overturned.

Federated argues three points as justification for overturning the precedent. Its
~

argument does not meet the "substantial burden of persuasion" required by the Utah Supreme
Court.

1.

The existing precedent does not inhibit the right to contract.

Federated argues that all men and women have the constitutional right to contract and
that overturning the 100 years of precedent will enhance that right by allowing them to
submit to the personal jurisdiction and law of a chosen state. Fed brief at 16. Federated
further states, without argument, that freedom to contract aids other policy considerations
~

including protecting. a party's rights of expectation, certainty, predictability and uniformity.
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Id. The precedent that a cause of action arises in the forum where the contract was breached,

i.e. payment was to be made, in no way inhibits the right of parties to contract. For over one
hundred years, Utah citizens have had that right notwithstanding the precedent presently
before the Court.
Forum selection clauses and choice oflaw clauses have been fully enforceable. Parties
have always been able to select the substantive law to be applied to a contract. Federated
simply complains that Utah Courts have chosen to apply the law of the forum to procedural
issues such as the statute of limitations. The procedural law of Utah includes the borrowing
statute. Libby at ,r 9. For over one hundred years, interpretation of the Utah borrowing statute
includes an understanding that a cause of action for breach of a contract arises in the state
where performance was to be made, which in the present case was Pennsylvania. What
Federated is really complaining about is that it or its attorney did not know Utah law or made
a mistake about Utah law when it chose to sit on its Advanta accounts for almost six years
after it purchased them before it brought suit. It now asks this Court to dig it out of its
predicament by overturning over 100 years of precedent based on a meritless argument that
the precedent inhibits its right to contract.
Advanta had every right to include in its credit card agreements a provision that
required the Utah six year statute of limitations to apply to any lawsuits. It chose not to do
so. Federated had every right to walk away from its purchase of thousands of Advanta's
credit card accounts because this provision was missing. It chose not to do so. Federated had
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~

every right to timely file suit. It chose not to do so. Federated is asking this Court to limit,
under existing Utah law, the contractual rights of the card holders such as Ms. Nazar because
it made a mistake. It received what it should have "expected" under the agreement and Utah
~

law, which was clearly"predictable" and should be "uniformly'' applied to all of the identical
agreements in Federated's several appeals. 10
2.

The existing precedent is the most "judicially economical."

Federated next argues that "[h] onoring the parties' freedom to contract, and their right
to avail themselves of the forum and law governing their dispute helps spare the courts the
complex and tedious choice of law analysis under the 'most significant relationship' test."
Fed. brief at 16. First, no Utah appellate court has adopted the most significant relationship
<@,

test for a determination of where the cause of action arose in any situation especially
interpretation of procedural law such as the Utah borrowing statute. In fact, Justice Lee
-expressly rejected the most significant relationship test in his concurring opiniqn in Libby at

,r 34 as did the full Supreme Court reject it for a test of procedural law in Trillium at ,r 14.
..

. Next, the obvious solution to protecting the courts from such a "tedious task" and
"fractured opinions" is to apply a simple, bright line test that do~s notrequire factual findings

10

Federated's argument sounds very similar to the argument that it made in Libby with respect to
the forum selection clause. In Libby, it complained to the Supreme Court that it did not receive
the benefit of its contractual bargain of the forum selection clause. Id. at ,r,r 15 & 16. The Court
stated that the district court "gave the company precisely what it bargained for [when it dismissed
its suit]." Id. The forum selection clause required the agreement to be governed by all of Utah's
laws, including the borrowing statute. Id. "In fact, on appeal Federated essentially asks this court
to give it a better deal than it bargained for." Id.
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and legal conclusions on numerous issues. The simplest and bdghtest line test that could be
created by the courts would be application of the place of performance test that has been the
law in Utah for over I 00 years. All the court needs to do is determine where the contract was
to be performed; one simple fact. The court would then apply the limitation period of the
state in which the contract was to be performed.

3.

The existing law is quite simple to apply.

G0

Federated next argues for simplicity. It acknowledges that Utah applies the law of the
forum for procedural issues and argues that the simplest rule would be for the courts to allow
it to select the law that applies to procedural issues. It states that the parties should simply
be able to select the law that should apply to procedural issues. It concludes that it selected
this law in its choice of law provision. The problem with this argument is that its choice of

~

law provision did not choose Utah procedural law that would apply to enforcement of the
credit card agreement. It chose the substantive law. Having failed to chose the.procedural
law, the Utah courts were left to apply Utah procedural. law which included the borrowing
statute and which included the interpretation of the statue that has stood for over I 00 years.

IV.

Justice Lee merely speculated that,a test other than the one supported by over
100 years of precedent might be considered. Such speculation provides no
guidance to this Court.
Justice Lee states in his concurring opinion in Libby:
"I write separately, however, to emphasize the limited nature of the court's
decision in this case. I note, in particular, that the court's decision follows from
a key concession made by Federated Capital in the course ofthis litigation that its cause of action arose in another jurisdiction (Pennsylvania). And I
40
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~

would emphasize that this concession takes a threshold question - of the
applicability of the borrowing statute in a case like this one- off the table." Id.
at ,I 32.
The issue of whether the cause of action arose in Utah was "on the table" only because
~

ofFederated's argument that some payments were made over the Internet and the monthly
statements showed that the payments were received in Utah. Libby at 120. That argument
was debunked by the trial court using the language of the credit card agreement that stated
that payments were not effective until received at Advanta's offices in Pennsylvania. Id.
Federated never argued (and never put on the table) the argument that the cause of action
arose in Utah, rather than Pennsylvania, because of the argument suggested by Justice Lee.
Justice Lee's suggested argument was that the Utah choice oflaw provision could "arguably"

~

require the cause of action to have arisen in Utah. The failure of Federated to raise this
argument is important because it further cements the fact that Federated failed to preserve
this issue in Libby and in the present case. The majority in Libby pointed out that Federated

"in its opposition to summary judgment in each case before the district court ... assumed that
its causes of action arose at the place of performance under the Agreement [Pennsylvania]."
Libby at 120. Federated's opposition memorandum filed in the trial court in Libby and the

opposition memorandum filed in the trial court in the present case are almost identical and
(ii)

do not make the argument suggested by Justice Lee or made herein.
Justice Lee continues in Libby:
"This is an important decision that a court should take up in a future case, and
that should not be deemed to be foreclosed by our decision today. . . The
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~

borrowing statute's "arises in" formulation, after all, is at least arguably a
reference to a choice-of-law principle. And the choice-of-law determination
in a case like this one is dictated not by the common law inquiry into place of
performance or most significant relationship." Id. at iJ 33 & 34.
Justice Lee refers to this new legal doctrine that he wants a future court to consider
without any direction to the future court. Indeed, he questions in his own mind if it is a viable
doctrine. Libby at iJ 3 7. Possibly, he does so because he recognizes that the Supreme Court
(\4)

ruled within the last sixteen years that a choice of law provision applies to substantive law,
not procedural law. Trillium, at iJ 14. He does not analyze the issue in his concurring opinion.
He simply cites three cases that led him to believe that a change might be considered. The
first case, Myers v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 275 Or. 501, 553 P.2d 355, 366 & 67 (1976)
adopts a most significant relationship test; a test expressly rejected by Justice Lee and
contrary to the over 100 years of precedent of our Supreme Court. See Libby at iJ 34. In fact,
the Utah Supreme Court rejected the most significant relationship test for choice of law
issues regarding procedure as recently as 2001 in Trillium. Id. at iJ 14. The other two cases
cited by Justice Lee, Bates v. Cook, Inc., 509 So. 2d 1112, 1113 & 14 (Fl. 1987) and

Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Eh/co Liq. Trust, 723 N.E. 2d 687, 693 & 94 (Ill. 1999) also
adopt the most significant relationship test which was rejected in Utah.
The Utah Supreme Court has maintained a bright line dichotomy between substantive
~

law and procedural law. See Trillium at iJ 14. A contractual choice oflaw provision applies
to substantive law. Id. It does not apply to procedural law including the statute oflimitations.

Id. If a choice oflaw analysis such as the most significant relationship test is viable in Utah,
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which is doubtful, it applies only to the choice of substantive law. Id. at ilil 14 & 15 and Libby
at il 34.
The forum selection clause raises the issue that is presently before the Court and was
~

before the Supreme Court in Libby. It "binds" the parties to the procedural laws of Utah.
Libby at il 13. All matters of procedure are governed by the law of the forum, in this case

Utah. Id. The borrowing statute is one of these laws. Id. The law that a contract cause of
action arises in the state where performance was to be made is also one of these Utah laws,
albeit a common law. Lawson, at 522-23. {Also, recognized by Justice Lee as the law of
Utah. See Libby at il 37.)

V.

Federated's analysis of the issue of where the cause of action arises is not
supported by Utah case law, including the cases cited by it.
A.

Federated misstates the holding in Financial Bank Corp., Inc. v. Pingree
and Dahle, Inc.

This Court ruled on the issue before it today in Financial Bank Corp., Inc. v. Pingree
and Dahle, at *17. The Court stated that "[u ]nless the contract states otherwise, a cause of

action for a breach of contract generally arises where the contract is to be performed." To
overcome this language, Federated argues that "unless the contract says otherwise" should
be interpreted to mean "unless the contract has a choice oflaw provision choosing Utah law."
<@

Fed. Br. at 14. This Court was not talking about a choice oflaw provision when it wrote the
above statement in Pingree. It is clear from the language used by the Court, the cases cited
by the Court and the issue before the Court that the Court meant what it said; unless the

43
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

contract chooses a jurisdiction other than where it is to be performed as the place where the
cause of action arises, the cause of action will arise where it is to be performed. Pingree does
not support Federated's position that a choice oflaw provision determines where the cause
of action arose. The Court was clear that "matters of procedure [are to] be governed by the

€iJ

law of the forum." Id. at *16. Statutes of limitations are procedural. Id. The Utah borrowing
statute is a stature of limitations. Id. The test for "arises in" under Utah law is where the

~

contract was to be performed. Id. at 17.
The basis for the Court's holding in Pingree is found in decades of Utah case law
which is summarized in the Supreme Court's decision in Trillium. A choice oflaw provision
does not apply to procedural issues. Trillium at ,r,r 14 & 15. It applies to substantive law
issues. Procedural issues are determined by the procedural law of Utah when suit is brought
in Utah. Id.
Federated next argues that the contact in Pingree had a choice of law provision
applying California law. Thus, the Court found that the claim arose in California and this
Court should follow this reasoning and find that since the present contract had a Utah ·choice
~

law provision, the-cause of action arose in Utah. Fed. Br. at 14. This argument completely
misstates the holding in Pingree. The Pingree court was faced with a contract that did not
state where performance was to be made. It, therefore, held that "[b]ecause the contract is
silent regarding the place of payment, we presume payment was to be made where the payee
resides or at its place of business." Id. at* 17. Since the payee resided in California, the Court
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continued "hence, we conclude that the cause of action .arose in California ... " Id. In the
present case, the contract expressly provided for performance in Pennsylvania. Thus, the
cause of action arose in Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania limitation period applied. See
~

Pingree, at * 17, "a cause of action for breach of contract generally arises where the contract
is to be performed."

B.

Federated's position is not supported by the other cases that it cites.

It is unclear why Federated cites Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 2001
UT 71,iJ 26, 10 P.3d 338. After the cite, Federated quotes the court for the proposition that
"[i]t is an elementary principle of the law of contracts that the place where the last act is done
which is necessary to give validity to a contract is the place where the contract is made." Fed.
~

Br. at 9. Although Ms. Nazar does not understand why Federated would cite this case without
any argument about its application to the present case, he agrees that this is an elementary
principal of contract law when the Court is dealing with the formation of a contract, as was
the case in Surety Underwriters. Id. at iJil 25 & 26. In Surety, the Supreme Court had to
decide if a company was conducting an insurance/surety business without being qualified to

~

do so in Utah. If so, then the insurance contract would have been void as being illegal. The
Court found, that as a matter of formation of contract law, the contract was signed by the

(cl)

parties in Utah. Thus, the company was required to be licensed by the state of Utah; the
company was operating without a Utah license; and the contract was void as being illegal.

Id. The case at bar is about enforcement of a contract, a procedural law issue with plenty of
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Utah case law directly addressing that issue. It is not about creation of a contract.
Gw

Federated cites three non-Utah cases for the proposition that when interpreting the
Utah borrowing statute "a suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action." Fed. Br.
at 12. If the cases truly apply to a procedural statute such as the borrowing statute, they are
in direct conflict with the Utah law discussed above. However, the cases do not apply to a
procedural statute. They do not support Federated' s argument.
Federated quotes language from Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) v. Branam, 126 So.
3d, 297, 303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2013) "because the dispute arises under the contract and the
contract contains a choice of law provision, the time limitations of the forum chosen by the
parties apply." Great Lakes involved an insurance claim on a boat that was destroyed by
hijackers. Claims were made on the policy, all outside of 90 days. A Florida statute barred
the claims because they were outside its required 90 day period. New York did not have such
a limitation for claims on the insurance policy. The court determined that the dispute arose
under the policy. Id. at 303. The court also found that the contract had a New York choice
of law provision and concluded that a New York statute applied that did not have a 90 day
limitation to file claims with the insurance company. Thus, the cla~s were timely. The time
period to which Federated is referring is not a statute oflimitations period, although it leads
the Court to believe it is such. It is a pre-suit period during which notices must be sent to
meet the requirements of an insurance policy. This is a classic substantive law issue to which
a choice of law provision would apply. Great Lakes has nothing to do with the issue
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presented to this court which involves enforcement of a contract, the consequent application
of the forum state's (Utah) procedural law to that enforcement, and over 100 years of
precedent interpreting one of those procedural laws, the Utah borrowing statute.
The second case cited by Federated is American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler

Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916). In this case, both the plaintiff and the defendant manufactured
pumps. The plaintiff complained that the defendant defamed the quality of its pump by
stating that the plaintiffs pump infringed on the defendant's patents. The defendant sued in
federal court alleging that the case involved a federal question, patent law. The U.S. Supreme
Court disagreed holding that the case was a standard, run-of-the-mill business defamation
case. Id. at 259 & 60. In doing so, the Court held that since federal patent law did not apply,
G@

the validity of the defamation cause of action depended on whether the law of the state where
the cause of action arose would allow such a defamation suit. Id. Such language refers to the
elements of defamation, a tort, which is state substantive law and differs from state to state.
This case has nothing to do with the issue presented to this court in the present case which
involves enforcement of a contract, the consequent application of the forum state's (Utah)
procedural law to that enforcement, and over 100 years ofprecedent interpreting one of those
procedural laws, the Utah borrowing statute.

@

The third case cited by Federated is Meeker R &D, Inc. v. Evenflow Co., Inc., 52 N.E.
3d 1207 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016). That case was a breach of contract case that had evidentiary
issues involving a patent. Id. at

,r,r 1 & 2. In discussing whether the case arose under federal
47
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patent law or state law, the court cited American Well Works at

,r

14, "[f]or statutory

purposes, a case can arise under federal law in two ways. Most directly, a cause arises under
federal law when federal law creates the cause of action asserted. (A suit arises under the law
that creates the cause of action.)" [Internal cites and quotes omitted.] The court was
addressing whether a contract action had enough connection to patent law to be brought in
federal court under federal question jurisdiction. The case has nothing to do with the issue
presented to this court in the present case which involves enforcement of a contract, the
consequent application of the forum state's (Utah) procedural law to that enforcement, and
over 100 years of precedent interpreting one of those procedural laws, the Utah borrowing
statute.

INTENT OF FEDERATED

I.

~

Federated never intended on raising the argument that Ms. Nazar waived her
statute of limitations defense in this appeal, so represented to the trial court,
waived its argument made in this appeal and is estopped from asserting the
same.
Federated never intended to raise any additional argument in defense of Ms. Nazar's

motion for summary judgment other than the arguments raised in Libby and Chapa. This
intent is evidenced by Federated's "Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Stay
Enforcement of Judgment and Approval of Amount for Supersedeas Bond" ("Stay Mem.")
filed in the trial court. See Addendum Exhibit "G". In the Stay Mem., Federated asked the
trial court to limit a supersedeas bond to a low amount. It argued to the court that a low
amount was justified because:
48
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G2>

~

"Additionally, there are two additional cases which are being appealed, which
will most likely be consolidated with this case [Deutsch], the Chapa case and
the Libby case because the issues are nearly identical. Those cases are
Federated Capital Corporation v. Abraham, Civil No. 119901843; and
Federated Capital Corporation v. Deutsch, Ciyil No. 139918085. [Both cases
are also presently on appeal to this court; Appeal No. 20140570-CA and
Appeal No. 20140568-CA, respective! y.] The legal research and argument will
be virtually identical in each of these cases at the appellate level." [Emphasis
added.]
It is clear from this statement to the trial court and from the fact that Federated' s
Opposition Memorandum to Ms. Nazar's summary judgment is "virtually identical" to the

Libby and Chapa Opposition Memorandums, that it never intended to raise additional
arguments in this appeal that it did not make in Libby and Chapa.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
The district court awarded attorney's fees, litigation expenses and court costs to Ms.
Nazar based upon the provisions of the subject credit card agreement and the: Utah
Reciprocal Attorney Fee statute, Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-826. She requests that the Court
remand the case to the district court for an award of her attorney's fees, litigation expenses
and court costs incurred on appeal
CONCLUSION
The Court should deny the appeal of Federated and remand to the district court for a
0P

determination an~ award of the attorney's fees, litigation expenses and court costs incurred
in this appeal.
CERTIFICATION
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The undersigned certifies that there are 13,323 words in the required portions of the
brief, within the 14,000 word limitation of Rule 24(f)(l)( C).
Dated this 6th day of March, 2017.
Hoole & King

Gw

Lester A. Perry
Attorneys- for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the~ day of March, 2017, two true and correct copies of the
foregoing brief was mailed to the following postage prepaid first class mail to the following:
Bernard Madsen (No. 4626)
Fillmore Spencer, LLC
3301 N. University Ave.
Provo, Utah 84604

~
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ADDENDUM

(@

Exhibit "A"

Federated's memorandum in opposition to summary judgment

Exhibit "B"

Transcript of Nazar oral argument

Exhibit "C"

Judgment

Exhibit "D" Advanta Business Card Agreement
Exhibit "E" Monthly credit card statement
Exhibit "F"

Federated opposition memorandum to summary judgment in Libby

Exhibit "G" Federated's Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Stay
Enforcement of Judgment and Approval of Amount for Supersedeas Bond
Exhibit "H" Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-103
Exhibit "I"

42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5525(a)(8)
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HrLL
FEDERATED CAPITAL CORPORATION

CHRISTOPHER C.

@)

Utah Bar Number 9583
10 Exchange Pl., Ste. 527
·salt Lake City, UT 84111
Ph: (248) 737-1300
Fx: (248) 406-8053
chill@fedcap.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DIST_RICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY: ST ATE OF UTAH

FEDERATED CAPITAL
CORPORATION d/b/a FEDERATED
FINANCIAL CORPORATION OF
AMERICA,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

vs.
REBEC.CA NAZAR
d/b/a BECCAS LITTLE GIFT SHOP,
Defendant(s).

Case No.: 129909968

Judge: D.C.
~

Plaintiff Federated Capital Corporation d/b/a Federated Financial Corporation of America

("Plaintiff'), by and through its counsel of record, hereJ)y files its Memorandum in Opposition to

~

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment - Statute of Limitations - and for an Award of
Attorney's Fees ("Motion for Summary Judgment").

An Affidavit of Patrick David

("Affidavit") in support of this memorruJ.dum is file~ concurrently herewith and is incorporated

1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00168

~

by reference herein.

Defendant Rebecca Nazar d/b/a Beccas Little Gift Shop ("Defendant") has moved for
summary judgment in this matter arguing that this case should be dismissed because Plaintiff's
cause of action for breach of a certain agreement between the Parties was not brought within the
period required by the appropriate statute of limitations, and that the Court should award
Defendant attorney's fees and costs. Despite the arguments made by Defendant, the Court should
deny the relief sought because of the reasons discussed in detail below.
In this case, Defendant is requesting that this Court rely on Utah Code section 78B-2-103
(the "Borrowing Statute") and Financial Bancorp, Inc. v. Pingree & Dahle, Inc., 880 P .2d 14
(Utah Ct. App. 1994), to dismiss Federated Capital's claims. The Borrowing Statute by its plain
terms is inapplicable to this case and may not serve as a basis for rewriting the contract between
the parties. Likewise, the court of appeals' decision in Pingree applies in limited circumstances
not relevant to these proceedings.

lt

is distinguishable. The law and the facts support that

Federated Capital timely commenced the proceedings in this case by filing a Complaint within
the time fixed by the applicable Utah statute,of limitations. Therefore, it would be error to enter
summary judgment against Plaintiff.

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

The plaintiff alleges that the defendant had a credit card account with Advanta.

See generally 1 2, Complaint.
Response: Admit. Defendant entered into a commercial contract ('-'Agreement") with
Advanta Bank Corp. ("Advanta") by applying for and obtaining a cre_dit card from Advanta. See

-2
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Affidavit of Patrick David ("Affidavit"), which is filed concurrently herewith; see also
Application, which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
2.

The account was governed by a written contract entitled "Advanta Business Card

Agreement" (the "Agreement" he.rein).

See

~

2, Complaint. A copy of the Agreement was

attached to the Complaint and is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
Response: The document referenced in this paragraph speaks for itself. Inasmuch as this

statement of fact d_oes not contradict that document, Plaintiff admits the same.
3.

The defendant alleges that the account was assigned to it by Advanta. See

1 3,

Complaint.
Response: The document referenced in this paragraph speaks for itself. Inasmuch as this

statement of fact does not contradict that document, Plaintiff admits the same.
4.

The monthly cr_edit card statements produced by the plaintiff in · its initial

disclosures show that the last payment was made to Advanta on July 10, 2006. The monthly
credit card statement attached to plaintiffs Complaint indicates that the account was charged
offby Advanta in February, 2007. That statement is attached hereto as Exhibit "C".
Response: The documents referenced in this paragraph. speak for themselves. Inasmuch

as this:statement of fact does not contradict those documents, Plaintiff admits the same.
5.

Based upon these documents, the assignment of the account to the plaintiff had to

occur sometime after the account went into default in July, 2006 because the account was still
owned by Advanta at that point and was not charged offby Advanta until Februa,y, 2007.
GJJ
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Respons·e: The documents referenced in this paragraph speak for themselves. Inasmuch
as this statement of fact does not contradict those documents, Plaintiff admits the same.

6.

The plaintiff is not a citizen of Utah, but is a Michigan corporation with its place

of business in Farmington Hills, Michigan. See affidavit of Jennifer F. Ferris, Executive Vice
President of the plaintiff, produced in the plaintiff's Initial Disclosures. The affidavit is attached
hereto as Exhibit "D".
Response: Plaintiff admits that it is a Michigan corporation, however Plaintiff maintains

an office in Salt Lake City, Utah, located at 10 Exchange Place, Ste. 527, Salt Lake City, Utah.

7.

The Agreement attached to the plaintiff's Compla(nt, and attached hereto as

Exhibit "A", states the fallowing at ~ 6.
"You agree to make all payments in US dollars payable through a US Financial
Institution, either by check or money order payable to us at the location and in the
manner specified on your periodic billing statement or in any other manner (such
as by electronic fund transfer or wire transfer) that we agree to and provided
procedures for. ,,

In the next to the last paragraph of~ 6, the Agreement also states:
"Account payment~ are to be mailed to the address for payments shown on your
periodic billing statement. Payment must be received by us at that address on or
before the specified timtl o_n the Payment Due Date stated on your periodic billing
statement, and must conform to any specific requirements for making payment
which appear with or in your billing statement. ,,
The next sentence of,i 6 states:
"Payments tendered to and accepted by us or our agent at a location other than
the address stated on your periodic billing statement are not effective until

received by us at the address specified. "
[Emphasis addedJ
4
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Response: The document referenced in this paragraph speaks for itself. Inasmuch as this
'1J

statement of fact does not contradict that document, Plaintiff admits the same.
8.

Advanta selected Philadelphia, Pennsylvania as the place that payments were to

be sent on each and eve1y monthly account statement. See monthly statements Exhibits "B" and

"C".
Response: The documents referenced in this paragraph speak for themselves. Inasmuch

as this statement of fact does not contradict those documents, Plaintiff admits the same.
9.

This case was filed on July JO, 2012 and service of the Summons and Complaint

were thereafter made on the defendant. Judicial notice.

Response: Admitted.
ADDITIONAL FACTS
1.

Defendant entered into a commercial contract ("Agreement") with Advanta Bank

Corp. ("Advanta") by applying for and obtaining a credit card from Advanta. See Affidavit of
Patrick David (''Affidavit"), which is filed concurrently herewith; see also Application, which is

attached hereto as Exhibit l.
2.

On

or

about January 11, 2005, an application for a credit card account was

requested by Defendant ("Application"). See Exhibit l.

3.

On or about January 11, 2005, the Application was received. See Exhibit 1.

4.

The Application was approved on January 13, 2005, and a card was issued under

the business name of Beccas Little Gift Shop, with the signing individual's name being that of

5
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Defendant, and assigned the following

identification number:

5584-1897-0235-8817

("Account"). See Exhibit 1. See also Affidavit.
5.

Upon applying for and using the Account, Defendant agreed that she would be

governed by the tenns and conditions found in the Business Card Agreement. Copies of the
relevant Business Card Agreements, dated 2005 (year of Application) and 2007 (year debt was
charged off) are attached hereto as Exhibit 2. See also Exhibit 1 and Affidavit.
6.

Plaintiff is an assignee of Advanta and is duly authorized and has all rights in and

to Defendant's obligation to pay sums due on the Account and has all of the rights, powers and
authority to enforce the terms and conditions that govern· or have governed the Account. See
Affidavit; see also Bill of Sale, which is attached hereto as Exhibit 3; see also Redacted Pool of
Assets, which is attached hereto as Exhibit 4; see also Charge-Off Statement, which is attached
hereto as Exhibit 5; see also-Exhibit 2 at 123 ("We may sell or assign any or all of our rights
and obligations in the Account, and/or this agreement without notice."
7.

Defenda~t took advantage of the Account by making purchases. See Statements,

which are attached hereto as Exhibit 6.
8.

Defendant's last payment on the Account was on July 10, 2006, in the amount of

$80.00. See July 24, 2006, Statement which is attached hereto as Exhibit 7. ·

9.

Defendant is in default of her obligation to repay the amounts due on the Account

because she has not made payments as required by the Agreement. See Affidavit; see also
Exhibit 4; see also Exhibit 5.

6
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10.

Defendant owes the principal sum of$2,860.15, plus interest calculated at 29.34%

from February 28, 2007. See Exhibit 5.
11.

The Agreement states that any party that files a lawsuit pertaining to the

Agreement must sue only in Utah applying Utah law:

31. CONTROLLING LAW AND JURISDICTION. This Agreement shall
be governed solely by and interpreted entirely in accordance with the laws
of the State· of Utah, ... regardless of where you reside or where the
Business is located. We process the Account application, make the
decision to open the Account and advance credit for you from our Utah
offices .... YOU CONSENT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS IN UTAH AND AGREE THAT
ANY LAWSUIT PERTAINING TO THE ACCOUNT MUST BE
BROUGHT ONLY IN SUCH COURTS IN UTAH, REGARDLESS OF
WHO FILES THE SUIT, AND MAY BE MAINTAINED ONLY IN
THOSE COURTS UNLESS AND UNTIL ANY PARTY ELECTS
ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO THE ARBITRATION PROVISION IN

~

~

THIS AGREEMENT.

See Ex4ibit 2 at § 31.
12.

An additional tenn of the Agreement, on which Defendant's Motion relies,

discuss tenns of payment:

6. PAYMENT: We may· process your payment check by electronically
debiting your account at your bank for your check amount and
transmitting check information (such as check amount, routing number
and check number), or a digital image of the check, or some other
substitute instrument, rather than the actual check, to your bank, and your
bank's record of that payment may appear as an automatic debit, substitute
check or other electronic transaction rather than a negotiated paper check) .
.... If you pay in installments, you must P,ay at least the minimum
payments shown on your periodic billing statement ..... Account payments
are to be mailed to the address for payment shown on your periodic billing
statement. Payment must be received by us at that address on or before the
specified time on the Payment Due Date stated on your periodic billing
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statement, and must conform to any specific requirements for making
payment which appear with or in your billing statement. ....

(jj

Id at§ 6.
ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is only appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Based on the following, Defendant has failed to show that she is
entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.
A.

The Forum-Selection Clause of the Agreement Governs in This Case.
Because the Agreement between the parties requires Federated Capital to b~ing suit in

Utah, Federated Capital is prevented from bringing suit against Defendant in Pennsylvania.
Federated Capital is not prevented from bringing suit in Pennsylvania because of the statute of
limitations of that state. Indeed, the Pennsylvania statute of limitations is irrelevant. As set forth
below, the forum-selection clause in the Agreement applies here; Utah's Borrowing Statute does
not.

1.

Forum-Selection Clauses Are Valid and Enforceable.

A district court is "not at liberty to ignore the contractual agreement between the parties."
Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Sporl, 2000 UT App 195, *1, 2000 WL 33244138. In this case,

an Agreement existed between Federated Capital. and Defendant. The Agreement contained a
forum-selection clause specifying that Utah procedural law governs this case. Under Utah law, a

8
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forum-selection clause is valid and enforceable. It "will be given effect unless it is unfair or
unreasonable." Coombs v. Juice Works Dev. Inc., 2003 UT App 388, 19, 81 P.3d 769; id. n10~
12 (a forum selection clause is valid even if it is non-negotiable). The Coombs case is instructive.
In Coombs, the plaintiffs entered into an agreement with an Arkansas corporation to open

~

a Juice Works franchise in Utah. When the franchise failed, the plaintiffs filed suit in Utah
against the franchisor and an affiliated corporation. Id.

112-4. The defendants made a motion to

dismiss because the fornm-selection clause in the agreement required the plaintiffs to bring suit
in Arkansas. Id. The plaintiffs opposed the ~otion on the grounds that they were located in Utah,
they opened the franchise 1n Utah, they had never been to Arkansas, the contract was not
negotiated in Arkansas, and the franchisor had been purchased by a corporation with offices in
Utah. Id. The district court and the court of. appeals were not persuaded. The court of appeals
ruled that a party who seeks to escape the forum-selection clause of a contract must first show
that the clause is unf~ and unreasonable. Id.

,r1 9-10.

Because the plaintiffs were unable to

make that showing in Coombs, the forum-selection clause was valid and enforceable. Id. 117.
A forum-selection clause binds the· parties to -the procedural law of the forum. This is true
because "matters of procedure in a contract action are . . . governed by the law of the forum."

Trillium USA, 2001 UT IO 1,

Co., 2002 {!T 69,

,r 14 (ellipses in original); see

1 20, 54 P.3d

Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar

1054 (Utah will apply its own procedural rules, even when it

applies the substantive law of another jurisdiction). Statutes of limitations are procedural mles.

Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1993). "Therefore, as a general rule, Utah's statutes of
limitations apply to actions brought in Utah." Pingree, 880 P.2d at 16. This court should look to
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the Agreement and the forum-selection clause to apply the Utah statute of limitations here.
2.

Utah's Borrowing Statute Should Not Be Construed to Rewrite
the Forum-Selection Clause of the Agreement.

While a forum-selection clause binds the parties to the procedural law of the forum,
Utah's Borrowing Statute operates to bar an action in Utah if two conditions are satisfied: the
action is barred if it arose "in another jurisdiction" and "is not actionable in the other jurisdiction
by reason of the lapse of time." 1 Utah Code § 78B-2-103. By its plain terms, the statute is
directed at the situation where a party seeks to present a claim in Utah because the party is
specifically prevented by an expired statute of limitations from presenting the claim in the
jurisdiction where it arose. Van de Grift v. State, 2013 UT 11, 1 9, 299 P.3d 1043 (court will
consider the plain language of a statute). In such a case, Utah's Borrowing Statute prevents
plaintiffs from taking advantage of Utah's limitations provisions. Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d _
343, 351 (Utah 1980). Put simply, borrowing statutes are designed "to prevent shopping for the
most favorabte forum." Hiiffington v. T.C. Grp., LLC, CIV.A,. No. Nl 1C-01-030JR, 2012 WL
1415930, at *7 (Del. Super. Apr.-18, 2012).
In this case, the Borrowing Statute does not apply. Indeed, the reason Federated Capital
did not bring suit in Pennsylvania is simple: Federated Capital-like Defendant-is bound by the
forum-selection clause in the Agreement. The clause required the parties to bring suit in Utah
and supports application of ·utah procedural law to the cause of action. Whether the

1 In full. Utah• s Borrowing Statute provides as follows: "A cause of action which arises in another jurisdiction. and which is not actionable
in the other jurisdiction by reason of the lapse of time. may not be pursued in this state. unless the cause of action is held by a citizen of this state
who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued." Utah Code§ 788·2·103.
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Pennsylvania statute of limitations would have barred the action is irrelevant.
Moreover, this case is governed not by the Bo1Towing Statute but by the more specific
statute of limitations dealing with an action based on a written contract. See e.g., Simpson v. US.,
435 U.S. 6, 15 (1978) (precedence should be given to a specific statute over a general statute),

superseded on other grounds· by statute. Utah statutory law states that an action "may be brought
within six years . . . upon any contract . . . founded upon an instrument in writing, except those
mentioned in Section 78B-2-311." Utah Code § 78B-2-309(2). The exception contained in
Section 78B-2-311 is not applicable here. Thus, based on the law of the forum, the Utah statute
of limitations for Federated Capital's action against Defendant is. six years.
3.

If the Court Applies the Borrowing Statute Here, It Will Allow
Defendant to Forum Shop.

Utah courts have not applied the Borrowing Statute to rewrite a forum-selection provision
in a contract between parties as is being sought here by Defendant. Indeed, to apply the provision

as Defendant is requesting would encourage the very forum shopping that borrowing statutes
seek to discourage and it would deprive Federated Capital of "the benefit of [its] bargain which
includes the forum-selection clause." Coombs, 2003 UT App 388,

1 15

(internal quotations

omitted).
In this case, Defendant defaulted on the Account in an amount in excess of $2,000.00,
and· now seeks to avoid her obligations under the Agreement by asserting that Federated Capital
engaged in a game of "pick and choose" for the statute of limitations. But both parties were
bound by the forum-selection clause. Just as that clause has prevented Federated Capital from
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forum shopping, it likewise prevents Defendant from forum shopping. If the tables had been
Qj

turned and Utah had recognized a shorter limitations period for a contract claim and
Pennsylvania had recognized a longer period, Federated Capital would not be at liberty to ignore
the forum-selection clause and bring suit in Pennsylvania. See O'Hara v. First Liberty Ins.

Corp., 984 A.2d 938, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (forum-selection clauses are valid and

enforceable in Pennsylvania). A Pennsylvania court likely would decide that an action could not
be brought in that state because the. court could not exercise jurisdiction over it by nature of the

forum-selection clause. Defendant should not be allowed to escape the forum-selection clause
here.
Moreover, the parties, the Account, and the Agreement have a significant relationship to

Utah. First, Utah public records show that Federated Capital's predecessor, Advanta, was
incorporated

in

Utah.

See

https://secure.utah.gov/bes/action/details?entity=l039490-0142

(Attached as Exhibit 8). Second, Advanta had offices in Utah. Third, Federated Capital is duly
licensed to do business in Utah and has offices in Salt Lake City. ·Fourth, at the time of the
~

Agreement, the parties acknowledged that Advanta processed the Account application in Utah.
(Exhibit 2). Fifth, Advanta made decisions about the Account -in Utah. (Id.). Sixth, Advanta
advanced credit to Defendant from the Utah offices. (Id.). Seventh, Defendant transferredpayments electronically to Advanta's offices in Utah pursuant to Advanta procedures. (Exhibit
6). Eighth, the Agreement specifies that the parties' c~ntractual rights shall be enforced in Utah.

(Id.). Ninth, the parties agreed that Utah substantive law applied to govern the Agreement and

they agreed to Utah as the forum. (Exhibit 2). Because Utah courts give effect to forum-selection
12
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clauses in agreements, the Borrowing Statute should not be construed to displace the parties'
contractual rights. See Burns v. Astr•ue, 2012 UT 71,

1 11, 289

P.3d 551 (court avoids absurd

results when interpreting Utah statutes).

B.

Because the Agreement Contains a Forum-Selection Clause, Pingree Is Not
Applicable and Does Not Alter the Pa-rties' Agreement to Apply Utah's Six-Year
Statute of Limitations.

Financial Bancorp, Inc. v. Pingree & Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) is
distinguishable from this case. In Pingree the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a funding
contract, which contained a choice-of-law provision but did not contain a forum-selection clause.
The choice-of-law provision stated the parties would be bound by California substantive law.

880 P.2d at 16.
Within months, defendant Pingree breached the contract by failing to make payment. Id
Almost six years later, plaintiff Financial filed suit in Utah for breach of contract. Id The

applicable statute of limitations in Utah was six years, and the applicable statute of limitations in
California was four years. Id Pingree made a motion and the district court dismissed the suit as
time-barred under California law. Financial appealed. The question on appeal was whether
Utah's longer or California's shorter stau1te of limitations applied to Financial's claim. Id.
The court of appeals began the analysis by noting the general rule in contract law that

"matters of procedure [are] governed by the law of the forum," and "limitation periods are
generally procedural in nature." Id The court recognized an exception to the rule with the
Borrowing Statute, which bars a cause of action that "has arisen in another state" but has been

13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00180

····-···-·-·-··"--------------------------------

brought in Utah to take advantage of Utah's longer statute oflimitations. Id. at 17. 2 The court
stated that "[u]nless the contract states otherwise, a cause of action for a breach of contract
generally arises where the contract is to be performed." Id (emphasis added). In Pingree, the
only perfo1mance remaining under the contract was payment. Id. Moreover, the contract was
silent both with respect to place of payment and with respect to forum selection. Thus, in
assessing which forum law applied, the court presumed payment would be made in Financial's
place of business, which was California. Id. The court then concluded that perfonnance and
cause of action arose in California, and the California statute of limitations applied. Id. 3
Notably, if the contract in Pingree had contained a forum-selection clause; the court of
appeals'· performance/cause-of-action analysis would have been unnecessary. As discussed
above, by its plain language, the Borrowing Statute does not apply if the parties agree to a
particular forum and the procedural law. The court of appeals recognized as much in Pingree
when it held that a cause of action for breach of contract arises where perfonnance is to take
place "[u]nless the contract states otherwise." Id at 17 (emphasis added).
In this case, the Agreement states otherwise. Unlike Pingree, the parties' Agreement in
this case contained a forum-selection clause under which the parties consented to personal
2

The language of the Borrowing Statute has changed slightly since Pingree was decided, but
it is substantively ~he same. See Utah Code § 78-12-45 (1992) ("When a cause of action has
arisen in another state or territory,.or in a foreign country, and by the laws thereof an action
thereon cannot there be maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action
thereon shall not be maintained against him in this state, except in favor of one who has been a
citizen of this state and who has held the cause of action from the time it accmed.").
3

The court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether a Califomia tolling
provision applied to toll the statute of limitations for Financial. Pingree, 880 P.2d at 17-18.
14
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jurisdiction in Utah courts, and they agreed that any suit pe11aining to the Account would be
brought and maintained in Utah courts. (Exhibit 2). That distinction is critical. Pingree involved
the precise type of forum-shopping that the Borrowing Statute was designed to prevent.
Federated Capital has not engaged in forum shopping here. It has abided by the terms of the
Agreement. Moreover, Defendant has not challenged the enforceability of the forum-selection
clause. There is no question that Utah's procedural rules govern Federated Capital's claim.

C.

The Utah Borrowing Statute Is Inapplicable Because Advanta Was a Utah Citizen
and Federated Capital Stands in Advanta's Shoes as Successor in Interest.
Finally, Utah's Borrowing Statute does not apply because Federated Capital stands in the

shoes of a Utah citizen-Advanta.
. By its plain language, the Borrowing Statute is inapplicable if the cause of action at issue
"is held by a citizen of this state who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued." Utah
Code§ 78B-2-103. The Utah Supreme Court interpreted a version of the citizen exception more
than 100 years ago in Lawson v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28, 95 P. 520, 522 (1908). It held that before a
party may rely on the exception, it "must be shown" that the party "was, at the time the cause of
action arose, and ever since has been, a citizen of this state" and "he has held the cause of action
since it accrued." Id Also, the court ruled that if the plaintiff "acquired his cause of action by
assignment after the cause of action accrued, he ... does not come within·the exception.'' Id. The
court relied on a strict-construction doctrine· and recognized it could not insert language into the
statute, but otherwise did not cite to authority for its ruling. Id.
In construing a statute in effect today, the Utah courts look to the plain language of the
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statute. In addition, Utah courts do not rewrite statutory provisions. State v. Parker, 936 P.2d
1118, 1122 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (declining to adopt an interpretation that would read language
into a provision). While the plain language of section 78B-2-103 states that the citizen exception
applies if the cause of action "is held by a citizen of this state who has held the cause of action
from the time it accrued," the statute does not require the plaintiff to hold the cause of action
throughout the pendency of litigation. Utah C_ode § 78B-2-103. In fact, under Utah law, an entity
generally may assign its interests in a cause of action. See Sunridge Dev. Corp. v. RB&G Eng.,

Inc., 2010 UT 6, if 13, 230 P.3d 1000. The successor in interest will have the same rights as the
assignor and will stand in the assignor's shoes. Id
That established Utah law may be harmonized with the citizen exception: the exception
applies if the cause of action is held by a Utah citizen and the citizen held it at the time it
accrued; and the Utah citizen may assign the cause of action because nothing in the section 78B~

2-103 prevents assignment.
Cases interpreting the citizen exception agree with this interpretation. The court in

Brossman v. Fed Deposit Ins. Corp., 510 A.2d 471 (Del. 1986), ruled that a non-citizen corporation is empowered to file suit by virtue ofan assignment from a citizen, "in whose favor the
cause of action originally accrued." Id. at 473. In that instance, the citizen's rights are passed to
the non-citizen corporation and the statute of limitations from the citizen's state "must apply." Id
Inasmuch as a corporation is a citizen of the state where it is incorporated, Advanta was a
Utah citizen. (See Add. B; note 2, supra). Advanta was a Utah citizen when the cause of action
accrued and it "held the cause of action from the time it accrned." Utah Code § 78B-2-103.
16
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Advanta qualified for the citizen exception. In addition, the Agreement bound Advanta and
Defendant to Utah as the forwn. A year after the cause of action accmed, Advanta assigned its

interest in the Account to Federated Capital, which stands in the shoes of Advanta. Because the
citizen exception does not bar assignments, Federated Capital may claim the exception. Thus, the
Utah statute of limitations must apply, and this court need not decide whether the cause of action
arose outside of Utah.

D.

Because Summarv Judgment is Not Appropriate, the Court Should Not Award
Attorney's Fees or Costs.

Because the Court should deny Defendant's Motion, the Court should also not award
attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Utah's Reciprocal Attorney's Fee statute (the "Statute").
However, if the Court grants Defendant's Motion, the award of Attorneys' fees and cost is not
automatic or mandatory, but is discretionary.
The Statute provides that a court "may" award attorney fees and costs to prevailing party
in any action based upon a written contract if the contract allows at least one party to recover
attorney fees. Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 160 P .3 d I 041, 1046 (Utah 2007), rehearing denied; Giusti v.

Sterling Wentworth Corp., 20 l P .3d 966 (Utah 2009). Whether attorney fees should be awarded

under the Statute involves a policy-driven analysis subject to the distdct court's
discretion. Hooban v. Unicity Intern., Inc., 220 P.3d 485, 488 (Utah App. 2009), certiorari

granted 225 P.3d 880, affirmed 285 P.3d 766.
The Statute is applied on a case-by-case basis in order to determine which party

"prevailed" and, thus, may be entitled to an award under the Statute. Anderson & Karrenberg v.
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Jerry' Warnick, 289 P.3d 600, 604 (Utah App. 2012). This approach affords the trial court the
flexibility to handle circumstances where both, or neither, parties may be considered to have
prevailed. Id. In furthering the policies behind the Statute, it has been stressed that courts should
also base their decisions with equitable and common sense principles. A.K & R. Whipple
Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 94 P .3d 270!) 277 (Utah 2004); J. Pochynok Co., Inc. v. Smedsrud,
116 P.3d 353, 356 (Utah 2005). In fact, the cou11s should avoid using the Statute if its use would
result in a windfall to the other party. Bilanzich, 160 P.3d at 1047.
Here, Defendant admits that she failed to pay as she agreed and now seeks relief from
this Court on procedural grounds to not honor her previous agreement. If the Court were to
award reasonable fees and costs, Defendant would completely avoid any liability on a legitimate
debt that she incurred in the principal amount of $11,528.59. Furthermore, Plaintiff has asserted

the action on goods merits and in good faith according to the terms of the Agreement.
Accordingly, in the event that Defendant's Motion is- granted, she should not ,also be awarded
attorneys' fees and costs.

CONCLUSION
The parties agreed to be bound by Utah s-ubstantive law and by Utah's procedural law.
The Borrowing Statute and Pingree do not bar Federated Capital's claims. Federated Capital
respectfully asks this Court to deny Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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DATED this 25 th day of July, 2013.

Isl CHRISTOPHER C. HILL
CHRISTOPHER C. HILL
Utah Bar Number 9583

· Attorney for Plaintiff

·.._
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P R O C E E D I NG S

1

THE COURT:

2

Okay.

We're on the record in three

3

matters:

4

Properties, Incorporated, Case No. 119901843.

5

is Federated Capital vs. Neil Deutsch, dlb/a A.O. Media,

6

Incorporated, 139918085.

7

Capital vs. Rebecca Nazar, dlb/a Becca's Little Gift Shop, Case

8

No. 129909968.

MR. HILL:

Chris Hill, your Honor, on behalf of

Federated Capital.
MR. PERRY:

13
14

And the third case is Federated

Plaintiff, make their appearances.

11
12

The second case

Would counsel in each of those cases, starting with

9

10

Federated Capital vs. Arne1la Abraham, dlb/a Weststar

Lester Perry on behalf of the Defendants

in each case, your Honor.
THE COURT:

15

Okay.

We have a motion to stay the case

16

and compel arbitration to deal with.

17

cases we have Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

18

is, however, an issue that I want to discuss before we get to

19

that, and it's a concern I want to raise.

20

with you.

21

And then in each of the
There

I want to discuss it

I have, filed as Exhibit A to the memorandum in

22

opposition to the motion of Plaintiff to stay cases and·compel

23

arbitration, a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation decision

24

in the matter of Advanta Bank Corporation, Draper, Utah.

25

an order to cease and desist, order for restitution, and order

It's

3
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1

to pay.

They•re Case Nos. FDIC 082598, and FDIC 08403K.

2

it looks like this order was entered June 30th, 2009.

And

And the concern I have is that we have a number of

3
4

Federated cases where Federated received an assignment from

5

Advanta Bank and the interest rates are in the, you know, upper

6

20s, lower 30s.

7

Deutsch case 29.99 percent, Nazar 29.34 percent, and Abraham it

8

looks like the rate is 39.64 percent.
And page 5 of 17 of the decision defines the term

9

10

So for example we have in this case the

"reprice.

11

It says:

11

"Meets the upward adjustment of an

12

annual percentage rate applicable to a

13

bank card credit card account, except for

14

the upward adjustment of an APR due to:

15

"(1)

default event;

16

"(2)

operation of an index for variable

17
18

APRs;
"(3)

a reset of the variable rate

19

floor, e.g. an adjustment to the margin

20

or change of underlying index;

21
22
23

11

(4) loss or expiration of a

promotional rate;
"(5)

termination or completion of a

24

workout agreement."

25

And there is a stipulation and consent to issue an

4
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1

order to cease and desist, and an order for restitution, and an

2

order to pay.

3

defined as the upward just -- adjustment of an annual

4

percentage rate.

5

And the decision uses the term

11

reprice

paragraph 3 orders restitution for repriced accounts.

7

except as provided in some exceptions:

It says,
Gt!.J

"The bank shall pay each elible

9

eligible customer the difference between

10

the full amount of interest that accrued

11

on the customer's credit card account

12

effect -- from the effective date of

13

repricing

14

paragraph l(k) that I did -- "through the

15

immediately-succeeding two billing

16

cycles, and the amount of interest that

17

would have accrued using APRs that would

18

have apprise -- appli€d if the account

19

had not been repriced.

20

as

And then on page 9 of 17 of the decision,

6

8

11

11
--

as defined in

"If an eligible customer's account was

21

repriced as defined herein more than

22

once, the bank will pay the customer

23

restitution with respect to each

24

repricing.

25

credited -- reduced by any interest

Restitution will be

5
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1

credited to the customer's account in the

2

form of an interest waiver for the

3

restitution period.

4

I guess the concern I have is that I've got these

11

5

four cases where we have, like, 29 to 34 percent interest.

6

we end up getting a lot of Federated cases where a

7

30-percent -- interest rate in the 30s is not -- is( I would

8

say, typical.

9

on a default.

10

And

Because you see a lot of them that come through

And the concern I have is in the three cases I have

11

today, and in the many other cases that come before this Court,

12

you have this kind of interest rate.

13

is, is Federated trying to collect amounts of interest at these

14

higher rates that were part of that repricing problem?

15

And the question I have

And how do we know whether that repricing thing,

16

that there was a cease and desist order issued on, is not going

17

on in the three cases in front of me today and in the many

18

other cases filed in Utah.

19

20

MR. HILL:

Your Honor, I am aware of this order.

I

think I'm recently aware of this order.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. HILL:

Uh-huh.
I've been in contact with the Federated

23

people as well.

24

received the letter when this initially came out with a list of

25

accounts that were to be modified.

They have indicated to me that they had

6
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. HILL:

Right.
The amounts were to be modified, or to be

3

amounts credited back to the debtor, or credited against their

4

account.

5

requested -- and that was a letter from Advanta to Federated.

That was done by Federated.

Those amounts that were

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. HILL:

So that was, was done, as far as I know.

8

THE COURT:

So when was the letter written from --

9

MR. HILL:

Shortly after --

10

THE COURT:

This came out?

11

MR. HILL:

12

THE COURT:

13
14

15
16
17

Okay.

-- this consent judgment.
So was it before or after the relevant

accounts were assigned to Federated?
MR. HILL:

It was after the accounts were assigned

to Federated.
THE COURT:

Okay.

So some of the accounts that were

assigned to Federated from Advanta had the repricing problem?

18

MR. HILL:

19

THE COURT:

Yes.
And so what was the effect when you sent

20

the letter?

21

these -- Federated is not going to collect on these accounts,

22

or Federated will adjust the accounts, or what?

23

Did you just say, I'm not going to collect on

MR. HILL:

From my understanding the outcome was

24

that the accounts were adjusted according to that letter which

25

came from Advanta saying, We need -- these need -- these
7
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1

accounts need to be modified based on this order.

2

understand that that's what took place and that's what

3

happened.
THE COURT:

4

It's my

So, and, and so do you have a sense of,

5

I mean, were all of the accounts subject to adjustment, were

6

only a few of them, or --

7

MR. HILL:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. HILL:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. HILL:

A lot were.
What?
A lot were.
Okay.
And again, from my understanding, when

12

those adjustments were made that was the amount that, it's my

13

understanding, that Federated was trying to go after.
THE COURT:

14

So for example in these three cases that

15

have higher interest rates, how can a judge be sure that if a

16

judgment were entered in these cases, or that if a default

17

comes up, how can I be sure whether or not, I mean -- and I'm

18

talk

19

rate or a 5-percent interest rate maybe I could probably assume

20

that there's not been an upward adjustment.

I mean, if it came through with a 7-percent interest

21

But on the other hand, if it's a 33-percent int~rest

22

rate or a 29.99-percent interest rate, how do I, how do I know

23

whether that -- an adjustment had -- whether that was one of

24

these repriced accounts or not?

25

MR. HILL:

Well, without seeing that letter you

8
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1

wouldn't be sure, obviously --

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. HILL:

Uh-huh.
-- if that had been changed.

I believe

4

in the account agreement there is a, a provision for when there

5

is a default, interest rate automatically jumps up anyway.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. HILL:

Uh-huh.
So that in and of itself I don't think

8

would have been part of this restitution letter.

9

there was a, when there was a default, certainly interest rates

10

But when

did increase.
THE COURT:

11

Okay.

So, so with respect to these

12

accounts -- I, I guess then the question that I have is, is it

13

your understanding that your -- I mean, you're not your client,

14

I understand.

15

understanding that Federated then adjusted the accounts?

You're an independent attorney.

But is it your

16

I mean, what happened,with the accounts that were

17

subject -- that, that were identified as covered by the FDIC

18

order?

19

adjusted?

Were they just sent back to Advanta?
And ff so, how were they adjusted?
MR. HILL:

20

Were they

Yeah, it's my understanding that they

21

were adjusted based on a letter that came from Advanta saying

22

there's this consent order.

23

there was a spreadsheet of, of numerous cases.

24

accounts.

25

THE COURT:

And, and along with that letter
Or numerous

Okay.

9
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MR. HILL:

1
2

And an amount to be adjusted.

It's my

understanding that was adjusted --

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. HILL:

5

THE COURT:

For each of the accounts?
-- for each of those accounts, correct.
Okay.

Okay.

So from your perspective

6

under Rule 11 do you believe that there is any repricing

7

problem with any of the three cases today?
MR. HILL:

8
9

Not according to what I understand, your

Honor.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. HILL:

12

THE COURT:

Okay.
I don't believe there is.
And have you ever -- have you -- so did

13

the adjustment -- is it your understanding that the adjustment

14

of the accounts occurred before they were sent to you for

15_

collection, or before a lawsuit was filed?

16

MR. HILL:

17

THE COURT:

Before a lawsuit was filed, yes.
Okay.

Because it appeared that during

18

this time~- this covers the same time period.

19

the same vintage accounts.

20

MR. HILL:

21

THE COURT:

22

Okay.

These are about

Correct.
Same time period.

Well, that's helpful.

Okay.
I mean, one of the

23

concerns that you have as a judge is in a high percentage of

24

collection cases there's a default.

25

MR. HILL:

Sure.

10
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THE COURT:

1

And we count on legal counsel to be

2

accurate.

And there are provisions requiring contracts to be

3

attached and so forth in the rules, but ultimately we rely on

4

counsel to submit claims in good faith according to what's

5

supported by the contract documents, so.
Well, that's helpful to get that input on that.

6

It

7

obviously is a concern.

Because you don't want to have the

8

court system be involved in collecting amounts that the FDIC

9

said could not be collected.

10

MR. HILL:

Sure.

11

THE COURT:

So.

12

answer those questions for me.
Let's go ahead.

13

I appreciate you taking time to

I believe I need to hear the, the

14

motions in each of the three cases to stay the proceedings and

15

compel arbitration.

16

there are two concerns that I have about arbitration in. this

17

case.

18

was briefed and right before hearing on summary judgment.

19

And I guess the -- just to give you --

One is the timing.

Being filed after summary judgment

The other issue is that these accounts were all

20

apparently to be -- at least the arbitration provision provided

21

that they were to be arbitrated through an organization that

22

was shut down.

23

jurisdictions on point basically saying that if, if there's a

24

specific arbitrator appointed and that arbitrator is not

25

available, then the arbitration clause is unenfor

And there appears to be case law in other

11
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1

unenforceable.
And so those are the two principal questions that I

2
3

have, so -- for both sides.

4

need on this?

5

MR. HILL:

6

THE COURT:

7

How much time do you think you

Not very long, your Honor.
Yeah.

I, I would think no more than

five minutes.

8

MR. HILL:

9

THE COURT:
MR. HILL:

10

That's fine.
Okay.
Thank you, your Honor.

Again, I'll, I'll

11

try to be short.

I think I know where we're going on this

12

anyway.

13

with respect to the three cases, the Deutsch case --

As far as the concerns about timing go, your Honor,

14

Is that how you say it?

15

SPEAKER UNKNOWN:

16

MR. HILL:

Deutsch.

Deutsch case.

The Deutsch case was

the most recently filed was filed in November of last

17

.filed

18

year.

19

The motion for summary judgment was filed on December 6th.

20

Served November 18th, and answered shortly thereafter.

Obviously the other two cases have been filed and

21

have been in process for a.little-while.

But with the Deutsch

22

case it's a short amount of time.

23

hasn't been going forward long enough to fall within the

24

two-prong test that we find in Wolf Mountain.

25

Mountain Resorts case.

We believe that litigation

The Wolf

12
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First prong obviously being that the party seeking

1
2

arbitration's participated in litigation for a period of time.

3

And the second prong being that the opposing party has been or

4

will be prejudiced by pursuing arbitration.
As far as whether or not the Defendants will be

5

6

prejudiced, your Honor, I don't believe so.

7

arbitration agreements are to provide speedy and inexpensive

8

means to adjudicating the dispute.

9

there's already a final judgment in the Libby case, Federated

10
11

vs. Libby.

The reason for

As your Honor knows,

There's been a notice of appeal filed in that.
There is a second case, Federated vs. Chappa, which

12

is right on the heels of the Libby case.

I don't believe a

13

final amount has been entered yet in that case for a judgment.

14

Both of those are by Judge Toomey.i Again those are -- and

15

there will be a notice of appeal filed in that as well.

16

Liberty Acquisitions case, which is -- I don't think

17

is necessarily relevant to the Federated cases; however, it was

18

attached by Defendants' counsel in some of the briefings.

19

think last week your Honor extended the time for an appeal to

20

be filed on that, and I'm under the impression that an appeal

21

is going to be filed in that as well.

I

22

Depending on how these cases turn out, regardless of

23

whether it's in Federated Capital or -- Federated's favor or in

24

the Defendants' favor, these cases are going to be appealed.

25

Certainly not going to be a speedy or an inexpensive result,

13
Kelly L. Barber-Wilburn, CSR, RPR
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00564

(March 7, 2014 - FCC vs. Abraham)
1

however whatever happens, happens certainly.
With regards to the NAF being closed or not

2
3

listening to these type of arbitrations anymore?

4

agreement the very last paragraph of it talks about important

5

notes.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. HILL:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. HILL:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. HILL:

12

THE COURT:

14

MR. HILL:

15

THE COURT:

17

Which exhibit was that?
This is Exhibit 2, I believe.
Okay.
To the -- well, let's see.
Okay, what page?
Yes.

Three of three?

It would be on the

it s the very
1

last paragraph of_ the ...

13

16

In the

These are very hard to read.
I apologize for that, your Honor.
The very last paragraph.

Important

notices?
MR. HILL:

Important notes.

It talks about if any

18

portion of this arbitration provision.is deemed invalid or

19

unreasonable, which obviously this would be because the NAF is

20

no longer taking these type of arbitrations, but the rest of

21

the arbitration provision would still be valid.

22

And that's why in our, in our original motion, your

23

Honor, I suggested that this Court use its discretion and

24

assign the arbitration to the Triple-A, which is a national

25

organization.

Which I believe would accomplish the same

14
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1

purposes that were intended by the parties to begin with.

2

Based on that, your Honor, and again understanding

3

where I think we're going, we would request that the cases be

4

stayed and arbitration be ordered.

5

THE COURT:

6

Mr. Perry?

7

MR. PERRY:

Okay, thank you.

Your Honor, there are basically three

Gv

The latter part's the statute of

8

parts of my memorandum.

9

frauds issue that has not been raised as an important issue to

10

the Court.

It's briefed.

And we'll leave it to the Court to

11

decide, if that issue becomes relevant, on the brief.
One of the underlying problems here, your Honor, is

12
13

that Federated is asking the Court to order -- compel

14

arbitration on claims that under Utah law can't even be made.

15

Can't even be brought.

16

bringing of these claims because they're outside the statute of

17

limitations.
THE COURT:

18

19

22

MR.· PERRY:

An arbitrator could decide that, your

THE COURT:

But you could get to -- go to the

Honor.

23

arbitrator.

24

kind of arguments.

25

But wouldn't·an arbitrator be able to

decide that?

20
21

12-1-8 and 78B-2-103 prohibits the

Submit the documentation.

MR. PERRY:

~

Make these -- the same

You're -- you are correct.

That, that

15
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1

is something that the arbitrator could decide.

2

within the arbitrator's jurisdiction.
The issues that the Court has raised.

3

0)

If that fell

First,

4

waiver.

I think you need to view that in light of the overall

5

picture of Federated and its cases before this Court and the

6

Fourth District Court.
There's 2,616 of them as of a week or two ago.

7
8

They're all virtually the same.

9

credit cards.

10

been hundreds

11

limitations that Judge Toomey ruled applied.

·12

They're all based upon Advanta

And every one that I've looked at -- and it's
do not meet the four-year statute of

And to my knowledge there's only been five motions

13

to compel arbitration.

.14

in every case that hasn't been appealed.

1s~ .. appealed.
16

They are

Or will not be

They've sectioned out the Libby and the Chappa

cases, which were the two decisions by Judge Toomey .

. 17
18:.

They are in five of my cases.

And they came immediately after Judge Toomey•' s
decision to not reconsider her prior decisions.

And they came

19· -. immediately after summary judgments were filed in these ·three
20 , :cases, and ,in two other cases that-are not before this :court.
21

, We think that this timing shows a lot .. - ·

.22·

And .also, the reason for filing lawsuits rather than

23:

arbitration under the agreement is very important for the Court

24

to consider.

25

clause.

The agreement provides that as a forum selection

And it provides for any lawsuit -- and this is

16
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1

lawsuits only -- that it must be brought in the courts of the

2

State of Utah.
So Federated could open up an office here in Salt

3
4

Lake City, which it did.

5

here in Salt Lake City, which it did.

6

started using Utah County over the last X number of months

7

also.

Except for it's now

The arbitration provision, however, requires that

8
9

And prepare and file its lawsuits

any arbitration be brought before an arbitrator in the federal

10

district in which the credit card holder lives.

So if they

11

would have chosen arbitration on those 2,600 lawsuits they

12

w0ald have been arbitrating each lawsuit in all of the vastly

13

different federal districts throughout the United States.
My clients are located in four different states:

14

15

Texas, California, Ohio, and California.

And these credit

16

cards were solicited over the Internet and by mail all

17

throughout the United States.

18

from Advanta throughout the United States.

19

arbitrating probably in several hundred federal districts.

So they have credit card holders
And they would be

So it was a rational business decision to file

20

21

lawsuits.

22

intent, the first prong of the Wolf Mountain test.

23

they intended to use the courts.

24

lawsuits.

25

And they made that decision.

That showed their
Clearly

In our cases they filed

That's the first indication of intent.
Then in our cases, depending upon which one you look

17
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1

at, there were various motions fought.

Abraham had a motion to

2

dismiss for failure of subject matter jurisdiction.

3

defended.

That was

4

In the Abraham case there was at least once, but I

5

believe twice, where the Court had sent out an order to show

6

cause why it should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

7

And Federated came back and said, No, your Honor, don't dismiss

8

it.

We intend on prosecuting this lawsuit.
There were initial disclosures exchanged.

9

10

In some

of the cases there were requests for production of documents.

·11

Those were answered.

And we finally ended up with the motions

12

for summary judgment.

And two days -- as the Court's aware,

13

two days before this

14

hearing, the motions to compel arbitration were filed.

15

those motions were scheduled for

That clearly shows intent, all throughout these

16

lawsuits, to litigate.

17.

decisions, and all of a sudden they decided they didn't like

18

this forum.

19

Until Federated received Judge Toomey's

And I don't have knowledge of whether they have

20.

filed motions to compel arbitration in any cases other than my

21

five, but I'm pretty certain they haven't.

22

five, where motions for summary judgment had been filed.

23

And it's only on my

Another issue is -- that has happened recently is I

24

discovered in about the last of January, first of February, the

25

FDIC order.

And I've never been really comfortable with the
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1

fact that Federated has not produced all of the monthly

2

statements on these accounts.

3

We cannot come up with a determination of how the

4

beginning balance was made on the amount that Federated is

5

suing under.

6

7.99 percent?

7

that is created at 35 percent?

8

of these cases I have made demands for all the monthly

9

statements, and they've been ignored.

10

Is it a beginning balance that is created at
Or 8.99 percent?

Or is it a beginning balance
And so throughout the history

And then you saw my letter, very firm letter, that

11

identified all these issues -- it was the first or second week

12

in February -- that I sent to Mr. Hill that identified the

13

problems created by this FDIC order and requesting all the

14

monthly statements.

15

And I also requested that they meet their duty under

16

Rule 26 of full disclosure.

17

Federated who have knowledge of this FDIC order.

18

handled that.

19

letter that we hear about for the first time today.

20

letter that I sent to Mr. Hill was ignored.

21

responded to.

22

That they identify the persons at
How Federated

And provide any documentation, such as this
And that

Has not been

Now, that type of discovery is very important under

23

the new environment that we face as judges and as attorneys

24

under the changes to Rule 26.

25

are Tier 1 cases.

For the most part, these cases

You don't have a right to any

19
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1

interrogatories.

2

production.

3

You have very limited requests for

You have very limited deposition hours.

And to discover something such as what may have

4

happened with respect to the FDIC, a very large corporation, an

5

opposing attorney such as myself must dig deep.

6

be cooperation in disclosures.

7

those disclosures.

8
9

Or there must

There's been no cooperation in

We hear about the letter for the first time today.
That could help.

But all of the monthly statements could also

10

help so we can determine what the beginning balances were.

11

we can compare them to the dates of default.

12

And

There's a statement that the agreements allow for a

13

default interest.

There is no default interest rate in any of

14

the agreements that are before the Court on these three cases.

15

They refer to supplements.

16

and they've never been provided to me or to this Court, so we

17

don't know what the interest rate was agreed to.

Those supplements are not attached,

Those supplements also contain the amounts to be

18

19

charged for late fees, over-the-limit fees, and other types of

20

fees.

21

Now, on the monthly statements, the partial monthly

22

statements that I have, those type of fees are being charged.

23

And the interest rate I believe on most of them are 35 percent.

24

One of my clients has several months where the interest rate

25

was 52 percent.

20
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So we need, we need that type of discovery that is

1
2

allowed by the courts.

That type of discovery is not allowed

3

by arbitration.

4

came within two weeks of my letter demanding full disclosure of

5

this FDIC matter.

6

should be denied.

And the motions to compel arbitration have --

That's another reason that arbitration

7

With respect to the National Arbitration, NAF, the

8

case law distinguishes between an integral requirement of the

9

arbitration provision and a provision that is not integral to

10

the arbitration provision.

11

the word "shall."

12

"Integral" seems to be defined by

In the cases that I've cited the Court explained the

13

difference between these two different types of decisions by

14

the courts.

15

before a specific arbitrator, that is an integral provision

16

that the Court says was negotiated by the parties.

And where the word "shall," arbitration shall be

17

And where -- in one of them, one of those cases it's

18

where the Court states where the parties decided that the· rules

19

of the National Arbitration Forum shall be used, then that's

20

another integral part of the arbitration agreement.

21

be severed.

22
23

24
25

THE COURT:

It .cannot

What about the, the provision at the end

of the three oh seven document that says:
"If any portion of this arbitration
provision is deemed invalid or

21
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1

unenforceable under the Federal

2

Arbitration Act or any other applicable

3

law or" -- excuse me -- "or the code,

4

that fact will not invalidate the

5

remaining portions of the arbitration

6

provision, except as follows:
"If the portion of the arbitration

7
8

provision deemed invalid or unenforceable

9

includes prohibitions on the arbitration

10

of claims on a class or representative

11

basis and/or the prohibitions on the

12

consolidation or joinder of similar

13

claims, then this arbitration shall

14

provision shall be deemed invalid and

15

unenforceable in its entirety."

16

So I guess the question that I have is. I mean, what

17

we have is the National Arbitration Forum that's essentially

18

shut down after the decision by the -- after the

19

MR. PERRY:

Minnesota Attorney General?

20

THE COURT:

-- Minnesota Attorney General.

So is

21

that an integral provision?

22

if this -- the NAF provision probably is deemed unenforceable,

23

couldn't be enforced, because NAF no longer does these kinds of

24

claims.

25

MR. PERRY:

And if it is, does this -- I mean

If the Court were to sever that

22
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1

provision it would be remaking the agreement as to an integral

2

part of that agreement.

3

severed.

4

there's some significant issues on that.

That is not something that can be

The parties specifically chose that arbitrator.

And

5

Before I get to the significant issues and costs if

6

it is severed, I direct the Court's attention to the IHC case.

7

The Utah Supreme Court, cited in our brief, where the Utah

8

Supreme Court said:
"Arbitration provisions must be

9

~

10

interpreted consistent with the words of

11

the parties.

12

agreement they made, and the-Court is not

13

to remake that agreement."

14

In that case Peterson & Simpson, the law firm that

They have the right to the

15

used to represent IHC in its collection actions, argued that

16

the re was a wa i ve r prov i - - a non -wa i ve r po s it i on - - p r·o v i s i on .

17

And the Supreme Court said that if we were to enforce that

18

non-waiver provision it would remake the agreement to the-point

19

that the parties did not agree to that type of agreement.
And notwithstanding the non-waiver positi --

20

21

provision and the fact that it would remake the agreement, the

22·

Supreme Court would not allow that non-waiver provision to be

23

enforced.

24

talking about here.

25

~

It's a, it is a very analogous issue to what we're

Now, the prejudice to my clients would be this:

23
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1

First of all -- and this touches on the prejudice under the

2

waiver test, because waiver is intent and prejudice.
They were forced to come to Utah, hire a Utah

3
4

attorney, and litigate through this case.

5

for the attorney to litigate this case.

6

to get to the point where a decision on the merits needs to be

7

made, there is a motion to change the forum.

10

in the Chan -- Chandler case, which is the bedrock case on
these issues --

11

12

And when it comes time

And the Supreme Court, in the Wolf Mountain case and

8
9

And pay the money

THE COURT:

What's the -- remind me the cite of Wolf

MR. PERRY:

Yes, I have it right here.

Mountain.

13
14

245 P.3d 184.

15

specifically said that where arbitration is brought at a time

16

that it is apparent that the parties don't like the forum that

17

they are in, and that they're gaming the· system by selecting a

18

new forum, that won't be allowed.

19

other side.

20

It's a 2010 Utah Supreme Court case.

It is
The Court

And that is prejudice to the

Additional prejudice would be, my clients in this

21

arbitration provision negotiated for the rules of the National

22

Arbitration Forum to be followed.

23

different than the rules of the Triple-A.

24

rules will not apply any other rules but the Triple-A rules.

25

So that right is out the door.

Those rules are very
Triple-A under its

24
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Further, my clients negotiated for whatever the

1

2

costs and expenses of the National Arbitration Forum would be.

3

They didn't, they didn't contract -THE COURT:

4

But realistically, I mean, it sounds

5

like -- I mean, my sense is this is a contract of adhesion, in

6

the sense that these are the terms that you have if you use the

7

credit card.

MR. PERRY:

8
9

I mean, if you talk about the negotiating
If it is a contract of adhesion, then

the contract is unenforceable, because it's unconscionable.

10

THE COURT:

Well.

11

MR. PERRY:

It's procedurally unconscionable.

12

THE COURT:

So you're saying, you're saying that if,

13

if they are take-it-or-leave-it terms.

14

MR. PERRY:

Uh-huh.

15

THE COURT:

And you, and you decide -- I guess you

16

can either read the terms when you apply for the credit card,

17

or say, I don't care, and these are the terms you agree to.

18

MR. PERRY:

That's if you receive the agreement.

20

THE COURT:

Well, maybe so.

21

MR. PERRY:

-- is another --

22

THE COURT:

And that may be a·factual question.

23

MR. PERRY:

Is the statute of frauds issue.

19

24
25

Which --

That

moves us into that court.
THE COURT:

But, but I guess the question I have is

25
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1

when we're talking about negotiating an arbitration provision

2

my sense is that there was a -- either an agreement to use the

3

ere -- get the credit card and use it under these terms, or

4

there wasn't.
MR. PERRY:

5

~

Exactly.

And if those terms exist, they

6

must be enforced as written.

7

written.

8

business people sitting down across the table negotiating every

9

item of an agreement, or if it is a take-it-or-leave-it

10

They can't be enforced as

Regardless of whether it was two sophisticated

contract of adhesion.
Those terms still exist.

11

And they must be enforced

12

as written within the contract.

13

integral to the provision -- which these are because they

14

require that this arbitrator shall be used and this

15

arbitrator's rules shall be used -- then it's not enforceable,

16

because the very, the very important terms have failed.

17

the cases have, have said that.

And if some of those terms are

And

Now, if there are other provisions in there that are

18

19

not integral, do not use the words "shall," then there is a

20

line of cases where- the courts have said, Okay, we'll appoint

21

another arbitrator.

22

not the case in the line of cases that are faced with integral

23

"shall" provisions.
THE COURT:

24
25

But that's not the case here.

And we are very low on time.

And that's

Any more

points?
26
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1

MR. PERRY:

Just one, your Honor.

I have touched

2

base -- I have quickly touched on the issue of prejudice.

3

it's, it's written in my brief.

4

issue of waiver.

5

It's the Utah Supreme Court speaking:

6

And this falls also under the

I would like to take 35 seconds, your Honor.

"Utah public policy favors arbitration

7

agreements only insofar as they provide a

8

speedy and inexpensive means of

9

adjudicating disputes and reduce strain

10

on judicial resources."

11

In this case enforcing the arbitration agreement

~

12

would undercut both policy rationales.

13

point would be neither a speedy and inexpensive way to

14

adjudicate this dispute, nor·•a means of reducing strain on

15

judicial resources.

16

I

Arbitration at this

"Public policy is better served by

17

finding waiver where a party has

18

participated in litigation to a point

19

inconsistent with the intent to

20

arbitrate, when such participation causes

21

prejudice to the other party."

22

Wolf Mountain case, your Honor.

23

THE COURT:

24

Brief reply?

25

MR. HILL:

Thank you.

Okay.

Just really brief, your Honor.

Counsel
27
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1

mentioned that these are the only five motions to compel that

2

he's aware of.

3

MR. PERRY:

4

MR. HILL:

You mean compel arbitration?
Compel arbitration. correct.

In

5

Federated cases.

6

in other cases; however. other cases have been arbitrated.

7

in the process of being arbitrated.

I don't believe Federated has filed motions
Are

8

And in fact other judges, even after litigating down

9

the road a little way -- a little ways have come back and said,

10

There's an arbitration provision.

11

to contact the Defendants, see if they're willing to arbitrate,

12

and then move forward at that case -- at that time.

13

that's happened.

14

We require you, Federated,

All of

This is not a singular event, your Honor.

As far as the NAF being an integral part of that

15

arbitration agreement, I don't believe that it is.

16

the integral part is that there was an arbitration provision

17

allowing the parties to arbitrate.

18

NAF is gone. · However, moving to another organization that does

19

similar type of arbitrations would effect the same outcome,

20

your Honor.

21
22

I believe

Where it was done, yes, the

I don't believe that's an integral part of that.
And again, based on everything we said before, we

would request our motion be granted.
THE COURT:

23

24

advisement.

25

five minutes.

Okay.

Motions.

I'm going to take it under

I'll direct Counsel to be back in court in about
I anticipate being able to issue a ruling at
28
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1

that time.

2

Court will be in re -- brief recess.

3

(A recess was taken.)

4

THE COURT:

Good morning.

We're back on the record

They are Federated Capital Corporation vs.

5

in three cases.

6

Arnella Abraham, 119901843.

7

Deutsch, 139918085.

8

129909968.

Federated Capital vs. Neil

And Federated Capital vs. Rebecca Nazar,

In each of, each of these cases there is a motion to

9

10

stay the case and compel arbitration.

In each of those cases

11

they, they involve collection of a credit card debt that was

12

owed to Advanta Bank, and the account was assigned to Federated

13

Capital Corporation.
It's undisputed that the -- or that the credit card

14
15

agreement that has been submitted contains an arbitration

16

provision.

17

facts in each these cases are as follows:

18

The Plaintiff wants to enforce that provision.

One of the cases, Federated vs. Abraham, was' filed

Federated vs. Nazar was filed in 2012.

And Federated

19

in 2011.

·20

vs. Deutsch was filed in approximately November of 2013.

21

The

Significant to the Court is that in each of these

22

cases the Defendants hired legal counsel in Utah.

None of

23

these Defendants are residents of the State of Utah.

24

If the arbitration provision -- if, if Federated had

25

choose -- chosen to arbitrate the proceeding it would have been
29
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1

required to arbitrate the proceeding in the federal judicial

2

district where these Defendants live.

3

their home state, in the part of their home state that is

4

defined as the judicial district in which they live in.

In the -- essentially in

Because if -- if arbitrations had been brought

5
6

initially to pursue these debts then it's possible they could

7

have hired -- they could have represented themselves in the

8

arbitration or possibly hired in-state counsel to represent

9

them.

10

Once, however, Federated sued them in Utah they were

forced to retain Utah counsel, which has defended them.

11

Certainly the 2011 case faces -- had the most

12

litigation.

13

for dismissal for failure to prosecute.

14

counsel hired in Utah -- hired -- Utah legal counsel hired by

15

these out-of-state Defendants filed answers and has filed

16

motions.

17

One of the cases was a case that the Court noticed
Nonetheless, legal

The thing common to each of these cases is that a

18

motion for summary judgment that poten -- had the potential for

19

dismissing each of these cases with prejudice and obtaining

20

award of attorney fees for these Defendants was set for

21

hearing.

22

motions, that had been fully briefed by both Federated's

23

attorney and defense counsel hired by these three Defendants,

24

there was this motion to stay and compel arbitration.

25

And just two days prior to the hearing on those

I conclude that it was filed way too late and a

30
Kelly L. Barber-Wilburn, CSR, RPR
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00581

(March 7, 2014 - FCC vs. Abraham)
1

waiver occurred in these cases.

2

who chose to sue.

3

cases in the Court system.

First of all, it was Federated

It was Federated who chose to litigate these

4

And it would be severely prejudicial to these

5

Defendants once the Plaintiff has gone down that road --

6

they've hired legal counsel here in Utah, legal counsel's

7

actively defending the case, sending out discovery requests,

8

filing motions -- to now stop in midstream and have that all be

9

for naught because three years, two years four months after

10

filing the case Federated decides to shift course, moves to

11

stay, and moves to compel arbitration.

12

ELJ

I would note in this case that the reason the courts

13

favor arbitration is that it often could be a less-expensive

14

means of resolving disputes.

15

Defendants have already spent significant money retaining legal

16

counsel and defending themselves in court, it would essentially

17

cost much more money.

18

litigating in court and would have to start over·in an

.19

arbitration proceeding, in a totally different jurisdiction,

20

outside the State of Utah.

21

In this case, where these

Because they've already spent the money

In other words, their current counsel would not be

22

in a position to represent them in their home state because

23

I mean. it's possible Mr. Perry is a member of other bars.

24

not aware of him being a member of the bar in, I believe it's

25

Florida, Texas, and California.

I'm

31
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So I, I conclude that there is a waiver, and

1
2

therefore I'm denying the motions.
Mr. Perry, I'll direct you to prepare a form of

3
4

order reflecting the Court's ruling.

5

pursuant to Rule 7.

Get it to Mr. Hill

And then get it filed with the court.

6

MR. PERRY:

Thank you, your Honor.

7

THE COURT:

Any clarification needed?

8

MR. PERRY:

No.

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

10

Mr. Hill, any clarification needed?

11

MR. HILL:

12

THE COURT:

No, your Honor.
Let's go to the issue of the motion for

13

summary judgment.

And we, we are now -- I have a very full

14

afternoon.

15

I really have read the briefing.

16

about ten minutes.

17

minutes per side.

This, this motion took longer than I'd anticipated.

I think we can get through the issues.

MR. PERRY:

18

I'll, I'll direct you to take
Ten

I remember legal argument that I had at

19

one point in time a number of years ago before a different

20

court.

21

I said, Your Honors, it's 10 minutes to 12, why don't we break

22

early for, for lunch?

And it was 10 to 12 where I looked at the justices and

I will try to make it so we can break early for

23
24

25

lunch here.
THE COURT:

I mean, the matters that -- see, part of
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1

it is the matters have been briefed and I've read all the

2

I've read the briefs.

3

cut to the chase.

Let me, let me just, let me see if I can

Ask both counsel.

I understand that in each of these cases Federated

4

5

is not a Utah resident.

6

calls for Utah law to be applied.

7

contract were, were directed to be paid to Advanta in

8

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

The payments under the

There, there is a provision in the agreement that

9

10

There's a forum selection clause that

says:

11

"You agree to make all payments in U.S.

12

dollars, payable through a U.S. financial

13

institution, either by check or money

14

order, payable to us at the location and

15

in the manner spectfied in your periodic

16

billing statement, or in any other

17

manner, such as electronic fund transfer,

18

or that we agree and provide procedures

19

for."

20

So I understand that each of those cards has those

21

provisions.

22

credit cards was greater than four years or less than six years

23

after the last payment.

24
25

That the time period in question for each of the

So it really tees up the issue as to whether we
apply the Utah borrowing statute, Utah Code Section 78B-2-103,
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1

and apply the four-year limitation period from Pennsylvania as

2

being the place of payment, or whether we apply a six-year

3

limitation period pursuant to the limitation period for written

4

contracts.

5

I -- that's what I understand are essentially the

6

undisputed facts that really set up the fact that I've got to

7

address the legal decision of whether, on the one hand, Utah's

8

borrowing statute 788-2-103 -- I mean, the agreement requires

9

application of Utah law.

10
11

Included in Utah law is Utah Code

Section 788-2-103, the borrowing statute.
So does that apply and require the Court to apply a

12

four-year limitation period, which would essentially bar each

13

of the suits because they were not filed within four years.

14

does the six-year limitation period apply, thus making the

15

suits timely.

16

17

Or

Let me just say, have I got the facts accurately as
to.-the three cases from your perspective?

18

MR. PERRY.:

You're correct, your Honor.

19

THE COURT:

And Mr. Hill, do you agree or disagree

20

with the facts? · I want to make sure we' re on the same page

21

with the facts.

22

MR. HILL:

23·

that you brought up.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. HILL:

Mostly.

I may disagree with one fact

Uh-huh.
An agree -- you were reading about, I
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1

think it's in paragraph 6 --

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. HILL:

4

payments being made to the --

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. HILL:

7

THE COURT:

MR. HILL:

Uh-huh.
- - address on the statements.

Okay.

Further on

And let me make sure I'm there.

If you want, I can, I can wait to bring

this up later, or I can bring it up now.

12
13

Talking about

And this, once again, is (inaudible.)

10
11

-- of the agreement.

in Section 6.

8

9

Uh-huh.

THE COURT:

I just --

Well, I just -- I'd like to understand

what the facts are.
MR. HILL:

14

Sure.

In the fourth paragraph in

15

Section 6, your Honor.

16

mailed to the address shown on the statement.

17

THE COURT:

Again, it talks about payments being
~

Account payments are to be mailed to the

18

address for payments shown on your pillar -- periodic billing

19

statement.

20

MR. HILL:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. HILL:

Correct.

Payments must be --

Received.
~

Payments must be received by us at that

23

address (inaudible) specified time (inaudible) specifie'd on the

24

statement.

25

and so on.

Must conform to any specific requirements, so on
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The next sentence:

1

2

accepted by us or our agent at a location other than the

3

address stated on the billing statement are not effective until

4

received by us at that alternate location, is where it turns

5

out to be.
THE COURT:

6
7

9

10

Wel 1, it says "at the address

specified."
MR. HILL:

8

~

Payments tendered to and

At the address specified.

address specified, the alternate address that they were talking
about previously in the sentence.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. HILL:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. HILL:

The Pennsylvania address.

16

THE COURT:

-- the address shown --

17

MR. HILL:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. HILL:

20

THE COURT:

15

Which is the

So it's not
So -In your view it's not referring to -It's referring

to --

On---- on your periodic billing statement.
Correct.
And then payments accepted by -- at a

21

location other than the address stated on your periodic billing

22

statement are not effective until received at the address

23

specified.

So --

24

MR. HILL:

25

THE COURT:

Correct.
-- that sentence refers to the address
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1

stated in your periodic billing statement.

2

I read that, payments tendered and accepted at a location other

3

than the address stated in your periodic billing statement are

4

not effective until received by us at the address specified.

5
6

MR. HILL:

It's my interpretation, your Honor, that

"address specified" refers to, in this sentence, to that --

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. HILL:

9

You're saying, when

Alternate.
-- alternate address.

Which in two of

these three cases there were payments made electronically.

If

10

you· look at the last payment statement it shows they were made

11

electronically (inaudible) SLC.

12

Lake City, they didn't go to Pennsylvania.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. HILL:

15

They came directly to Salt

Okay.
That's the only caveat I have with what

you said.

16

THE COURT:

17

Okay.

18

MR. PERRY:

Okay.

Go ahead, Mr. Perry.
I'm going to address that very issue

19

while it's fresh on the minds of everybody in the courtroom.

20

If the Court will look at the contract.

21

THE COURT:

Well, there's the next paragraph:

22

not authorized

23

That's, that's as to balance.

24
25

The contract states ...
We're

required to accept -- well, wait a second.

MR. PERRY:

Well.

That's not location.
At any rate, your Honor, I can't

bring up the contract as quick as I can.

Well.

Here's a
37
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1

statement of it from Judge Toomey's decision.

Paragraph 6:

2

"You agree to make all payments in U.S.

3

dollars, payable through a U.S. financial

4

institution, either by check or money

5

order, payable to us" -- meaning

6

Advanta -- "at the location and in the

7

manner specified on your periodic billing

8

statement, or in any other manner that we

9

agree to and provide procedures for.
That's the first statement.

10

11

If the Court looks at

11

the periodic billing statements, every single one of them has,

12

in the upper right-hand corner, "Make payment to," and then an

13

address in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

14

state:

15

The contract goes on to

"Account payments are to be mailed to

16

the address for payments shown on your

17

periodic billing statement.

18

So what happens is these periodic billing statements

19

go out to the customer.

20

payment to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

21

on to state in paragraph 6~

22

11

They look at it.

And it says make

Then the contract goes

"Payment must be received by us at that

23

address.

And must conform to any

24

specific requirements for making payment

25

which appear with or in your periodic
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1

billing statement."

2

Periodic billing statement:

3
4

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

~

Make payment to

The contract goes on to say:

"Payments tendered to and accepted by

5

us or our agent at a location other than

6

the address stated on your periodic

7

billing statement are not effective until

8

received by us as the address -- at the

9

address specified."

10

Again, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

11

receives the periodic billing statement.

12

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

13

So a consumer

<&.i

Says make payment to

Now, the argument that is now being made by Advanta

14

is that sometimes a person who decides to make payment by a

15

telephone call will receive a subsequent statement after that

16

payment is made.

17

column, electronic -- or "Telephone payment," and then it has

18

the statement "SLC, Utah."

19

And it has notations down in the transactions

And then it has underneath it a charge to the

20

account for the telephone payment of $12.

21

statement "SLC, Utah."

22
23

24

~

THE COURT:

And it has the

So the $12 is a charge for making

payment by phone?
MR. PERRY:

That's the telephone payment charge.

So
i)

25

Federated's argument appears to be that because a subsequent
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1

statement has that indication in the transactions column, that

2

means the payment was made to Salt Lake City.

3

admissible proof that the payment actually went, went to Salt

4

Lake City.

5
6
~

They submit no

It's only Counsel's argument.
This argument was made before Judge Toomey.

guess my ar -- my argument cannot be any better than she wrote:

7

"Federated Capital argues that the

8

Pennsylvania address was only one of

9

several ways in which Ms. Chappa could

10

have made payments.

11

Ms. Chappa made payments by telephone or

12

other electronic means that were received

13

in Utah."

14

Again, that was just argument.

15
16

And in fact

There was no

admissible evidence."This argument is not well taken, given

17

that the agreement states that

18

Ms. Chappa's performance would be

19

recognized only when payment was received

20

in Pennsylvania.

21

And I

"Therefore, even if Ms. Chappa had made

22

electronic or telephonic payments to

23

Utah, her performance under the contract

24

would be deemed effective only when the

25

payments reached Pennsylvania.

For that
40
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1

reason the contract was to be performed

2

in Pennsylvania."

3

I can't make any better argument than that on a key

4

issue, your Honor.

5

the pleadings.

Every other single argument is made within

The cause of action arose in Pennsylvania, it's

6

7

clear, because that's where performance was to be made.

8

all of the other arguments or defendant

9

application of Pennsylvania law boils down to one thing.

10

mean, appli

11

statute of limitations.

12

through Utah's borrowing statute.

defense against
I

you know, application of the Pennsylvania
You get to that statute of limitations

These are procedural matters.

13

And

Statute of

14

limitations are procedural matters.

15

matters.

16

chapter on statute of limitations is 70B-2-103 -- I mean 70B-2,

17

and is entitled:

18

statute is contained within that chapter.

19

Utah law applies on those

And Utah law includes a statute of limitations.

"Statute of limitations."

The

The borrowing
It's 2-103.

Federated simply likes portions of that statute but

20

does not like the statute -- the borrowing statute, and asks

21

the Court not to apply it.

22

single argument they make.

23

That is the bottom line of every

I haven't gone through all of the arguments.

It's

24

because they're well set out in the pleadings, your Honor.

25

There's no need to.

We can save some time.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. HILL:

Mr. Hill?
I can't believe we might be done sooner

3

on the summary judgments than we were on the first one.

4

try to be brief as well.

5

set out.

I'll

I think our position is fairly well

The borrowing statute, as Mr. Perry explained,

6

7

788-2-103, contains two prongs, really.

Cause of action which

8

arises in another jurisdiction, and which is not actionable in

9

the other jurisdiction by reason of lapse of time.

Again,

10

those two things have to be there for the borrowing statute to

11

apply.

12

In the two cases which I brought up before we were

13

talking about where electronic payments were made directly to

14

Utah, I don't believe the cause of action arose in Pennsylvania

15

on those two so I don't even think we get to that point.
However, even if we get past.that and on the third

16
17

one they were mailed to Pennsylvania, to the address stated on

18

the statement, the second part of it, cause of action which is

19

not actionable in the other juris -- jurisdiction by reason of

20

lapse of time, that whole thing, that whole clause needs to be

21

true in order for the borrowing statute to apply.

22

Now, in our cases it's just not.

It can't, it can't

23

be.

24

in Pennsylvania by reason of lapse of time, it's not brought in

25

Based on the contract this cause of action is not brought

. Pennsylvania because it can't be by contract.

And that's what
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1

the Pingree case says.

2

you use that.

If the contract states otherwise, then

3

In this case it does state otherwise.

It states any

4

lawsuit brought on any of these matters must be brought in

5

Utah, either federal or state courts, as we know what the

6

contract says.

7

cases in Utah and has applied the six-year statute. written

8

contract statute of limitations, because the borrowing statute

9

simply legally doesn't apply.

That's why we've -- Federated has brought the

Again, we know what Judge Toomey has said on her

10
11

decision. and that is moving forward on appeal.

12

already been filed.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. HILL:

A notice has

Uh-huh.
And I don't believe your Honor is

15

required to follow that as well until we get an appellate

16

decision.
THE COURT:

17
18

law.

19

MR. HILL:

20

THE COURT:

21

Well. it's certainly not binding case

Sure.
Another district court's decision is not

binding on me.
MR. HILL:

22

Correct.

And that's, that's what I meant

23

to say.

Again. your Honor. I don't -- we don't believe --

24

Federated doesn't believe the borrowing statute applies.

25

don't believe cause of action arose in another jurisdiction for

I
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1

2

And then even if they were, I believe all of them,

3

all these three cases the borrowing statute shouldn't apply

4

based on that second prong where a cause of action was not

5

brought in Pennsylvania because of lapse of time.

6

wasn't the case.

7

It could have been a week after the default.

8

been 5 years and 364 days after the default.

9

~

the two cases where electronic payments were made to Utah.

That simply

It could have been a day after the default.
It could have

A cause of action or a. case could not have been

10

brought in Pennsylvania.

11

the agreement of the parties.

12

six-year statute should apply, your Honor.

It had to be brought in Utah based on
And based on that we think the

13

THE COURT:

Anything else?

14

MR. PERRY:

May.I respond briefly, your Honor?

15

THE COURT:

Well, I just want to make sure

16

MR. HILL:

17

THE COURT:

18

Reply argument?

19

MR. PERRY:

· 20

No, I'm through.

I'm through.

Okay.
Brief, please.

Very briefly.

there that the Pingree case says:

There was a statement in

"Unless the contract states

I would request that the Court read Pingree.

21

otherwise."

22

You'll find out that that statement actually is:

23

"Unless the contract states otherwise,

24

the cause of action arises where

25

performance shall be made."
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That is what Pingree says.

1

2

about being able to, to shift that.

3

cause of action arose.

It doesn't say anything
It is addressing where the

The argument -- their main argument seems to be that

4

6,,j
~

5

their -- the reason it couldn't be brought in Pennsylvania is

6

not because there was a lapse of time under Pennsylvania

7

statute but because there was a forum selection clause.
Well, certainly there was a forum selection clause

8

9

that said, We're, we're selecting the forum of the State of

10

Utah.

11

it couldn't be brought in Pennsylvania not only because of the

12

forum selection clause

13

They could -- someone could have brought it in Pennsylvania and

14

sued there, and if you responded you waived the forum selection

15

clause.

16

And that was met.

The case was brought here.

However,

which could be waived by the parties.

·sut theie's an6ther rea~6n ~hy-it-couldn't be

17

brought in Pennsylvania.

And that reason is the Utah borrowing

18

statute and the lapse of the four-year Pennsylvania statute of

19

limitations.

20

not abrogate the fact that the cause -- that this case couldn't

21

have been brought in Pennsylvania because of the lapse of time.

22

They both exist.

The existence of the forum selection clause does

They're both reasons.

23

Thank you, your Honor.

24

THE COURT:

25

advisement.

Okay.

I'm going to take it under

I'll direct counsel to be back in court at about
45
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1

12:25.

My hope is to be able to issue a ruling at that time.

2

MR. PERRY:

3

MR. HILL:

Thank you, your Honor.
Thank you, your Honor.
(A recess was taken.)

4

THE COURT:

5

Okay.

We are on the record in three

6

matters in which the Defendant has filed a motion for summary

7

judgment.

8

Mr. Perry?

9

MR. PERRY:

(Inaudible.)

10

THE COURT:

Your paper is hitting the microphone.

11

If you want to scoot the microphone away.
We're on the record in three matters in which

12
13

essentially the, the key facts related to the legal issues on

14

the three motions for summary judgment are not materially

15

different.

16

Corporation vs .. -Abraham, 139901843; Federated Capital vs. Neil

17

Deutsch, 139918085; and Federated Capital vs. Rebecca Nazar,

18

129909968.

19

These three cases are:

Federated Capital

The -Defendant in each of these cases has filed a

20

motion for summary judgment arguing that a four-year statute of

21

limitations applies, and th~s bars each of these claims that

22

were brought outside. that appl -- what is argued to be

23

applicable four-year statute of limitations period.

24
(i@

25

If a four-year limitations period applies, then each
of these cases are subject to dismissal with prejudice as not
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1

being brought within the limitation period.
The, the issue -- in each of these cases the

2
3

Defendants are persons who obtained credit cards from Advanta

4

Bank.

5

have -- are alleged not to have paid them.

6

its claims against these Defendants to Federal Capital

7

Corporation, and thus is pursuing the, the claim related to the

8

Advanta credit cards.

And are alleged to have used the credit cards and
Advanta assigned

Federated Capital Corporation is not a Utah

9
10

resident, and none of ·the Defendants in this action are Utah

11

residents.

12

This motion for summary judgment requires the Court

13

to analyze the credit card agreement related to the Advanta

14

credit cards, and also the Utah statute of limitations, to

15

determine whether each of these actions was brought within the

16

four-year -- within the appropriate limitation period.

17

The bottom line is, if a four-year limitation period

18

applies, then each of the lawsuits are barred by the statute of

19

limitations and should be dismissed with prejudice.

20

six-year limitations period applies, as argued by the

21

Plaintiff, then each of these causes of action was filed timely

22

because they are filed within six years -- within the six-year

23

time period.

24

25

If a

So what this, what this motion -- to start out on
this motion, this is a Rule 56 motion.

A motion for summary
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1

judgment is to be granted under Rule 56 if there's no genuine

2

issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled

3

to judgment as a matter of law.

4

I find -- I, I conclude, after reviewing the facts,

5

that the material facts are not disputed in this case.

They

6

include the following, as I have started to articulate:

7

Federated Capital is not a Utah resident.

8

Defendants are not Utah residents.

Each of the

9

The -- each of the Defendants when they received

10

credit card statements, the credit card statement specified

11

that payment was to be made to an address in Pennsylvania.

12

The critical provisions governing the agreement and

13

for which summary judgment is argued include the following:

14

Paragraph 31 of the credit card agreement, dealing with

15

controlling law and jurisdiction; and paragraph 6 of the credit

16

card agreement, dealing with payment.

17

The first issue is that there's a, a controlling law

18

and jurisdiction paragraph in the credit card agreement.

19

going to read the key language:

20

"This agreement shall be governed"

21

And I apologize, this type is like 3 or 4 point

22

type, and so it's very, very small.

23

hard to read.

24

states, in relevant part:

25

I'm

And even with glasses it's

But let me take a shot at it.

Paragraph 31

"This agreement shall be governed
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1

solely by and interpreted entirely in

2

accordance with the laws of the State of

3

Utah, except as and to the degree that

4

such laws are superceded by banking and

5

other laws of the United States,

6

regardless of where you reside or where

7

the business is located.

8
9

Gr)

GlJ

"You agree that all the terms,
conditions, and other provisions relating

10

to the method of determining the balance

11

upon which the interest rate or finance

12

charges are applied and all other terms

13

of this agreement are material to the

14

determination of the interest rate."

15

And then in all caps it says:

16

"You consent to personal jurisdiction

17

in the state and federal courts in Utah.

·18

And agree that any lawsuit pertaining to

19

the account must be brought only in such

20

courts in Utah, regardless of who files

21

the suits.

22

those courts, unless and until any party

23

elects arbitration pursuant to the

24

arbitration provision in this agreement."

25

The Court previously ruled that for these three

And may be maintained only in
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1

Defendants there was a waiver of the arbitration provision.
So that law -- that paragraph 31 requires the Court

2

Gj

3

to apply the Utah statute of limitations.

4

six-year statute of limitations in Utah for written contracts.

5

But there's also a statute of limitations under Utah Code

6

Section 788-2-103.

Now. there is a

That's Utah's borrowing statute:

7

"A cause of action which arises in

8

another jurisdiction. and which is not

9

actionable in the other jurisdiction by

10

reason of lapse of time, may not be

11

pursued in this state. unless the cause

12

of action is held by a citizen of this

13

state who has held the cause of action

14

from the time it accrued."

15

Right now Federated. a non-resident of Utah. holds

16

the claim.

17

Utah.

So it is not held by a citizen of the State of

Then the question comes up:

18

Does this cause of

19

action arise in another jurisdiction. or does it arise in Utah?

20

If it arises in another jurisdiction. the specific language of

21

that first phrase of 78B-2-103 applies.

22

And the answer to that question of where this cause

23

of action arose is governed by paragraph 6 of the credit card

24

agreement.

25

read.

And there's some key language that I'm going to

And again, this is small language. so hopefully I'm
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1

reading it correctly.

2

credit card agreement:
11

3

Paragraph 6.

This is again the Advanta

You agree to pay all amounts due on

4

the account until paid in full.

You

5

agree to make all payments in U.S.

6

dollars, payable through a U.S. financial

7

institution, either by check or money

8

order, payable to us, at the location and

9

in the manner specified in your periodic

10

billing statement, or in any other

11

manner, such as by electronic fund

12

transfer or wire transfer, that we agree

13

to and provide procedures for."

14

So you -- you've got to pay as stated in the

15

specified billing stat~ment, or pursuant to other procedures.

16

Then going down - - skipping· a couple paragraphs under Section 6

17

it says:

18

"Account statements are to be mailed to

19

the address for payment shown on your

20

periodic billing statement.

21

be received by us at that address on or

22

before the specified time on the payment

23

due date stated on your periodic billing

24

statement, and must conform to any

25

specific requirements for making payment

Payment must
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1

which appear with or in your billing

2

statement.
"Payments tendered to and accepted by

3
4

us or our agent at a location other than

5

the address stated in your periodic

6

billing statement are not effective until

7

received at the address specified."

8

The only address specified is the address for

9

payment shown on your periodic billing statement.

The language

10

in this agreement specifies that they have to be at that

11

location.

12

Now, even though there are alternative -- you --

13

alternatives, perhaps pay with electronic fund or wire transfer

14

that they provide procedures for, what is clear in that --

15

those last few sentences I read was that if they are accepted

16

by the bank or thei.r agent at a location other than the address

17

stated on ·your-periodic billing statement, are not effective

18

until received by us at the address specified.

19

The only address specified is the address on the

20

periodic billing statement.

Now, an argument's been made that

21

that sentence really, when it says "received by us at the

22

address specified," then that is a location other than the

23

address stated in the periodic billing statement.

24

definition the, the

if it's an electronic-fund transfer or

25

wire transfer, it's

well, let, let me step back and put it

But by
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1

this way.
If it• s an alternative, I think the "at the address

2
3

specified" language refers back to the address stated in your

4

periodic billing statement.

5

to an address in that language.

6

language were ambiguous -- and I really don't conclude that it

7

is.

8

this is a provision drafted by the credit card company.

9

Because that's the only reference
Furthermore, even if this

But even if it were ambiguous, there's no question that

Giv

And in the event that it were determined that there

10

was some ambiguity, that ambiguity would have to be read in

11

favor of the non-drafting party, who is the debtor and

12

defendant in each of these cases.

13

is that paragraph 6 states that performance is due in

14

Pennsylvania because that's what the billing statements say is

15

the address where performance is due.

16

Either way, the bottom line

Gb

Since performance is due, then the question -- in

17

Pennsylvania, then the question is:

18

this cause of action arises?

19

Bancorp vs. Pingree and Dahle, 880 P.2d 14, page 16, Utah Court

20

of Appeals 1994, that unless the contract states otherwise, a

21

cause of action for breach of contract generally arises where

22

the contract is to be performed.

23

Does that affect where

And I m persuaded by Financial
1

Gv

It's undisputed in this case that the credit card

24·

statements show payment is due in Pennsylvania.

The language

25

of paragraph 6 states that that's where performance is due.
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1

And then -- and so I conclude that the cause of action arises

2

in Pennsylvania.
Now, if we go back to the forum selection clause it

3
4

says where the lawsuit may be brought.

5

paragraph 31 does not say where the cause of action arises.

6

And with that we go to para -- Utah Code Section 78B-2-103,

7

which says:

8

jurisdiction."

9

~

It does not say --

"A cause of action which arises in another

I conclude that that applies in this case.

Each of

10

the -- the cause of action for nonpayment of those debts

11

arise -- arose in Pennsylvania because of paragraph 6 of the

12

agreement, and because the billing statement addresses where

13

payment due is Pennsylvania.

14

So this, fo~ each of these claims, is a cause of

15

action which arises in another jurisdiction, and which is not

16

actionable in the other jurisdiction by the lapse of time.

17

Well, after four years it's not actionable in Pennsylvania

18

because the four-year sta1ute of limitation at the date where

19

performance was due had, had run.

20

The bottom line is, when the payments were not made

21

and were not received in Pennsylvania, a cause of action arose

22

in Pennsylvania.

23

lapse of time, as in the second phrase of 78B-2-103, it was not

24

actionable in Pennsylvania after four years.

25

And once four years had gone by, due to a

Whether it may -- whether it may not have been
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1

actionable -- whether it may not have -- whether there was a

2

forum selection clause that may or may not have been waived I

3

conclude ultimately is not material to that language.

4

four years went by with the cause of action arising in

5

Pennsylvania, it was not actionable in that other jurisdiction

6

because of lack of time -- lapse of time.

7

says -- then the key language is, it may not --

Once the

And then it

8

"Then it may not be pursued in this

9

state unless the cause of action is held

10

by a citizen of this state who has held

11

the cause of action from the time it

12

accrued."

13

And I conclude it's undisputed that Federated is not

14

a citizen of this state and did not hold the cause of action

15

from the time it accrued because it received an assignment of

16

these debts after they were -- it's undisputed that after they

17

were in default.

18

·Thus I conclude that this -- that when·I apply Utah

19

law, as required under Section 31 of the Advanta credit card

20

agreement, the Utah law that I am to apply is -- includes Utah

21

Code Section 78B-2-103.

22

Once I apply 78B-2-103 Utah law, as· I am required to

23

do under paragraph 31 of the agreement, I conclude that this

24

cause of action is barred by the four-year statute of

25

limitation where this cause of action arose.

Namely in
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1

Pennsylvania.

2

And, therefore, each of these lawsuits are subject

3

to dismissal as a matter of law under the undisputed facts in

4

this case because they are barred by the four-year statute of

5

limitations incorporated by Utah Code Section 78B-2-103.

6

The business card agreement with Advanta does

7

contain an attorney fee provision.

8

if Federated had won, it would be seeking its attorney fees.

9

Utah Code has a reciprocal fee statute, namely

10
11

Section 78B-5-826.

And if Advanta had won

That provides:

"A Court may award costs and attorney

12

fees, excuse me, to either party that

13

prevails in a civil action based upon any

14

promissory note, written contract, or

15

other writing executed after April 28,

16

1986, when the provisions of the

17

promissory note, written contract, or

18

other writing allow at.least one party to·

19

recover attorney fees."

20

In this case there is an attorney fee provision in

21

the terms and conditions.

22

prevailed, each of them is entitled to attorney fees.

23

Because the Defendants have

I direct you, Mr. Perry, to submit -- we'll talk

24

about timing in a few moments.

But submit affidavits, separate

25

affidavits for each of the cases laying out your -- the
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1

attorney fees that you are asserting that you would be entitled

2

to.

3

we'll talk about that time period.

And then I certainly would allow time for objection.

And

So in sum, I'm granting the motion for summary

4

5

judgment of each of these three Defendants, dismissing each of

6

the three cases with prejudice, and awarding each of the

7

Defendants their attorney fees spent in defending this action.
Is there any clarification from the moving party,

8
9

Mr. Perry?

10

MR. PERRY:

No.

11

THE COURT:

From the Plaintiff?

12

MR. HILL:

13

THE COURT:

No, your Honor.
How much time -- I'm going to also

14

direct you, Mr. Perry, to prepare a written decision form of

15

order laying out the undisputed facts and the legal reasoning

16

of the Court.

17

MR. PERRY:

I'll do -- for both of these motions

18

today I'll do a findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

19

order.

20

THE COURT:

Right, but --

21

MR. PERRY:

And judgment.

22

THE COURT:

Right.

And make clear -- I, I've seen

23

it -- not from you, but from other attorneys -- they talk about

24

finding the following facts on summary judgment.

25

a holding that facts are undisputed based on the record.

It should be
So.
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MR. HILL:

1
2

Just to clarify, maybe separate ones for

each case

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. HILL:

5

THE COURT:

Yeah.
-- correct?
Yeah.

There'll be separate ones for

6

each case.

Even though the reasoning is the same, there'll be

7

separate ones for each case.

8

ought to be separate from the arbitration order.

And my conclusion is that order

9

MR. PERRY:

It will be.

10

THE COURT:

So we're essentially going to have six

11

orders.

Or six --

12

MR. PERRY:

13

THE COURT:

I understand.
six documents:

Three for each of the

14

cases on the arbitration, three for each of the cases on the

15

summary judgment motion.
And then just to clarify, I want to make sure that

16
·17

there's not -- and I, and I've seen your attorney fee

18

affidavits before, Mr. Perry, and I know you do a good job on

19

them.

20

positive you already know is you're not to duplicate time.

21

Even though the hearing today was for all three, you'll get

22

your hourly rate divided by three.

23
24

25

But just, just to make clear what I, what I'm pretty

MR. PERRY:

I will, I will split my -- the time I

actually spend -THE COURT:

In the hearing.
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MR. PERRY:

-- one-third to one, one-third to

3

THE COURT:

Right.

4

MR. PERRY:

-- one-third to another. and then just

1
2

5

another

keep my hourly rate.
THE COURT:

6

That's what I would anticipate.

7

Obviously when you're drafting a brief for one case, that's

8

allocated to that case.

9

allocated in the appellate case law.

10
11

MR. PERRY:

I'll, I'll put that statement in my

affidavit also on how I calculated it.
THE COURT:

12
13

So I just want to make sure it's

And how I broke it out.

And again, so you would have three
~

affidavits as well.

14

MR. PERRY:

Right.

15

THE COURT:

And what's, what's a reasonable amount

16

I understand that.

of time, given your schedule?
Let me just tell you how I would anticipate dealing

17
18

with it is have Mr. Perry submit his attorney fee affidavit.

19

Have an objection~- give a specific amount of time for an

20

objection.

And then give him a chance to reply.
Rule 7, there's not clarity in Rule 7 as tb, as to

21
22

giving a chance to reply to an objection.

But if there's no

23

objection, then they could be immediately submitted for

24

decision.

25

chance for a reply.

And if there is an objection, then I will give a
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But then that would have to be submitted for

1
2

decision, and certainly when it's submitted for decision you

3

can request oral argument.

4

argument on an attorney fee issue, but there have been cases

5

where I've done oral argument.

6

where I've had an evidentiary hearing.

7

those submitted.

I don't know that I would need oral

There have even been cases
But go ahead and get

8

When, when would you -- and the other thing that I

9

would direct you to do is direct -- create a form of judgment

10

in each of the cases and submit that along with the attorney

11

fee amount.

12

blank, to be filled in by the Court -- I mean the amount of the

13

judgment for fees and costs.

And you can leave the amount of the judgment

So when could you have an affidavit of fees and

14
15

costs for each case?

16

MR. PERRY:

May I direct a question to your clerk?

17

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

18

MR. PERRY:

When can I get an audio of these two

THE CLERK:

Probably Tuesday we would be able to

MR. PERRY:

Do I need to do anything more than make

19

hearings?

20
21

22
23

24
25

make it.

this request now to you?'
THE CLERK:
before we can make it.

You actually need to pay for it first
There's a form you fill out, and you
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1

need to pay for it.
MR. PERRY:

2

We have a credit card account set up

3

with the court where they automatically charge all filing fees

4

and everything to us.

5

THE CLERK:

Is that -Okay.

I can give you the form after

6

this, and if you want to fill it out 1·11 be happy to submit

7

it.

8

THE COURT:

Let's say

9

MR. PERRY:

Thank you very much.

10

THE COURT:

-- assuming you get it by Wednesday,

11

~

when, when?

12

MR. PERRY:

The next Monday.

13

THE COURT:

So Monday --

14

MR. PERRY:

Well, that will include all the ~ttorney

15

fees affidavits.

THE COURT:

16

17

today is the 7th.

22
23

Okay.

So

The 14th?

The 21st?

20

21

Well, let's, let's do this.

No, it'd be -- you wouldn't get it until Wednesday.

18
19

I probably need a week, your Honor.

MR. PERRY:

That would probably be right, your

THE COURT:

Okay.

Honor.
So, so forms of order, attorney

fee affidavits and cost affidavits by the 21st.

24

How much time would be reasonable for objections?

25

MR. HILL:

A week would be fine.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. HILL:

3

THE COURT:

Okay.
Twenty-eighth.
So objections would be due by the 28th,

4

assuming that they are served by the 21st.

5

be due by April 4th.
You know what?

6

And replies would

Looking at my schedule, if they

7

arrive on the 4th I'm not going to be able -- ! 11 tell you

8

what.

9

is what I'm going to do.

1

If you get yours by, if we say the 14th -- let•s -- this
I'm going to, because of my schedule

10

not being able to get to it I'll give you, Mr. Perry, till

11

March 21st.

12

and a half for a reply.

13

I'll give two weeks for opposition.

And a week

So the 21st for each of the six forms of order, the

14

attorney fee and cost affidavits.

The 4th of April -- that's

15

the 21st of March, by 5:00 p.m.

16

to your opposing counsel.

And then on Friday, April 4th, any

17

objections would be due.

And then any replies and a request to

18

submit for decision would be due by April 16th.

And have those -- email those

19

MR. PERRY:

Thank you, your Honor.

20

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you very much for the

21

briefing on that issue.

I ll look forward to getting those

22

documents and getting this matter completed.

1

23

MR. PERRY:

Thank you.

24

THE COURT:

Court will be in recess.

25

(The hearing was concluded.)
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Lester A. Perry (2571)
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone: (801) 272-7556
Facsimile: (80 I) 272-7557
E-mail: lap@hooleking.com
Attorney for Defendant

~

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FEDERATED CAPITAL CORPORATION,
dba FED ERATED CAPITAL FINANCIAL
CORPORATION
Plaintiff,

Holding of Undisputed Facts, Conclusions
of Law and Order on Plaintiffs Motion to
Stay Case and Compel Arbitration

v.
REBECCA NAZAR, d.b.a. BECCAS
LITTLE GIFT SHOP
Defendant.

Civil No. 129909968
~

Judge: Collection

The Court held a hearing on March 14, 2014 on the plaintiffs Motion to Stay Case and to Compel
Arbitration. Present at the hearing were Christopher Hill as counsel for the plaintiff and Lester A.
Perry as counsel for the defendant. Having heard the argument of counsel and having read and
considered the pleadings and exhibits filed herein, the Court makes the following holding of
undisputed facts and conclusions of law and enters the following order.

~

I. Holding of Undisputed Facts.
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The Court holds that the following facts are undisputed.
1. Federated Capital Corporation ("Federated") chose to pursue Ms. Nazar in court by filing
this lawsuit on July 10, 2012.
GJ;

2. On October 23, 2012, Federated substituted its counsel.
3. On November 7, 2012, Federated moved the Court for an order allowing service of the
summons and complaint by mail.
4. Ms. Nazar was served by mail at her home in Texas.
5. She was required to hire Utah counsel who answered Federated's complaint on April 15,
2013. The answer contained the affirmative defenses of the statute of limitations and the
statue of frauds.
6. On Jy[ay 8, 2013, Federated served its initial disclosures on Ms. Nazar. Ms. Nazar, thereafter,
served her initial disclosures on Federated.
7. On July 8, 2013, Ms. Nazar filed her motion for summary judgment based on the running of
the limitations' period and her motion for an award of attorney's fees.
8. On July 25, 2013, Federated filed its memorandum in opposition to Ms. Nazar's motion for
summary judgment and an affidavit in support of its opposition.
9. A reply memorandum was filed by Ms. Nazar on August 19, 2013.
IO.On August 23, 2013, a hearing was held on the motion for summary judgment. The
summary judgment was continued without decision by agreement ofFederated's counsel and
Ms. Nazar's counsel because of the pending motions before Judge Toomey in identical
Federated lawsuits.

May 121 2014 09:51 AM
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11.On December 30, 2013, Ms. Nazar filed a supplemental motion for an award of attorney's
fees.
12.On January 10, 2014, Federated filed on opposition memorandum to Ms. Nazar's
supplemental motion for an award of attorney's fees.
13 .Ms. Nazar filed a reply memorandum in support of her motion for an award of attorney's
fees on January 14, 2014.
14.After Judge Toomey issued her decisions, Ms. Nazar noticed up her motions for a hearing to
be held on February 28, 2014.
15.Two days before the hearing, Federated filed its motion to stay and to compel arbitration.
The motion for a stay and to compel arbitration were filed after Judge Toomey issued
memorandum decisions in Federated Capital v. Libby, Civil No. 129914062, and Federated
Capital v. Chapa, Civil No. 129911232, 'fhird D.istrict Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, dismissing two other Federated cases based on collection of other Advanta credit card
accounts. Judge Toomey ruled that Federated's suits were barred by the Pennsylvania four
year statute of limitations. These decisions were based on facts materially identical to the
facts in the present case.
II. Conclusions of Law.

I. The right to arbitrate is a contract right. ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, 245 P.3d

184, ,r 22 (Utah 20 I 0). A party to an arbitration agreement can waive the contractual right to
arbitration. Id; citing Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356,360 (Utah
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2. The public policy that favors arbitration provisions is that they serve as speedy and
inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes and help to reduce strain on judicial resources.
ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, 245 P.3d at ,r 22.
3. This public policy is defeated when the arbitration would undermine these goals because the
right to arbitration is not raised until an opposing party has undertaken much of the expense
necessary to litigate a case in court. ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, 245 P.3d at ,r
22.
4.

Waiver of a contractual right occurs when a party to a contract intentionally acts in a manner
inconsistent with its contractual rights, and, as a result, prejudice accrues to the opposing
party to the contract. ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, 245 P.3d at ,r 29. In the
context of arbitration, waiver amounts to a two-part test: 1) whether the party seeking to

~

assert arbitration has participated in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to
arbitrate; and 2) whether the opposing party has been prejudiced as a result. Id; citing
Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d at 360. ·
5. In the present case, Federated intended to pursue its claim through a lawsuit. The clearest
evidence of this intent is the filing of the suit against the defendant and the prosecution of the
lawsuit to the point of the motion for summary judgment.
6. Ms. Nazar would be prejudiced by compelling arbitration at this point of the litigation. The
subject contract, the Advanta credit card agreement, required that every card holder submit
to the jurisdiction of the courts of Utah in lawsuits. Agreement ,r 31. The arbitration

~
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provision required that arbitration be conducted in the Federal District in which the card
~

holder lived. Agreement 136. Ms. Nazar lives in Texas. If arbitration would have been
brought in the Federal District where she lived, she could have hired local counsel to defend
her in the arbitration or she could have defended herself. Since she was sued in Utah, she had
to hire Utah counsel to defend her. She incurred the costs of this defense to the present point
of this lawsuit. If this case was stayed and arbitration compelled, she would incur the
additional cost of hiring counsel in Texas to defend her in the arbitration. Further, the cost
incurred by Ms. Nazar in the present suit would be wasted as would the judicial resources
spent to this point.
7. Ms. Nazar would also be prejudiced by granting the Motion to Compel Arbitration at this
point in the litigation.
8. Federated waived its right to arbitrate.

III. Order.
Based on the above holding ofundisputed facts and conclusions of law, the motion of Federated to
stay this case and compel arbitration is denied.
END OF ORDER
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any'other inallcr, whelhct or.-tXJ\ It aCCG!Tl)lani~ IIJ\ Account pa~inml arv.l. whether. er n.ol ncoitl[alilcls orpUIJJOllS lo
.:1m&nd any plll"Aclons-of W~ ~e..e:ment lncludlng (bulnot lumetf lo) this P.mgra~h 6 2nd \ 1heUm oi net It puipoi\s lo
b!!comu elfedivs.\'111hout.our expil!SS BDll!ment {Ulal is.oy•mgaU'l!.qi~lf bisad upon i:.udl lh~gs as VJ9: p~snge o.r
·lim: crour'falura lq ciject.1;rtirn:>9J1d), unlmv)!a spa!:lr~ am 2flflJ1211vdisi.grae lab~ ~ound byn h :a v(!iing sl~eil
.by·curnt.ihomd ~r-rir ~pre:inla[y.r. Commmk:cliom regnn!'")!f dspuled chamll8 aqo li-Cllh:menl proposals .f!\Usl

~

1

~

·1:e diraCl!ld lo U\il address for.~ch ma"cr, sh111111 CO ynutp:?rie&c b~ll!l sla'lernsnl..
. A,!:c.ount ~ym!lnls iTII to be ~2!1 la lhn ~drnts lor.p~ iihown ~n.YJUipgria'cil: blfir,v ~~l!Jlt. P:iymen\'
mustb~ recaived by .us 21.lhat ad&!s!..im oflr.cfora lha~eclli!if ti@!!. Ill) lht'Plymcnt Oµo. tl~la ~ m your pedo~io
'bill'~ slalomtntand tnUslconfonn lo aw specilioJi:quiretmnb for mal6,g paym:nl v,i1Jch appeeJ'.\'1111 ~In Y,our blliog

sfa~inenl Pjjrnebl';,l~~r~d.lo.rod .!(~P.~~ bY .us or.9ur~·~ all! ~~l\~h2tllta1J!h~.~~s~l~lf.on;ya~
pe,iOliic·bling s_lalcm~nl i~ l)ol ell'1!1:r~·unl:l td~~ ~tw-allh!! 1 1 ~ spacft1eo;lC a paymenL~-rawmi:d lo llS

Ull?aij er rrisho!ICO?d ror•.D?Y.£02.SOn, Df ff your A~ll olhllMls'G [n·dl!f.,ul~ or 11'\!l,O ~1?1\',\$e.de:::m :IPF.Of!i!alDa \\Ja
ma.Y lrnpase '4 Credit Urlt ~o~ oq_ ane more pq'lmfltnrp ti!Qllva lh.eraaller an:}Wr Acaru.ntsuth llal.:aMou~h ihe
~nl \1.U dem:nsa
au~l.;lridingh~afy.c ai lhll dale lhB payme¢.~ P.t!Sle4lil\•.ij ~il:ie0iies\oil;your

:yaur

er

not

or

~

n\'i?3~blo Crada IJnulrcra p~"rDd orl)p lo ~'lenly-9ile ~} ~-aflw-po~\xlg.
.,•
We 2~ mlJctllih!d·to ncceji~yp~ontllim ~unl Vt1poh ~~-vourou~fl!t!i!~unl bafallC9«~v~
,•,u!Jld woouca -~ credit hMlUnl"balence.. -'.8ul.·lhve:a,!l'.lapt.s:u~h a paym!nl a·cUU!l\\1se -gai11ral! ,u ere.cll.Am:mnl.
,
.billan~; your a\t.t~~-Ored~UroICls-rint lncrwe.:t b~ fna amoonlof iltalcnerpayroenl or ereall balair-!i. End.\va c1a not
requred to :Ji!J!Jlodze-or,praee:s:
ll'l<Z"S cf-lhe ¢f?dll LJ~ Qf \d ~il\ thatll\'ClP~I ct
tr6t!i1 bal~.-as. a.d.$posjh1ilnleresl-beaiin]·Rl!rn1 ot.lo ls:sub .~·lW!d·w.~dl or any pinlio.n of !hnl ev~~l or
-tradtll12121\te ~P.t ln·111Splll1S3 lq your ~·requ~ that.~ do so (er ol~IIIVis~ 2!.,Jm:l:i~m:hy oiiJPEl2b?~Jaw)
·11iil:!n do!ng·~o .\mu..'d lie cons!s\ent1.•~ti ~ples or sa i!nU~Gllltd baniill!l;
· ··
·
7. FESS ANO CHARGES; SitaSUWlera:!lllcxmL'l~ a(!d;'f~na!Te~ ~1eµ an:1 c;tiil~
....J!:_F\NANCE Cf-{.a.RGC..S: Sec:Sl.'Jlpmnenl.cort:lnil.9~~1'rcrms"CJ\.linanca tbz~
.
.
, ·dAWl~ OOUPUTA110N ME11100: Awraso oa~ ~lanr.es~to calct!lafod £l!pi!ra~Jqr~-A~vanw;, fq
Piidfuse~ 211d for.any o!fier.kciiur2 co,npanonlk n!gffilir rw·1n1saducloiv, iuomc&ri!ll or aIner :;i:par.ih>-lrJ~sl r.al~
Wo 1:21cll1wi 02cit such~var..ne·D~yB~ca•as·rcl4\'ts: Fot enclt day in lhe.bilinn:C'Jda v~·talai ~days ~effejrln.9
oalanm.(an arnel!I\t utat k\cllXlcn B!:J\lcd i!ll'd/or ~.l!riance.m2Jge.s1 fees and li\h!c ~s'from.pr,c,io~ bl!irr.g
eyd:_s} .ond zrl;d sny-na<:r(ron!lacllons and:othcr dc;b!ts.,Wo•ilwi'zdd-iin hiterast iamwnl:CG$Ho·im p~·dafs
ta ding btl.al}e,Q mu!li_pl!Ed tty Iha ai:,rlicalila O:ilf P~iild!e Raio •. WoJhen N2batt any.p~h . ot ~b posted ~t
·d~y;Thi~.g}JE.u tl'.a :1b~Yb:21il008.·Wa-lhen add :in,ar=Um .dDll)l,b2lm\cas (i!lfe!ur!ilg c!:lys 'Jmlch md \'Alh·a cm!lil.
·bal:a,!ltal,.aµl divlda·~ach :&um ~YA~a:nurn_b.er.md~ hJha,g1ing·C)TJ~.'Jij! g~sJ1.s:l!re Aw~_D~y ea~~'l1Y.o
.
,lhen:~tnbfm:.llie.:/\Verag1i:llail/ .B11la~s & Cash ./u1w.nces.-Puldliises _l!qd.any ~ther.sep-~..bulated~Acc.c;lW •· .. • -- .. . ·.•.
~mponzmls ~.nel Iha Aceol.tl\ AVl!f?9~ Dnty.llal;meo; .M.(l!!S·tqw.;i!d ID yaur Aol11uotRe edded'\a ihi>·app.'Dp!Ull8
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8 ~g cyt1a·:1s ih1um11$g P.!JlDd of·ilm~ .nmm~y ipll!D)lmm~'Y GO tL.-,s. dUtirJg ·,~cl\ Accx11nt tmJGacllaps.
ch~:rnndaadits'21B~\ailzndrcrf\1,hlciia_p!doal~timng~ent19"l3SU?.d, Th~lmuy.aabifugwdafs
·113 :al!fng -Oycb Clo~g l>a~ ·EJWng.L)tl~ d:i no\ -~t'O!nt°ilo v.1th.camnda!'tmRfts.;i:nil a~ cyd.1r1hal~.
.id!nLlie.tl orlalx2loo asUi!l 6ii;lng cyd~ IG!'.a Jalil;t.ll2r~endMmonlh otathet ~enad l~thcC)'dc·wlihH l~s-nse1&9
tycta Cfosiflg D.ita !I\ 11ml monUt er p~ (Far ~{n?q: °¥CI.Jf Ac=unro •J.snu:iry hll~ r:tt#I' ~tho·bli'tll!l c;ft!IJ.
wltlch.him·l~~mpn.CfdllC~gpil~inJ.inuasyJ - ·
.
•
..
10. EVENTS O.F OOA\LT: You am -\ulefatifW1der11Jis Agreem2n\ li any of Ua f~cr;•Ang or.cue ·(a) _you.:do .nyt
mcl<o thuo~G.rea riiWmlklJ perlodlc~~tcn1haACCt1unHn fhorn11nner2nd by Ille line c:if.d!lYon Oto PilyimnlDoo
=O010.lh:!t a~ sP.ecilie~ on y~p~cr!'t bi!lng ~~men~'{'o} ~ fai(loJ.aY aa agrca~•llfo1her«i!ilfdefu>ll'Ctl any'DlheT
obDgaUcn y.il!h3Va 'llllh ~ UAUi,ny df oi,r;i~tes or~,ih Fl}'Dllu:~lllo1;;(c)~ ~~ ~ ofyu11 proni!sa ijnder
lh!s /\greament (d) you .becume·~ un.bE.lP~ll.'SYiYGUt.deb~ crcaasn doing l!l!Sfnass-tn oolii9 concam, or
dbo::nUnuo :fOU' i:mpkJ:tm~n\.or o~~ra1;ff10 n:illt~J,lll !hc:~~kl2!Si (o) any olhei: mtlilar.~ by leg.:J pcC"Bss ta laka
1nonriy o( yous kt. aurpoSSCS'Slam-(O .YOU provida us ~.illi any (ab:i Q'lre.~ lnfcirrn~tk11i Ci':signa~.:s.ln ctinn~lion
w:lh l!D AcclXllll or.ils ~ 2pP.lc;tion er c1111J ~er.a:ceunl \'iAh u11;-(9),Yll\l diej (h} Im 1Jil9 o.f a palllol\ or .~lattng ol
other. pr~s I/lid~ Iha fl!i:f2ral Baunupl~J Ced!! or2frf .sl2lc, nsdvanttJ..C(alJJta·lly or;agmst rcu: ·(i) Iha Crnlil
Umit or lll!I ·Acrount .Is -exce.adajr(ilwa -0e111nnnu !hat yuu pte.5cnl i:lfsl( fJf ~ noo-~;m~nl cif ~vr Ai.CCl.!lll
ohlW1Uon~ ~) Iha ·Hash .on \m1ch l'la ·dstemmed }-our mw;odlim:SS and-2Rgibili{y 1cir your.Aa:ounl .tenm ha.1

~

GD

chang~di ·ll}_your A~ b closedJo.-.any-re~, oryo_u.f.eil lo uso your /o.ccotllll f~r ~w.transc:GCl5Jora numbe;.of
c:ons!u:ulive b?fing tY~e.s dolcmmeil 17tu~.(m)Jou ~ l 0 i or~tterppt lo COf!?JTIUllli:a\e,~il,~ b$ or~/'P.f•C!!I".
Dll)ployees crag2nls tn amanntr Ua\-r.ia da.em ta biiblp_propnate.or1lllatllho1lzed.(::uch a!i tr-J ahusL-g our cmp!oyees;

or.a~_g ID pslfarm Aa:ounl trm~ac110i1s or use,ourWebstlas Oiolher SUP.Port fao1U~ 11!h!1 Dan In lhc mam.ter

l

.. •..~f

liOntcmrplll:d ~ .our ~Glems 2nd pro~): ·o/ (n) 1ot1 uss, 11r:al!.empt io;~se1 a Cald or lht ACC®nl foMIQY
lraf?ndian by:Willdi·~-Ptl!'Purl.to purcha."a 9oodi ot,$et"Yl~1rom1h.s Busl~ or \T'hlch.has no app.r~nt~Hlmelc
1illSin~ purpose, tlt'.\iihich botld Clll\$0M9 fraud nra.111ol3~ i)f appll::ablo la'll•orregtllotor1 go!dan:a or.a w.fulion of
DnY lltisinl!!::1's ~ezthanl.l?an!< tiiltiser~.s agreamenl:.am:Vcrof epJi!C2hla i:-ard ls'sa?.r mamb!ishlp C.'!JMiz~lion nil!S.
, 11. RIGHTS.tJPON.AN EVENT Or DEF.Alll.T: lf·&nYl!'ll!,nlcW~ OtdUS, wa tr.3}' do 2nyor Ill cf the (O&l\•,m
vn'if.o~l ad•l?Jl~ no6c.11 lo yoo:'(a) iii<~-a·ifi~ ou1sta1ufug balance oving on Ula /1.ccnt!tt ta be Jmml!daely dua aid
:p:iya}il°: (b) aYm•1 yau lo rzpay'~" /v:::mlli:&ibJtcl to the \ams and moow:ms or this Agn:2ftlenti (c}re6Js!f to PoY any
Cc!Wenerea Dh~cWJ or pJhenrilhdtawals.or charges; (d) lmmcd!aeb' lemii:Jalo ktcunt ~Ult p!M)g:s} (e) :ru~:rid
U-.e ava!latffi./ ~lh~ Accrium. '3!\l!fcNI llf!Y of 011r~ll\5Ufppil fa-!1 (str-.h ~ onllnti Websaaoc~)i (Q i(j}ust
~ur Accxxmt p11dng and/or lhn_ ~~lawe lJS1l lo·caeu)aJn lhnmiPlmum pa--yrnent due on lhe ACl.1)1:d, ~l?f"as.sai out
mPzri19rapm o .:md 8 orolhm~rr, ~} con$1der1hc ~tu1lnof::,ngc,.rit".good $t2n~n9"'t fqrpuipos!l.S orpartrc.:pati~9·"1
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Aer.cunl progr.inis ~lid (eM!I (:.~ch o,. Gaih B.o:k and ~I\CI' rewanls prograTM), clio:'bfillt fur ln'rodUclOIY

Wl~/orp£omDUonal m~s an~/orolfers, or olhe1w~ei ~) lru?o~lhe Cradi\tlli11 hold n.mt QI!}~ Pmoraph 6; lQ

c:ancol ~ell" Crr.if1l Pmtcd'tDl .imllcr ernm ln~u~n::e: (I) ·er~~ ~11)' oclslori!lng bul.tt,e': fWll!g on lhs Ac:oun~
1tiUl funds f1am :a1w mpd!ll c:rinve:!.tmcnl uccounl you h:l'm l,!h u.s: or our afiilial~ (:t1bJ::tl \o lha·\~IJ!l.-Of ilnY
su~h.aGrou~ and lo 1w~l:J.e aw). In e.va\Ul?Ung a11y own\ qf d2fruJl, •ne may ml\S!dl!r Um lmig!l\ ol lime }'Our
.MctOnl ha~ been op2rr, the exmntscr\:.1us12ss ?nd ~g ur. 01:1\ D'i'~I\I; ~n:1·olJ\Cr ra.~11 rnl~Ung lo ~ollr
Ac«u1t uB and pl?fl:irman:o. tJ~:in-0\li dsmsnd, ycu V.11.~oialtt/ ~2'1 Iha owl anding /i.c-ccunl bslanca ln
full ml rel\lm 2ll Can:15 aid unused Ci:lnven~qe Checlis..
.
12. A.lv\Elmt.1.ENUCHMtGE. IJ-l U:ro.l5;Wa lr.i•,a-lha tiglt\ P changc..run:1n~ ~dd ;md citl&l~ \ettns c;f lrls
A!l~~~ @ud(ljJ .(wi!ho\t rJniii\bn) changes ·that Clfied exlsO.ig ffCIJ!mns· on 'ba:ir.ces., tale3, f~ns 2r.&or
Gn~ th-;1130:. ~ \'itll zs cliatige:s ihal add f'll!NI plll'rl~toll!I ool orci;!.t/ o:lill!d to prdY'~u:\y-c);is'f~g pmi!s.bir..1
llpiin \\1nlnn riol~ ll'.i rcll'Jl1til by aprlecb!~ bw. Artt cha,ged. att\:?lldtlll or ~d~d {cc, dtlf8i?1 ln\!:ro~l ralc,
flllancc ,har~ .or m1iimum p.l)'nl?nl am~unt (~•,lnLior . ~ er dqi;c~::~d) or olh:r r\ct:cllnt 191111 er
A9reem!!nl prok.0115h-aU hoerecfr{o ~ to. bolh lho cg~l:!rdl\ll At:e11nJ bllaneo and~~ lranc.i,~oo:; urilo~
11Urnn!im s~cll~Sv provides o\hS\'ii~s;we c:irrs~er, und.~rou ~gru, lh:ilyou hma:cepfud any ~:iru.ic Hyo~
J~e por 11::J CIrie Card GT !ho A..'"COllru allerU\e 1dfeclr.'e ilal~ allui clwnga.
13, BIWNG STATEMENTS AND ERRORS: Wa sand pEdodbb\t~ s\alem,etls{o Ute- BUS:oe?i'!I and/or lo lh9
°S'ijiiiig Individual. st oielr ~ddress(cs) shrwn In cur ll?tords (QUI\\~ hatt-na .o!J!gaUon {o sind.mli!Gif.e·or
dupftc:l)o s\olemerits). We m~y. ii QIJt optton, e~C.l lo sand ecnad'IC blU!yJ $\~em\?nl!l clecllonica.1y. Wa mii}'
ti.eel nol lo send a J)!rnO.c slalem~t for any.bU!ir.g cytI: ~, Y.,i!lidt lher:e Is no~ ar ~fildll~unt balan~ of
mora \han $1 1 a; no kcounl uaa~ons ord1.ugis, .ar no fl'Elca c!Jm.Ia ~assl!d..",You ;;9l'l!l! .10 r.o\fy Us Uvnu
lb n(!l ~o ony pa.1~uar ~i:itslJli!!ll- Unl;SS:you.tl!IDrius..lo.\vnlng of~ aleg!d Cf!O.ro:on ~ slaem!lll
v,~ln 00 days of tho tssuo tlale appeariqg:!Jn· lhe,slal2met\};:i'~! ~vill cnnsider ~a s\ammnnl correc\ ror anpurposes. •

'J

·'14-.!JI:IlMlNAil0lJOF:AC00UNT-P.N.0.REOUc 0 0
~1/omayl•lmtn.11~1hol\cet:unlor~ee
"ino C(lldl
at any Orne upon s!mdlng:wdlleO nvac·to.yau at Jre laEl addres'i srmm on our rel:!h'tts (whicl\
noac.o need not ·b:1 n-acrr.!llcel, Md regiY"Jle~ of ".1h11_lhor-YQU ~1'!1-ill d:fnln .1-tmler llis :AgreemErL Yoµr.tigb\S
under.lh:I /\CCCllnl \lD be !mmlruie.d ot mecfilii!d a~nMID'•~lf !he Aco::lmh~ lcmini:i.ad orth4 Credll l.ltdl Is
recy~d, ~'0\1 ~l. O!~-I<f~ G_:1~ ~~a~ P!fl~C. paymmn Qt~ 'ih~ he~L~l~ic pad ln _nf.l"l:n!ea!I
paym enl-.of"lhe Ac9llirt· be!ancu Is damagded.:-Thc Accoonl. oolil P?.id '1:'1 ill, ~nuls to•b2':'st!b1acl ·10·.1my
cm~dmvntmatlo ltilhhlAgreen'rJll ~ \ lo-Parograp)112.·
·
_
•
~5. Ml:RCHAl~r C[A~Jcu~c: la !!SliBr\ all deCeNc:., COfll?n.~·1\ghl$ ood claims ~et~nlCeina')
• ,w.rfoh -~ou rnay hiiixi rel! lo giiotls ouuvtcas :tJ~d·ntmugh·Blri'tJsi;i.cf:lh-: .Al:o:n/l\(ar,.':f igeiiu\ 11\c
·merchant -or.olhlir psl"Sllll ·sellno or proVi~ .lho$a·SQ.Dds or ser.ices Md not ·b93tnsl 11$; You .a:g~~·lbal
~art!lsss.of"lh11.e~lcnte and/at' lhc oabm of.any Mcrtha\l Claw, ,pJ. :ara liafl\e (o us ss)tis Agr~II\Slt
prnv1de~an~withouhrw ~;eptiog. and~ am r.ohispansib~ for1{r! ~anl CIEmSycu_mayba~a.
• ·16. REfl:»Tl0MOF·m·Vcu •~·ilia\ at \li~-\!ffl~Y~-~bblfl.a ~asit-Mr.mt11 (ir.c~l for,klM
.if~c'Jonsj Qr urc:~.-a -::7 or·olll:1rmed!on,:you \\I'll ~n ~il·r.etain•:i ~J x:f ti\~~ or·11~r
d;,oument\':bli:h·o\iden&es'lhe:lr.lnsadlolj. Toe absenre nr.suc1, aJiiaft:91' doeum~ .or-lhi: ~hstn!!o cf yw.

/'.

• -~!5m1~ dc::inat~c youiroml!!bURy-(orin ;m\ounJ~rJy~mud ol\·tb:l ti.cc!J\!llt
..
•
_ 11. OOUECTION: Ya.1. agreo lhaUfYQU dt>.nqtpay.oo Uie Atr;ot11tas-awee<1 or.~ ~3',~ln·ds&u9, you

.,filact:?r.tt~ephotlllcalls!i'om1µ.oronaucbehalfa\ytlthomo-an()'CU'_~~-orbusl<t11S;Sre931IlhgcoTEcllon

of ~cunls owad en lhekccunl Yctruidet$blm Dud~ ~R:r_Jtr.iY bs nu!Q~llc:31)' d~ad atd:a:recqroro·
~~11.tnaY ~ J;!ayed. Ye11_;:inroo micb cais e11S ~ -imso!b'l.ea• on~fcrpU"pmas of.~JJ?~o.laVI. Ycu·nlso
ii~IS lhsl~pl \oUie ~t~hlbitedby_qpp!'J:8bla l!\Y1 we~croorrapra5t:n1$anny~0 ccmml!lllt:ilil
Tlilh you _by o\hcrmmli3 lrd1H1!pg ;t~iilhaut lirnlla~a)} fax or-tcb!cophr, lntmlet, \151113\ e-maU, c:iunar.d.~!Jery,

2ndperoal\91'.~si~·

:

• .

1!· AOOOUNT USE jl.FfER'fERl~'TION: µse or 1h11 Arxwril ;nd/or_your-Caid .qndlor Ccnv~enca

~cK!i afi~no«~ ol rovr.calon &tiaffifulenlaiiir'rrav.!:ll~e:tyau fD.dvlfablnfV arxllorw. pfl)tecrnfon. . •.

19. ~Ca!ATION: '.thit. SJ{inlng'.lri:IM;flliil orl~erliUCC!iill' C2fl•t:arQl.tho·AtttJllll by .dalvedng io·us
·· -~;~en or·tihl.ncGr.c,iha{~u;i\lsh..l~i:!9~:so~ ~n.;el~lpi.~~-~1#.lt~Y.:.c!rtt. $11Ch.peray?\ operales:lalin~~c
tho k::aunl-'lS lo ~Qixyou. Upon i!Nils ~_yourcancetallt!ltilircii )'CU Q311lEi°-tim-ycu-ft,ftio\ u~1h~Actolinl lo
-ob\ti.111 ~ddiL'oo:il cadil:ll!' f~ ~ .o~r ~~e. -~ Qial you .\\ill ~"Omp\~ :m$1raY.;a1! C3J?S ~ unu!lal!
Conml~•Ched1~.by C11filng Ihm\ Vl ratt.anil rcwmnu ID 1&al.~idtlras!. l11 Par3_graph s. .02nce&al!nn of
. lhe.Account. Boes rot aiil:cl yoor.nh&galiott \o.pay.any i6ntollis Due iild o-:ing -on:tha,Atulun\ at.ttui"lime er
1:2nCi!lal!i>I) er pn:pndy 2taU!ng lletoti!t~, 11nd ~,nu:contnJQ lo.l:!a hovnd·\o ma!ta.Jr,IYttllnls put:$Uan\ lo Dus
.~teiimc.nt un~ -tbs.Ao::Gtmt .t. paid ·lo '{dt 1h~ AtcoUll~ tmtil Mid .n :ru11c tnnlfntie; to ·be su~cl·to .any"
arandmenl mildcla IHsAgrae:ment~1<1 Pa~ga):h 12. · .
· ·
·
·
20.AOORESSea ":.NOTICES -:AOfJOllS: YOU P.gtea·lo~ uslnfclmei;i <iYQ\iqti'dramind hoW~CtJn\act ·
•yau. n'P. mll'lil, yov ·t#h·,rll11 )'Cllrnuw aii'~ 8fldlcloph~.nvmlmron ti~ mlum llltlb or the p-2licdi:btll\lg

··•.--.-·•

!llalamon\ or.nlve us som11 ll'!m ~nolJeo :ow~ ll\11Y ch,nngn:tur fEtO*•You ngiec lu1l-whenuYar-~cre

.fe(ifirod kl giwyou nolice\isa n\ily.eonclwitllypiesum~·~w::1 h1va_grlPJl i1 byotJ lfwa-ms1Jtlo yau al\ha:lasl
1:ddress ir,n\m to us as s!mwn on our ntoltl~ v,ne11mr_:zs· p2J\ ol·a puiooio llll!ll!J:Slal21nenl er. rilhel\'45$. Atl
·niJUce:; (l!gaid[no th11 'Aetounl.can ba ~wn .to any C!lilmarn¥r en~ \'lhi!n '!!"rnn so l!ff~divG a:rto-alt

Cart!m,rw:1'3' and- any a~uon lc:i<e.n 0ragre!mantma:!11 ir.eny ~ O,!drnem!m shat h\td ail Oardtnl!tn\x3s.
2.1, CREOrr ltlVESTIGh110N >.J-JO AEPORllNG;Yau nuU\adM ter{Q mako Vtb~liV!!rcradit rmsl!gillon w~'1i2"6ave-ts propcrluviiluate Your cijdfI ttislc\al s!2n4hg :ind ~"Floymmt lrit!~cing {bill n:il'llmitccl (o} oroeifna
~nd tccctilng reports ~m·Ql;d:t blrsls,uaifilc:<chang~ 'Bid s'Jnier agereics mt·lh:.1 ~!gn~g 1r.d'l't'!dl1lll1,the

Duslnilss ood ~ carr!nembl!IS, Wa mr/ Ho so-at &r/ fime.md fiqm 1imt 1o !m~ :i) fs,rarn ~a Account 1~•
.oirnncdjb)·YihUil Ole t-.ccoun\ 1?1T11ins~.snd G)·ullet il::.Acoo)lntls {;loscd-so.l9na U iili)f ~m01.mlS nus
.ro~~1 lll!p:tid nn&cr :Jf11.displh, dlt.t9T"Come11t-or lcgalp,~cmlifig ~•ihtclr ~lrNOh'03 us .e11d :~ ar,YDU rem;i!ns
·urronNetl Yau 11uth0fll4·Us !a.reJ:(lrl and eMchan.s~ crur cram eXl)e11?11ce ~,~h~_u10i ~!ld ~pond to fnqiliri~
·"frolJ\ cretlil.burc~.-acdl cxc1Bng2s and sltnlar agandas ~ welfas-on,~r cmdiois \'(no \\'il.rea:;onab[y 'tiebva
~ro (ur. tro-a,nsldaoog) doing bll:Rllcs~ .~.yau. (Tlti~. rnean~·\'!e.may,repoil Jtirormalion, lile!Ud!n!l nogauve
xuomiaoon.,abou\yoUi A~unt to crewlli\srenus, 811d any lab! ants-sed Ja)'m!r.\.5 r:rolher e11mts-cf defa\!ll.ritr

your cre~l qbli~n ur.dcr !h!s.A~11meritna'J bu relltGled In ya~Q?dit reporl.} You ~iho )Cllr.em,ptoyers
(past, t,12S11nt.D11d fulUro) and olher PerereAces lo mte.aso.and/crYl!ll(}i tnfonri::Uc:n.la us ol-any Umc.:.Yr11 .igrc~ lo

promph'yprov!d~ lo us Stl:h-nn~ncl;l mdoU,erlnfonn:illon ~bout yourself ar.d lho B.usi~ 311d/or.~ ~als
(coiporale 0Dic~;,g2mml patnm DI' owanrs, as-;iQ¢t:abl,) 25·\'{ll mot 1equsst-rrtm i!n1e In lime, end ~nrlt.us

.· •

7,00Lo

?M''Jt

L\ of- to

lo in~::ct1 conr11111 enq cQJJYyaur booll'!·l!lld records il i!m' Une.'dllting nmtml.bus'n!!S lu,u:s. Yeti ~l!ii agme tc
promp~ pMa,ide us ~th-lnfcnnaUon aio dorJXnfl\ls,abQ\ii lre-BtGir..ss's conUnl!!!d e)islence mid goc~
slaniln.g and yolr elnJ:lrtjJTienl or olher amccllon \'nh ii, a!!Vli!II as its contlfl'.ll119 aulhollYI!> tr.rrow, as:vte mi:iY
requu1 rrom fl1ls lo lxI\9.
·
22. ACC0UITT-INfOFWAl10N! You eUllJoiim

us lo (a) rdi!ia '!nbmtaU:n froq1 mirn~ 2.b:iuly_ou·t1nd·

1ncAccountm response.lo any.summons, rerpcsl or subp.isn:i kst1erlbyan~ ir,.lnbipal, G1.ale orfedetol ;igeney
or c::t!rl-arby co~sc.trorapcrlj lo~nytiUgaUcn; Oll pravi!c tnromslionainut~u and lha·/IJ:c:nL-nHrrnn m1rfi!... ,:
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'')_OOw. rl'-l}t 'O D ~ - LO

1d fromcrccit~porllng t1gmicl~ und !.lmfarsourtus \o~ of qW ~f(;a\cs ~ha\is-1 ccmp1n:os ,·dlich ate parl. cf

r Adnnta oo!poralo famJJ); le) indlldo iWiihO\JI l~n\JaUon) yot; name, nusin~ nan~~ ~dom~s nnd clh~

:ceunl nUribules · ii \he tnron1taUon alloul cur cusl&f!i21S ll)a.l ·\'r.l er cur :ilf:li:ilu mwl:ll., :mil dJ!;'Jllay
tcimn'.cilllY and oUmv,lse (such ,:is on a.Websile desail(rJJ u,~ bu!lness~ al our cuslom::si er In pubns.'ied
1slancrlis~). oml U1al wa maymalto iN.iiabl~ from limo lo \:ma by sa\:: crpD\c~•,ito t~ _oura!ii~ales and/orlhW

A·
f"\

lriie~ (d} l~ldA responses Ol\il lrlormaUon cl>olrt you, y,,ur op~Gan rod~ /i.CXO\I™- {v1h1ch cculd ln~Ud!:1
Jt ~ net \.mlel1 to. kcount nUm~, sssigMd sr.d avaf.lbb Cradil Un\ls, Acmunt \Ea, md wv:mfo prosra!ll
rormatian) to ?rJ'l CtJ•brantl v.m~, i;crti--..o pruvidtr, ~mj\y groUJ) or.other pc~on or anl.lty\.'ll'tl ~anlifil!d:you ~s
,_
member, cust0i1\er or pro~ peel ar In
r~trb.e?shlp Is ;m >wnml pro(J:?in b!!n~ ar,Who 1w conmdod.
ju rut our b!hclC; and (c) pro'Jida tesJ>tme~ antlW01tni1llon ob:i~ll'IIU, yournppa:aUon,an~ lhoAt~lll),l f10m
V\V'.f(Q,.i/.\. f
ur mes nntl from cratiil ~011lng 29cnclc$ znd olnilar tou~ to •.r:1, pcr.;co or en~.liJ who \!Ja .bch!:Vo l:i
:mducllng a flitJP!f lo~u:ry. lf.yGU da noh•il!ch Us lo p1D'lido.Jrua1mallon to our 3/fl!;al1;£ er lncl~oyc1.1 qr.yoµr
. · •~.G~.~ht:ss .m!r,~) or{c) :i~O'Jn, itiU m~y ~so us ~lcuradd1?Ss kl P~o1M.
,
·
. ·
.
.
~ --~
.,.23. ASSIGNMENT: -W~.f!m'..~d.or.assioo.tny or'cll of our !i!Jbl~~od cb~;;Uons ~~c~l-~.ndJorJhl!.
~
~;;,11l;fYA'l!1ou! noll:e,:You lrla)'Jlol l-ltjgn·lo i!lro.iilliiiA(tQ11nl.or.ony.of ycs.r~noh!s.or.oll~ga\T,ln!i..U11({ffr
1
/
lu "9''-'-ffi?fu.
.
. 2l"St0PPING CONVENIENCE CH§CJC PAYMEl:{TS:.D.ic !a {hs no!ure of Coovcnlcncc Cl~l~•. \w 12lli10l •
d'ecTvay siop p~.~t ori di!tn. /IJlhoUl)lt·\IJa rnrrf allempl lo &:, so ·h respor.se to a re~l from you er for •
!her reasons, and v,c ma1 clmga an Ac(ounl ree In lhal. CMnc:!an, U'I! hoVa no 2;ib~• rcrtwu!n lo d? so.
25. AUTHORIZATION~ Wo teli!M 1h11 !lghl la llmll,-from lime lo ijma :ind riilhool iµce, Ult .mi:iunl vm
i.ifuru.e !or -O.rf/. Purth:1$e, c11sh i\d'ronce- er cU,cr Accnunl tian:rc.e&xl, Wo ~ nol reS"'~l\slblc for all'/ refusal
tJ ~n A~, Jllefl?b:utl, fmancli!I h~Wllon arolh~ pcllion lo hontiryour ~ or Cc:nvani:nca. Chack~.
25. AlJTOI\/A11C Tati:R 1#..CHIHE.CI\SHAOV/IHC§; O:isl1 Ad11_20cc:1 mily nol:cxcecd.~ laasl cf ln!!
•~5i!AIM lffl(l~SO P.~rd.ay, cclheportlon o}yoor Cmdlllll\11 wenulhoozo from \Ima 1o lime as ;1,v-.Jlabl~
·.-:ir Cash Ad~2.nru. A receipt Cl'QJ!l nn l,\lM mcy•nol !ndca\e 1hal the lralm:bl was.ca:duc:led \\WJ.a .ca~
legardless ofth1rnrormallan r.ontahed.on loo retflpl, arrt·\'ltlhdrawa\.iil.illl /\Thi mwc v.-llh thc-C;ITd ,·lilt be
11q~sdbyus.osa-cashM!va~. , •
• • .
:.·
·
·
,?.7:TERJJJNATION Ori\™ PntVtlEGES: We i:miylcmilrialL? or.~gek U10 USQ or 2lt/.Q3(tl_~l~OY.AJ!M! CU!
,~ctellcn, l':nenfur \'Ii ~50<1abfi 6illeve .Uie,a 13-4_n\$RI .aclivi'ly 011 .lh3 Card or Iha At~µri ~r ~'OU. as~i, •
lafa.iaunlferlhli:h.lreemenl
•
·
t 26. OlHER.PRODU~ AHO SERVICE:S; From llmi> lo llnra.our amialas an!Ycr~,w po11tles may c!fer)?J
1'lilliioriill (cilurc:r, ·pro ud1, ·.ii-i:ivlci, .iinil cnhancarn2Jlls. lrdudr,J .cradn- mtd. lravel•relaCcd pn:xlircts ilrd
~rvicas (S\lCh ·~.~l.6fe1·dnb;ty, qrolh~r ins\m!IC', cle~t ~lx:dulilJn..cQVerogo, comrrJJn t.".1dcr t~,tl
nsl!/2llca, regtstr.JUon f!X: lost.-cr.:\olan cmdil emf$, ewrg=IY:{ ca::b su/iea .and edHrass ch:uigc s_cr,~o), olhcr
'l?alurl!,Sj;proifutb, servkes-and enhailccnren.13.. You U)dmlimd.thatwa .irc.mUiable rar llliY asped·ontvm
.~rci::sortl\osci fe~res, mt1ucts,.:mic:.s,.G11d cnhooccmenls, nrd \h~y ara tho scle rospD(l!iibliyof tha nlli~lts
::rlhW pank\i ~'ltlc:h ~rrer Um11.. Vcu ;gre~ IIJ bo\d Ui brumless fitm mt clakr~, acuQfl$, .or damugeu.::.su'dlng
from U-,psa ofi~n,..oryour a.epV~Uon ·ror or use:01 any. of lhoi~ JrtalUtet p1c11Jucts, SIJIYICCS a- j!nhn~me~\Sf lo.
lhe•rnatm-dagrce pernillu!d·by.Bflp2cab19'.law... lf:Xoll.'1!cl. lD.appl9 for Qt'.:itttpl cr.mn 2f!Y;Df 1hc fategc~.9
.\'fticMnvotYi!S"clllcgt'lg a prenlium,•.feeordiarge lo YotF Ac:ounl (wh&lharyou do so by e:r.pre,5Sly ccnscn!.ilg, nr
·byfcJinglo1aptau1~~cznccl d\llirig an ~dqtlcqo~P.fombml penoit,.or.o~dsa),'JDUauL'lorlzcus lo pa!il
[hnl d,aiga !Q lho"AccOU1~ If D:IIY.•Cfiho rlm!9oln9 !nyc}1r:;lhe p~ml.cta\~ ,Q(.any re~ate. to\1/iid,'b?MGl,
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P.mrnfllm,'.pn!!! oralhar le;mir.or 'lakul~o you nronJout.be~f IX' on your k.:COIRl\, you ~1n01tlcog~ 2nd ag~e

U1~l\'m ha~enc;iiabllilt/fl?r;inyl~Wh!cllmayb9 assessed cnaly.o!lhosenems.cfvil!u!!oron Iha p~~cr

p\vool prow; and lhal yotuha.tf.d corcll ycur taxadY!str ttla1~ PJ'Oll'A..rtax lraa\lmntor any sucnllcms.
·20. CREDIT PROTECTIO~~D CREO[ INSURANc.E:: U.ycu croo:s,s·to 'oecom:: cnrololf t.mdtr-~ CrellR

plotao'l at ~di:lnsuranc1r ·rnad~:mlahlo from w,.our alilvid~-ora ~- party, En·amcndm:m to lh13
_Ag~nt·(ror-CrM11Protecli11!)) nra Cenucale ofl~lr.!nto. vM ~ tssucdlo ~~oo ~gra~lhatO,~ tippDcablu

monlhly chmge ·cr ptetrilum ··ITlilY. b:J d'lagod lD )'O.Uf Acco~ Th~ charoa at ;prem!!Jn 1,l!-be -cm_p11teo .as
:pro\ideij IR·lhttCredn Protecllon oi'Cretnt lrr.itJronl.9·plan end-~ bo 1alcc\cd 011 yourpt:lictJ'JC bing 1la\emanL-k'

.. _•• :·--·--~· -~.+:".

.. ___ _. . -~-you I~ l~ nr.i_lre 1\\e:raqu'red PCVJ11Ei1l.Ot\ .yo,ii·AcaiunUora pkdcl~minea li\lirh:r~cwettitNa·l:iJUnrr c,Ytlc~

- ·

-· · • -

••

.--:-

J vn sck( ~v'\
-~
/''

·· UilsC1?liill'ro~UonorCmdllnsurancamsybD·ca~~l1.-Y~t?llfemand~llh!!·pusthz1n,f.Crarll\P.10\2cllon~.-. ~., ...--~-~--..--.~..,, ...
er Grudit fn~cc·b vdmtrr2r.li.l:i'nol ra.qugd {or lha·Cl.11:nslon of-Clotlil (allhough ~ maY. cnnslder~·our
In\erastancgor•Jmlli!;ljlaoon ln_.sich.plen~·tn 11Vi11\!illln:l 'fG\1 re.JiU:Sls for auditald YO\!f'sce11unl :ilalt=), Iha\ \'/c
or.ixlr.11l!Tiale.rnay.mcetva a dlmmls:fei'\ or 111hct-pa"f.112lff.Oi' benefd:q cormdit1r\'Alh \he pwthaie, lhal wa
~av;nofdL'daty-t1rnUm-duly\ll)'aJh.conM.dJcq\1.{lt:i~asp~cr1m.pl,rCh~or!het;O"reiagc,.undll;tn\_)iou
should COOS11lt~rour.lax2d'Jlsor-p,S to thopropetlcii ~ oronyblll!Blils ~~ed umlern!JYsuch pb,n.
30•.SPECIAL PROGRAMS;Frome.ta Urre vre may ntrerSpecfzl ProSQl1lS (such as il pmmoUmal ln!.!!rillt
-talc orfCtl.:\'lilvar on c:ei\a'n tramac:tklm,.<lJ' 11\9. IXMeso ol $\~ns ~ pt:doclic:. p~I, or,P3(liclpal!on In Cnlih
Bzck·or olh~ ~\~ prourams).on lhs Accaun~ HaimalAcccunt few, ·cne,ues rmd o\hcr.lllmu 2pply lo any
s~al P~sram urJass lrico~nlwlllt IJlC! pa(r:darle~ures or tulas Dpp1k2!Jl9 Iii-a siro~tPrcnram clfeMg,
Th~ featu~ ard Julos llf fi\l~rpngram*•m:i}'VaJYfrom. ~ to fill\&, zn~ UllC•Of the Account~ 2CCOJdani:a V,ilh
lhc til.alurcs ·cr rules of-a ·Sp,eclal. Plcgram ~fli611Jtes• a91iem1111\' ~·tho~ -lc.al111es and iuas v,ilhout ronnm
m~ficalton·Qr~cnd1nerUo llis-Agreem~i (Alh~Jgh 5p~al P.rog~ (ealuresand rules, tnd.uain.!I [\'rlhcul
U~Uan.) C:lsh,Bachnd:o:J,ennvmds pn:igmm JU~.11tc·non11rms oftblsAgroemon~ !hoy ~o-reralcd la Iha
uio·oryour.Attoea\ ::oar lo bo ~-en:d lrJ lhs Mil.'nllon r,nMmni: 111 P~gtaFhs 35 :ind SG.} .U eny.or 01e
fa-$in.9 tnvo\vis tha•paymerh1r.~r,ud-0Tnrrf 11!ba~,w.Y2ri:I, b1tt1!U~ precruum..pnze or o\her items ot vauil ·lo
Yl1lt er Q'1 YOU[ behzif or-en ymr Ac!XMl~ you acm01vl~dmi mi ngee·lhat.•,'lc hava ·na Uablliy (orarr{ laxes
_.v.ldch matba 2ssessed (?fl ~IY of lhosc ~s ol' Ym!o .a-on Iha paymual ora<,ntd p[?ccss and th:!\ you shct.Jld
"V.. ca~llyour~ advl:o~ to lh~ prop:r~lraa\msl\ of Al'IY.~eh i!cms.
1·'f .G1• .C.Ol'lTROLUl-1GlAW~O J.JRISD1CT1~:nt~ As~:menl shaU b g0vemcd :;clely brand .lnli:rpret~d
.e.ilrilf·liuu:coit(an~ \\~'Ui ihu Jqyr. of iheSIJi(a ol Ulah, ~epl·as (and lo Ire de~ Ihm)~ law9 era
·Sij21fflied·bY.:U1e.bantting oroUi~hws o['tha Uole!I-Sratcs, rel)a(lJless·orv~ )'OU ~ 8 .or\l,he,a Iha
f n
·BU5hess ls lucated. We µaress lh!i A1X0Unl app!t:3Uoniniekc Iha de,hlan to Ojl!ln·U1e Attourtlcfld advance ~-D~r
C. r _
c1edit for ycu from. ouru1a11 orscus; You z.srcs ml allenM1 CtJntfilon,,.;md other pnrtistons retaUog lo Uie
. r.,. ,..) , \D
. ii!!..~ad or dEl~g tho h_a.iance up:m ~,!'lch Oiitbthrost rato ct Grnmco dJillg~ll CCll ~p-pUc.d, mtd a1othc_rt.~ims.
·v{ Iii.ls As,:ai:mcn!, lllo materlal. lo.th:3 ·delenu!llilllon bl lho•WolDS\ Tiila. ~-'(OU· CONSENT. lD
f"' «.;
AUR.ISDIQ'Jl.Ql[!_H ~~.Q.:.f§!ERA!..COURTS ·11-1 Vf/•JMNo·),GREe"THJ\T~SU1I:
-~fift-llt!t!>.TI-1~~1.h"T·e.aBF!i:lTIGtrr o.~:{ff 50cR-coQars·,~· B.EGARDU:S.S.
J~F.Wlto FltESlHSSU[1 ANPllAY-8mJ/Um'A!N"E[)'()NfrtWrnosa-eo1Jmt~ff
S ANO.Ur-mL~'/PARli'.El.ECTS ~ITR>.1lOlf PURSUAJ{TTOfflEAABl1Rf'.TION PROVISION IH THIS.AGREEMENT. ..
_n.sercAAeUIY!_~pl r~, P.~rcph 36l'lhTch has·11s. mm scv~ d:w.,e,_each provislcn In lhls
Agracmeru!:ha.Q·~~ lnlg!Jl!Glad SD BS to ha elEti'ID and vali:! to:lha ma>:imlm·~r:nl ~ossl>te· tnftr DHfi::abD
la~, an~ arr/ pro'll510n
Mo\Yld to'h~P.tulJ!bl!!d or!nvar{f underap~ laV1.sha.%~ deemed ~ccilva
orly ~ l1rtho J?ldtlof -Uul prol;ioih oc iwa~1t, \'thut invauJn&tg llie ramafru!2r of !he pralision or c11y.0Uiar

~
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. 3j. ADDING ·ANO Dili.En~m 01\RO\ffif.mERS! )V11-mhY chros~ lo VEml't th!) addllill of canlmm!ber~ ~~ Un:

oilier 61:in itie g!!lnfnri lndM:?ual1 and I( w~• do so, lhe.rercrcacu rn U11!i #-g!l!cment \0 t:.!cll midaum:1.I
C2rdmcmhJ?r.i '2-pp}/, You an~ ntt/ dl1e.r proseri\ or prclposcd Cardman'\Jcr.i 'lciil fd!au il.ad 0Jrnp!e.l11 an r.roco!l•J~s 211d
forms requ)td by us 10 add I di:!~ or changs Cin..'-nembelS', lo u,a ~iml of ~a d~l!b'o11 GI" a caidm~mbor, nn:<limrn
di 1r10 (5) busness $ys Is re~u\md 2r.d you1 lh!J Bus<ne£.S 211d 2rrf n·eri-:irieclcd C:1.-dmcmbsrs Wll !fl~~ ~l ra.2s00i3ble
u.ltcmp\G to .o~\aln 1h11 dsctcd Cudm!:m!re(s card and umm.d eaiv~nt~ncc Chedts:. N~1it!.land'~g lh!I del:l~s ol wJ·
-ni;lice.~Vcn Ci o\h.!r commurJcaUons, lh~ slgM!I ln:fiYid11cl aid Uw&Jsi1-..ss are. D.bl~ foe a! Atroint cfunge.s m;;dc by
\ho deellld ·eanfrrernber un6l \\>a ·ba-1e :a to<!scnable cpfOi(\Xll\y bl RSb~ 2c~!i .lo U1~ Acc.omrby tb:1 ·t!l!W:!d

.G::iur:1t

•C3J'dmmbor.
··
·
•
·
34. CARD REl,'AINS OUR FROPERlY~'{ iu tmderslclld 1h2l r::::4' C;;c dissued by um mains [ilJf prop;;ey ar.d we
om fuvait_-ynur rl@u lo l;:;e ta ;iny-iliiio. Wti can If~ 1hls \•Alh llr\'lilhc:ul C31lsQ ~n:{ with O[\•Jil.houl nMC!!l you ndGre. ll
yoirc ·card is li!'rolt.i!d or e:qiires )tU musl tat001 nup:>n our ra~llSL A\m, Hlh11 Businass Dr 'Zll"J enl~ or~ uson (mm ·•
· whom yDU.ll!qUeslcicdil ot~hth YA\om you inlend lo tnalm an P..ccountlrr.nsacYrn·as1:s YC!l to sme~r'2ll ~!rJd ~r
lc'lo\:ed C2nl, you musl:do so. l\/mi Jl1a'/ not U'5e Iha ·card i:ficr·lt has exP.ired, ancr II bill be-en [t!VO\id, or.arw }Uur
'l!mptoym~ntor d~.er cor.reµIon \,Rh U1e sucrncs:; hi!!i bnen di;conUnua.~ 1 ~r !flcr Uto a~ni:!i:; ~ Lo e:dslor lo
'9ff!fiJl11 i?i. .i golJE coocem
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PAYMENT lNFORMATION

ADVJ\NTA

5584 1897 0235 8817
08/18/06
1,985.91
45.00

Account Number:
Pnyment Due Date:
New Bal:rnce:
Ml~ltnum Payment Due:

www.advanta.com
Plensecheck here if address, phone or
c-mnil changes are indicalcd on rc~•erse side

□

PLEASE WRITE IN
PAYMENT ENCLOSED:

·

MAKE PAYMENT TO:

5183

BECCAS LITTLE GIFT SHOP
REBECCA M NAZAR
PO BOX 167
.
ITALY TX 76651-0167

ADVANTA BANK CORP
PO BOX 8088
PHILADELPHIA,PA 19101-8088

l,,,l,ll,,,ll,,,l,1,,,,llll,,,,,,ll,ll,,l,,,l,11,,111,ll,,I,

1111111 Irr 11, 111111111, II lul,ll111 III I, I II I,I II I, 1111, III I 1

5584189702358817 0198591 0004500

y

~~~~~·~

ADVANTA

ADVANTA PLATINUM DUSINESSCARD WITH-CASH BACK STATEMENT

PLATINUM

BUSINESS CARD

BALANCE SUMMARY

ACCOUNT SUMMARY

2,053.66
0.00
0.00
57.25
125.00

Previous Balance

5584 1897 0235 88 I7
2,150.00
164.00
2,150.00
164.00
07/24/06
32
08/18/06
45.00

Account Number
Total Credit Limit
Total Credit Available
Cash Advance Credit Limit
Cash Advance Credit Available
BiIJing Cycle Closing Date
Days In Billing Cycle
Payment Due Date
Minimum Payment Due

'(+) Purchases & Cash Advances
(+) Miscellaneous Fees
(+) Finance Charge
(-) Payments
(-) Credits
(==) New Balance

0.00
1,985.91

REBATE SUMMARY

Previous Balance

+/- Earned/Adjusted This Statement
0.00

0.32
Post Date

Trans Date

06/30
06/30
07/10

06/30
06/30
07/J0

"" Current Balance

0.32

TRANSACTJQNS ___ .,
Activity Since Last Statement

Reference Number.
85584 I 8J500ZMTGEE
F837400J5000PT630
8558418JF2SB2GH3T
*FINANCE CHARGE*

- Forfeited This Statement
0.00

Amount

ELECTRONIC"PYMTTHANK YOUSLC
UT
PHONE PYMT SVC FEE-COL SALT LAKE CTY UT
PAYMENT-THANK YOU
PURCHASES· S0.75 CASH ADVANCE $44.S0

-45.00
12.00

-80.00
45.25·

IMPORTANT NEWS
ENCLOSED JS A NOTICE OF CHANGE IN TERMS ON YOUR ADVANTA
BUSINESSCARD ACCOUNT. THIS NOTICE IS IMPORTANT.
PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY.
FINANCE CHARGES

Finance Charges
Average
Nominal Annual Daily
Annual
Daily Balance Percentage Rate Pe1iodic Percentage Due to Daily Transaction
Rate
Rate
Periodic Rates
Fees
23.34%
.06481% 423.94%
0.75
0.00
36.09
25.34%
1,976.38
.07037% 25.34%
44.50
0.00

I

Purchases
Cash Advances

PAYMENT SUMMARY
Payment Due
+ Amount Over Credit Limit
+ Past Due Amount
= Minimum Payment Due

45.00
0.00

0.00

4s:oo

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
FREE 2S0 FULL-COLOR BUSINESS CARDS FROM VISTAPRINT. YOU
CAN ALSO SAVE 20% ON FULL COLOR PRINTING AND DESIGN SERVICES
WHEN YOU USE YOUR. ADV ANTA CARD. PROMOTE YOUR BUSINESS AND
CUT BUSINESS PRINTING COSTS AT WWW.VISTAPR.INT.COM/BUSINESS ·

FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE, PLEASE CONTACT US:

1a1

~

By Mail:

Online: ·
www.advanta.com

By PJione:

Advanta Bank Corp. P.O. Box 30715,
Salt Lake City, UT 84130-0715

1-800-?05-7255

NOTICE: see REVERSE SIDE FORIMPORTANTINFORMATIOH

5962

0005

X6D

7

15

060724

Page 1 of l

l 045

9700

D683

01 AA5962

5183

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

OOO=t9

EXHIBIT ''F'~ ,·

. ....

........ ---,, .......· . .

.

•

I

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

REGAN R. DUCKWORTH, ESQ.

~

FED ERA TED CAPITAL CORPORATION
Utah Bar Number 12500
10 Exchange Pl., Ste. 527
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Ph: (248)737-1300
Fx: (248) 406-8053
rduckworth@fedcap.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

GiJ

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, ST ATE OF UT AH

FEDERATED CAPITAL
CORPORATION d/b/a FEDERATED
FINANCIAL CORPORATION OF
AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND
MOTION FOR AN AW ARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES

V.

CONOR LIBBY d/b/a CRITTERBOX,
Defendant(s).

Case No.: 129914062
Judge: Kate A. Toomey

COMES NOW Plaintiff FEDERATED CAPITAL CORPORATION d/b/a FEDERATED
FINANCIAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA ("Plaintiff'), by and through undersigned
counsel, and files its MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION ("Memo") TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT- STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND MOTION FORAN AWARD
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES ("Defendant's Motion"). A declaration of counsel in support of this
Memo ("Declaration") is filed concurrently herewith and is incorporated by reference herein.
Defendant CONOR LIBBY d/b/a CRITTERBOX ("Defendant" or collectively with
1
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Plaintiff as the "Parties") has moved for summary judgment in this matter arguing that this case
should be dismissed because Plaintiffs causes of action for breach of a certain agreement
between the Parties ("Agreement," which was attached both Plaintiffs 'complaint and to
Defendant's Motion as Exhibit "D") were not brought within the period required by appropriate
statutes of limitations, and that the Court should award Defendant attorney's fees and costs.
Despite the arguments made by Defendant, the Court should deny the relief sought because of
the reasons discussed in detail below.

I. RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

The plaintiff alleges that the defendant had a credit card account with Advania.

See generally ,r 1 & 2, Complaint.
Response: The document(s) referenced in this paragraph speak for themselves.
Inasmuch as this statement of fact does not contradict those documents, Plaintiff admits
the same.

2.

The defendant alleges that the account was assigned to it by Advanta.
a.

if3, Complaint, as to fact of assignment, and Exhibit 2 of the Complaint, a

Bill of Sale dated July 11, 2007 that is attached hereto as Exhibit "A ", alleged by
the plaintiff to be the bill of sale that includes the defendant's account in the
transfer of the account to the plaintiff.
Response: The -document(s) referenced in this paragraph speak for themselves.
Inasmuch as this statement of fact does not contradict those documents, Plaintiff admits
the same.
2
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3.

The documents produced by the plaintiff show that the account was assigned to

the plaintiffafter the account was in default.
a.

Advanta monthly statement, Exhibit "B ", showing the account current

with the next payment due August 4, 2006;
b.

Advanta monthly statements, Exhibit "C", showing that the August 4,

2006 payment was not made, thus constituting a default under the terms of the Account
Agreement. See 'if 10(a) of the Agreement which is attached to the plaintiffs complaint
and is ·attached hereto as Exhibit "D ";
c.

Advanta monthly statement, Exhibit "E", showing payment on October 31,

2006 of $517. 00, an amount insufficient to cure the default.
d.

Advanta monthly statements, Exhibit "F", showing no further payments

. on the account; and
e.

Advanta monthly statement that is Exhibit 5 to the plaintiffs Complaint,

attached hereto as Exhibit "G", that shows no further charges or payments to the
account and a charg~ off of all amounts on the account on April 30, 2007.

<tu

Response: Plaintiff denies that the October 31, 2006 payment was insufficient to

cure the default pursuant to the tenns of the Agreement. See Agreement at 'if 'if 6 and 11

("[i]f you pay in installments, you must pay at least the minimum payments shown on
your periodic billing statement.). Additionally, document(s) referenced in this paragraph
speak for themselves. Inasmuch as this statement of fact does not contradict those
documents, Plaintiff admits the same.
3
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4.

The plaintiff is not a citizen-of Utah, but is a Michigan corporation. with its place

of business in Farmington Hills Michigan. See affidavit of Jennifer F. Ferris, Exhibit 4 to the
plaintiff's Complaint and attached hereto as Exhibit "H".
Response: Plaintiff states that it is legally licensed to do business in the state of

Utah. See Entity Details, which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. Additionally, the
document(s) referenced in this paragraph speak for themselves. Inasmuch as this
statement of fact does not contradict those documents, Plaintiff admits the same.

5.

The Account Agreement attached to the plaintiffs Complaint as Exhibit 1, and

attached hereto as Exhibit "D ", states that the defendant is to make payment on the account at
the address indicated on the Advanta monthly statements.
a.

See ~6. "You agree to make all payments ... to us [Advanta] at the

location and in the manner specified on your periodic billing statement . .. "See also,
towards the. end 6, "Account payments are to be mailed to the address for payments
shown on your periodic billing statement. "
Response: the document(s) referenced in this paragraph speak for themselves.

Inasmuch as this statement of fact does not contradict those documents, Plaintiff admits
the same.

6.

Advanta selected Philadelphia, Pennsylvania as the place that payments were to

be sent on each and every monthly account statement. See monthly statements identified above.

4
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Response: the document(s) referenced in this paragraph speak for themselves.
Inasmuch as this statement of fact does not contradict those documents, Plaintiff admits
the same.

7.

This case was filed on October 4, 2012 and service of the Summons and

Complaint was thereafter made on the defendant in January, 2013. Judicial notice.
Response: Admit.

II. ADDITIONAL FACTS
1.

Advanta was a Utah Company located in Salt Lake County Utah from 1989 to

November 3, 2010. See Exhibit 1; see also Declaration.
~

2.

Plaintiff is an assignee of Advanta and is duly authorized and has all rights in and

to Defendant's obligation to pay sums due on the Account and has all of the rights, powers and
authority to enforce the tem1s and c_onditions .that-govern or have governed the Account. See Bill
of Sale, which was attached to Def' s. Mot. as Exhibit A; see also Agreement at ,r 23 ("We may
sell or assign any or all of our rights and obligations in the Account, and/or this agreement
without notice.'').
3.

An additional term of the Agreement is the choice of law and forum selection

clause requiring any party that files a lawsuit pertaining to the Agreement to sue only in Utah
applying Utah law:
3 I. CONTROLLING LAW AND JURISDICTION. This Agreement shall
be governed solely by and interpreted entirely in accordance with the laws
of the State of Utah, ... regardless of where you reside or where the
Business is located. We process the Account application, make the
decision to open the Account and advance credit for you from our Utah
5
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offices .... YOU CONSENT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS IN UTAH AND AGREE THAT
ANY LAWSUIT PERTAINING TO THE ACCOUNT MUST BE
BROUGHT ONLY IN SUCH COURTS IN UTAH, REGARDLESS OF
WHO FILES THE SUIT, AND MAY BE MAINTAINED ONLY IN
THOSE COURTS UNLESS AND UNTIL ANY PARTY ELECTS
ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO THE ARBITRATION PROVISION IN
THIS AGREEMENT.
See Agreement at § 31.

4.

An additional tenn of the Agreement, on which Defendant's Motion relies,

discuss terms of payment:

6. PAYMENT: We may process your payment check by electronically
debiting your account at your bank for your check amount and
transmitting check information (such as check amount, routing number
and check number), or a digital image of the check, or some other
substitute instrument, rather than the actual check, to your bank, and your
bank's record of that payment may appear as an automatic debit, substitute
check or other electronic transaction rather than a negotiated paper check).
. . . . If you pay in installments, you must pay at least the minimum
payments shown on your periodic billing statement. .... Account payments
are to be mailed to the address for payment shown on your periodic billing
statement. Payment must be received by us at that address on or before the
specified time on the Payment Due Date stated on your periodic billing
statement, and must conform . to any specific requirements for making
payment which appear with or in your billing statement. ....
Id. at§ 6.

5.

An additional term of the Agreement· deals with Plaintiffs rights in the event of

default:
11. RIGHTS UPON AN EVENT OF DEFAULT: If any event of default
occurs, we may do any or all of the following, without advance notice to
you: (a) declare the outstanding balance owing on the Account to be
immediately due and payable; (b) allow you to repay the Account subject
to the terms and conditions of this Agreement; (c) refuse to pay any
6
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Convenience Checks or other withdrawals or charges; (d) immediately
tenninate Account credit privileges; (e) suspend the availability of the
Account and /or any of our account support facilities (such as Website
access); (f) adjust your Account pricing and/or the formula we use to
calculate the minimum payment due on the Account, either as set out in
Paragraphs 6 and 8 or otherwise; (g) consider the Account no longer in
"good standing", for purposes of participating in Account programs and
features (such as Cash Back and other reward programs), eligibility for
introductory and/or promotional rates and/or offers, or otherwise; (h)
impose the Credit Limit hold as set out in Paragraph 6; (i) cancel your
Credit Protection and/or Credit Insurance; (j) offset any outstanding
balance owing on the Account with any funds from any deposit or
investment account you have with us or our affiliates (subject to the terms
of any such account and to applicable law). . ... Upon our demand, you
will immediately pay the outstanding Account balance in full and return
all Cards and unused Convenience Checks.

~

Id. at§ l 1.

III. ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is only appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
inte1Togatories, and admissions on-file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Based on the· following, Defendant has failed to show that he is
GiY

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

1. THE UNDERLYING CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE IN UTAH, THUS THE
BORROWING STATUTE IS INAPPLICABLE
Defendant, relying on Utah law, states that Utah's statutes of limitations apply to actions
brought in Utah. Financial Bancorn. Inc. v. Pingree and Dahle. Inc., 880 P.2d 14,

17

(Ut. Ct.

App. 1994). Furthermore, Defendant, by way of his motion, is not challenging the subject forum
selection clause. Thus, Plaintiff concurs with Defendant that the Utah statutes of limitations
7
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govern this lawsuit. However, where the parties disagree is in regard to the applicability of
Utah's "borrowing statute" and where perfonnance by Defendant actually occurred.
The "borrowing statute" applies only to causes of action that arise in another state. Pan

Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1991). Defendant relies on Brown v. Bach, 53 P.
991 (Utah 1898) for the proposition that a cause of action for breach o_f contract arises in the state
in which the parties determine that performance was due. Although the issue before the Brown
court dealt with selection of venue in certain counties within the same state (Brown at 994;

holding that "the cause of action in [that] case arose in Salt Lake City and county where the note
was made payable, and that the suit was improperly brought in Tooele county."), Plaintiff agrees
with Defendant, for the sake of Defendant's Motion, that a cause of action for non-payment of a
note or breach of a contract may arise where the note was to be paid or the contract perfonned.

Lawson v. Tripp, 95 P. 520 (Utah 1908). "The place of payment in a promissory note, or in an
acceptance of a bill of exchange, is always matter of arrangement between the parties for their
mutual accommodation, and may be stipulated in any manner that may best suit their
convenience." Brown at 994.
Defendant argues that the Parties only stipulated to performance of the subject contract in
a Pennsylvania, and thus, the_ cause of action for breach of contract arose there. Certainly, the
Agreement between the Parties provides that Defendant was to perform the contract by making
payment to Advanta. See Exhibit D to Defs. Mot. at

i

6. One way that Defendant could have

made payments was by mailing them to the address indicated on the Advanta monthly
statements. Id.
8
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However, the problem with Defendant's argument is that the Parties stipulated in
Agreement that it could be paid within more than one jurisdiction. Moreover, not only was
payment contemplated in a variety of manners, but Defendant in fact did not even pe1form in
Pennsylvania by making payments there, as evidenced by the statements attached to Defendant's

ii

Motion.
Plaintiff, as assignee of Advanta, processed the Account application, made the decision to
open the Account and advanced credit to Defendant from its Utah offices. See Agreement at §

~

31. Regarding electronic payment, the Agreement states, in relevant part, the following:
[w]e may process your payment check by electronically debiting your
account at your bank for your check amount and transmitting check
information (such as check amount, routing number and check number), or
a digital image of the check, or some other substitute instrument, rather
than the actual check, to your bank, and your bank's record of that
payment may appear as an automatic debit, substitute check or other
electronic transaction rather than a negotiated paper check).

Id. at§ .6.
Based on the evidence before the Court, Defendant made payments pursuant to the terms
of the Agreement by telephone or other electronic means. See Defs. Mot. at Exhibit Band E.

Gw

These payments were presumably initiated in California and, as the documentary evidence
submitted by Defendant reflects, received in Utah. Id. Thus, Defendant's performance actually
occurred in Utah, and not Pennsylvania. Accordingly, the "borrowing statute" does not apply
because the cause of action arose in Utah.
More importantly, Defendant admits that he failed to pay as he agreed and now seeks
relief from this Court to not honor his previous agreement on an invalid procedural technicality.
9
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Qv

Furthermore, and as cited by Defendant, should the Court decide that the Parties did not stipulate
to performance in a certain state, the cause of action clearly arises in the state in which the
contract was made, which by the terms of the Agreement is clearly Utah. Financial Bancorp,

Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 17.
2. THIS MATTER WAS FILED WITHIN THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF
LIMITATION
Plaintiffs claims against Defendant are based upon a writing and therefore the governing
statute of limitations is six ( 6) years. The applicable statute is Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-309(2),
which states "[a]n action may be brought within six years: ... (2) upon any contract, obligation
or liability founded upon an instrument in writing[.]" The six years statute of limitations does
not require that a writing be signed, but only that the liability be founded upon an instrument in
writing. The Utah Supreme Court has affirmed the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2309(2) in Empire Land Title, Inc., v. Weyerhaeuser Mortgage, Co., 797 P.2d 467 (Utah 1990).

See also Recent Rulings, which are attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
Here, Plaintiffs claims against Defendant are based upon written terms and conditions;
the Advanta Business Card Agreement. The tenns and conditions are a written memorialization
of the provisions governing the use of the business card. Thus, the terms and conditions are a
writing as requi~ed by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-309(2) and the applicable statute of limitation is

6 years. The subject complaint was filed on October 4, 2012. See Court Docket. Defendant made
her last payment on the Account on October 31, 2006. See Def s. Mot. at Exhibit E. Thus, the
Complaint was filed within the applicable statute of limitation.

10
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3. THERE CLEARLY EXISTS A RATIONAL NEXUS TO UTAH
Utah law, as relied on by Defendant, is applicable in this case given that the Agreement
contains a forum selection and a choice of law provision indicating Utah law is applicable, and
the Agreement was made here. See Agreement at § 31. Moreover, forum selection clauses are
"prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to
be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances." See MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S.
1, 10, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972), citing National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent,
375 U.S. 311, 315-16, 84 S.Ct. 411, 11 L.Ed.2d 354 (1964) (noting it was settled law that
"parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court"). 1
Here, there is a rational nexus between: 1) the forum consented to by the Parties; 2) both
Plaintiff, as assignee of Defendant (where located at all relevant times) and Defendant (the state
where he sent payments); and 3) the transactions that are the subject matter of the contract.
Jacobsen, 2005 UT 4,

1 11.

Regarding Pennsylvania, there is no rational nexus given that

Defendant did not perform there and the only fact relied on by Defendant that seems to connect
this case to Pennsylvania is a payment PO Box listed on the statements sent to Defendant.
More importantly in this case, there is no evidence to indicate that Plaintiff is not acting
in good faith by bringing this action in Utah. In fact, the reason why this matter was brought in
Utah was so that it could properly perfonn pursuant to the Agreement. But for the forum

1

Although the Bremen case involved an international forum selection clause, the Bremen standard also applies in
cases involving domestic fomm selection clauses. See, e.g., Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc.,
741 F.2d 273 (9th Cir.1984) (overruled on other grounds, Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Svcs .. 551 U.S. 224,
235-36, 127 S.Ct. 2411, 168 L.Ed.2d 112 (2007)).

11
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selection cause, Plaintiff may have been better served by its complaint elsewhere. Accordingly,
the Court should not apply Pennsylvania law.

4. BECAUSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE .. THE COURT
SHOULD NOT AWARD ATTORNEYS' FEES OR COSTS
Because the Court should deny Defendant's Motion, the Court should also not award
attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Utah's Reciprocal Attorney's Fee statute (the "Stah1te").
However, if the Court grants Defendant's Motion, the award of Attorneys' fees and cost is not
automatic or mandatory, but is discretionary.
The Statute provides that a court "may" award attorney fees and costs to prevailing party
in any action based upon a written contract if the contract allows at least one party to recover
attorney fees. Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 160 P .3d 1041, 1046 (Utah 2007), rehearing denied; Giusti v.
Sterling Wentworth Corp., 201 P.3d 966 (Utah 2009). Whether attorney fees should be awarded

under the Statute involves a policy-driven analysis

subject to the district court's

discretion. Hooban v. Unicity Intern., Inc., 220 P.3d 485, 488 (Utah App. 2009), certiorari
granted 225 P.3d 880, affirmed 285 P.3d 766.

The Statute is applied on a case-by-case basis in order to determine which party
"prevailed" and, thus, may be entitled to an award under the Statute. Anderson & Karrenberg v.
Jerry Warnick, 289 P.3d 600, 604 (Utah App. 2012) This approach affords the trial com1 the

flexibility to handle circumstances where both, or neither, parties may be considered to have
prevailed. Id. In furthering the policies behind the Statute, it has been stressed that courts should
also base their decisions with equitable and common sense principles. A.K. & R. Whipple

12
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~

Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 94 P.3d 270, 277 (Utah 2004); J Pochynok Co., Inc. v. Smedsrud,

~

116 P .3d 353, 356 (Utah 2005). In fact, the courts should avoid using the Statute if its use would
result in a windfall to the other party. Bilanzich, 160 P.3d at 1047.
Here, Defendant admits that he failed to pay as he agreed and now seeks relief from this

~

Court on procedural grounds to not honor his previous agreement. If the Court were to award
reasonable fees and costs, Defendant would completely avoid any liability on a legitimate debt
that he incurred in the principal amount of $22,747.30. Furthermore, Plaintiff has asserted the
action on goods merits and in good faith according to the tenns of the Agreement. Accordingly,
in the event that Defendant's Motion is granted, he should not also be awarded attorneys' fees
~

and costs.

IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that Defendant's Motion be denied
in its entirety.
DATED this 4th day of April, 2013.

Utah

Attorney for Plaz

~
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Entity Details: ADVANTA BANK CORP. - Utah Business Search- Utah.gov

Utah Business Search - Details
ADVANTA BANK CORP.
Entity Number: 1039490-0142
Company Type: Corporation - Domestic - Profit
Address: 11850 ELECTION RD DRAPER, UT 84020
State of Origin: UT

Registered Agent: TOM BILLINGS
Registered Agent Address:

36 S STATE ST STE 1900
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
~

Status: Expired
Status: Expired

G) asof11/03/2010

Status Description: Failure to File Renewal

GriJ

Employment Verification: Not Registered with Verify Utah

History
Registration Date: 07/11/1989

~

Last Renewed: 05/12/2009

Additional Information
~

NAICS Code: 5221 NAICS Title: 5221-DepositoryCredit Intermediation

Doing Business As
COLONIAL CREDIT CORP
TRIO BANK

<sw

SHDRCORP.
VAL CORPORATION

Former Business Names
Giv
ADVANTA FINANCIAL CORP.

~

Refine your search by:
• Search by:
• Business Name
• Number
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
https ://secure.utah .g ov/bes/action/detai Is ?entity= 1039490-0142
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Entity Details: FEDERATED CAPITAL CORPORATION - Utah Business Search- Utah.gov

Utah Business Search - Details
FEDERATED CAPITAL CORPORATION
Entity Number: 6151822-0143
Company Type: Corporation - Foreign - Profit

Address: 30955 NORTHWESTERN HWY Farmington Hills, Ml 483342580
@

State of Origin: Ml
Registered Agent: CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
Registered Agent Address:

1108 E SOUTH UNION AVE
Midvale, UT 8404 7

Status: Active
Status: Active

@i as of 03/1712006

Renew By: 03/31/2014
Status Description: Good Standing

The "Good Standing" status represents that a renewal has been filed, within the most recent renewal period, with the
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code.
Employment Verification: Not Registered with Verify Utah

History
Registration Date: 03/17/2006
Last Re newed: 01/24/2013

Additional Information
NAICS Code: 9999 NAICS Title: 9999-Nonclassitiable Establishment

Doing Business As
FEDERATED FINANCIAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA

Former Business Names
FEDERATED FINANCIAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA

Refine your search by:
• Search by:
• Business Name
• Number
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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IN THE DISTRiCT COURT OF THE THIRD ·JUD~CIAL DISTRICT

IN AND FOR SAL'? LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FEDERATED CAPITAL CORPORATION
d/b/a FEDERATED FINANCIAL
CORPORATION.OF AMERICA,

ORDER
case No. 129908455

Plaintiff,

Judge ANTHONY B. QUINN

v.
DONALD GUINARD d/b/a GUINARD'S
PC CONSULTING LLC,

DATE: March

'2-1 ,

2013

· · :::o~f<?.n~~~~:; · -: · ~:· ·:- -_. _,-_· ... -~ ~-- -~ .
•••-.••

'"•

11 · -

•t• •-

I

•• ♦•·♦

o

· ·The' ahove :matter is before the Court on Det~r_i~ant Donald

Guinard's Motion to Dismiss filed on August 8, 2012.

The Court,

having carefully considered the Motion and relevant ·1aw, hereby

,·

denies tie Motion and rules as follows:

Defendant argues that this matter should be dismissed
because it is time barred under Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-307. 1
Code Ant1;. ~7-8B._2-307 establishes a four _year_ statute of

.limitations·· for- -actions. '~upon a contract, o};:,l_igation, or.
.... , ... ,

. . . . -.~. . . . . .

~-----·

•••

-···

s"

·-··

1Defend~nt.

··-·

......... -

.......... _

••

-~-.

........ -········

·-·

.. .

actually argues that the correct statutory

provisian"ts··'72B-2-307, which is' clearly in errQr •
• t:
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Utah

liability not founded upon an instrument in writing."
Ann. §78B-2-307(1) (a).

Utah Code

However, this matter appears to have been

brought to enforce the obligations under a written contract
between Defendant and Advanta Bank Corp., which Plaintiff alleges
Defendant breached on June 9·, 20-0G.

As such, Plaintiff's action

ie governed by Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-309{2), which establishes a

six year statute of limitations.

Because this action was filed•

on June a, 2012, it appears to be timely.

Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. 2
This is the Order of·the Court and no other ord~r is

required.
Dated this

1-7

day of March, 2013.

ORT JUD

Giv

court's decision in this matter renders moot
Plaintiff's January 28 th Motion to Enlarge Time to File Response
to Motion to Dismiss.
2The
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FILED DISTRICT CUURT

l(

Third Judicial District

MAR 11 2013

IN THE THIRD JUD'ICIA . DI RICT COURT
SA\J LAKE COUNTY ·cIN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAf\y_ _ _ _ _-;,i::::'!':/;~t;~·am,.,:t"'"k
08
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
DISMISS

FEDERATED CAPITAL
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ALBERT A. DITIZIO d/b/a ALLIED
OFFICE EQUIPMENT, INC.,

Case No. 0129918131
Judge Vernice S. Trease

Defendant.

Before the court is Defendanfs Motion to Disµuss. Neither party has r~quest~d oral

argument and the court finds that the issues raised in the Motion have been sufficiently briefed in
the memoranda that a decision is appropriate without further hearing. The court having reviewed

and considered Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the parties, memoranda, exhibits, affidavit,.
applicable statutes, rules .and case law,
. denies Defendant's Motion for the reasons discussed
herein.

·INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Federated Capital Corporation, has commenced a debt collection suit against
Defendant, Albert A..Ditizio d/b/a Allied Office Equipment, alleging that as of December 30,
2006 Defendant had a credit card balance of $29,329.29 that has not been paid. Defendant has
filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging several grounds in support thereof.. Defendant alleges that
(l) this court lacks personal jurisdiction and is an.inconvenient forum because Defendant is a .
resident of Maryland and has no contacts with the State of Utah; (2) Plaintiff has failed to name

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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proper parties and/or state a claim for which relief may be granted; (3).the statute of limitations
has run as to counts 2 and 3 of the complaint; and (4) count 1 fails as well because Plaintiff has
failed to show a written contract ot a signed card agreement and the statute of limitations has run.
Plaintiff contends that Defendant consented to personal jurisdiction and venue in the

State of Utah through a forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause in the Card Agreement1
that the complaint complies with Rule 8) URCP, and does state the proper parties and claims for
which relief may be granted, that under Utah law the Card Agreement did not have to be signed,
and that the statute of limitations has not expired on any of the claims alleged .. The court will
address each of these issues.

JURISDICTION
On the issue of jurisdiction there are essentially two questions to address: First, is the
forum selection clause contained in the Card Agreement enforceable? And second, if the forum
selection clause enforceable, is there a sufficient rational nexus between the forum selected

and/or consented to, and either the parties to the contract or the transactions that are the subject
matter of the contract?

· While generally personal jurisdiction is detennined by a three-part inquiry,1 the Utah
Supreme Court has detennined that in cases involving contractual fonim selection/consent-to-

jurisdiction clauses, a different inquiry should be made. Phone Directories Co. v. Henderson,
2000 UT 64, ,r 14. However, before this inquiry can be made, the court must determine whether

1

Generally, the test for personal jurisdiction is "(1) the defendant's acts or contacts must
implicate Utah under the Utah long arm statute; (2) a "nexus,, must exist between the plaintiff's claims
and the defendant's acts or contacts; and (3) application of the Utah long-ann statute must satisfy the
requirements offederal due process.» Phone Directories Co. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, 112.
-2-
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the forum selection clause itself is enforceable. Jacobsen Conslr. Co. v. Teton Builders, 2005
UT 4,111.

L Enforceability ofForum Selection Clause
"A prerequisite to determining whether the parties, forum selection clause is enforceable
is discerning which state's law governs the substantive validity of the contract's tenns." Id at 1
12. Plaintiff has argued, and Defendant does not appear to dispute, that Utah law, is applicable
in this case. Defendant has argued Utah law in his Motion to Dismiss. In addition, the Card
Agreement contains a choice of law provision inaicating Utah law is applicable.

In this case, there is no evidence to indicate that Advanta Bank Corporation ("Advanta"),
the original creditor in this case, did not act in good faith or that it was trying to evade the laws of

the State of Maryland. Furthermore, there is a substantial relationship between the transaction
and the agreement; namely, that Advanta was a Utah bank, doing business in Utah from 1989 to
2010. In addition, as discussed below, the agreement is not contrary to Utah,s public policy.
In order for the forum selection clause to be enforceable, the clause must not violate Utah
law or public policy. Jacobsen, 2005 UT 4, 112. Defendant appears to argue thatthe forum

selection clause violates Utah's long..arm statue as well as the traditional'notions of fair play and
substantial justice because of his lack of contact with Utah. However, as the Utah Supreme
Court has previously held, a forum selection clause does not need to cerise to the level required
under section 78-27-24 {(recodified as section 78B-3~205 (2008))].,, Phone Directories Co., 2000

UT 64, 1J 14. Thus, this_ argument is riot convincing.
Consequently, because Defendant fails to point to any law or public policy violated by the
forum selection clause, the clause is enforceable. Therefore, the court must next determine
-3 ..
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whether there is "a sufficiently rational nexus to Utah to justify the exercise of personal

Qw

jurisdiction." Jacobsen, 2005 UT 4, 111.

IL Rational Nexus
In order for a court to have personal jurisdiction pursuant to a forum selection clause

~

there must be a sufficient "rational nexus between the forum selected and/or consented to> and
either the parties to the contract or the transactions that are the subject matter of the contract."

Jacobsen, 2005 UT 4, ,I 11. While there is a requirement for "some connection between Utah
and either the parties to or the actions contemplated by the contract, it need not rise to the level

required under section 78-27-24 [(recodified as section 78B-3 ..205 (2008))]." Id.
In Jacobsen, the court held that one party's connection to Utah can be sufficient to satisfy

the rational nexus inquiry. Id. at 143. Thus the court held that the trial court had personal
jurisdiction over two Wyoming residents where the plaintiff's primary place of business was in
Utah and the contract's forum selection clause indicated Utah as the forum for litigation. Id.
The case at hand, is similar to Jacobsen. Advanta was a Utah bank doing business in
Utah. And, the Card Agreement indicates Utah as the proper jurisdiction and venue. While

Defendant argues the Utah is an inappropriate forum because he resides in another state that does
not negate the fact that Advanta was a Utah bank conducting business in Utah. Thus, because
there is a sufficiently rational nexus between Utah and a party, Advanta, jurisdiction and venue in
Utah is proper.

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AND IMPROPER PARTY
ijjv

Defendant alleges that the matter should be dismiss because the complaint fails to state a
claim for which relief may be granted. A Motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), failure to state
-4-
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a claim upon which relief can be granted> admits the facts alleged in the complaint but challenges

the plaintiff's right to relief based on those fact. Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d263 (Utah

1995). Under this standard, and accepting the facts alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff has stated
a ciaim upon which relief may be granted.
Regarding Defendant's contention of improperly naming the parties, the Card Agreement
~

by it's tenns and the later billing on the account include both Albert A. Ditizio and Allied Office

Equipment, Inc. The tenns of the Card Agreement holds accountable both the business and the
signing individual. Plaintiff asserts that Albert A. Ditizio is the card applicant and signing

individual.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The applicable statute is UCA 78B-2-309. As discussed herein, the Card Agreement is
the written contract in this case. The six year statute of limitations began to run at the time the
last payment was made on the Account. UCA 78B:2-113. The last payment was made on

December 30, 2006. The complaint was filed on December 28, 2012. At the time of the filing of
the complaint the statute of limitations had not expired.

.. FAILURE TO PRODUCE A SIGNED AGREEMENT
Defendant also contends that the forum selection clause is not valid because Plaintiff

have failed to produce a signed copy of the Card Agreement. However, Utah Code Section 25-54(2)(e) provides that

[a] credit agreement is binding and enforceable without any signature
by the party to be charged if: (i) the debtor is provided with a written
copy of the terms of the agreement; (ii) the agreement provides that
any use of the credit offered shall constitute ~cceptance of those
terms; and (iii) after the debtor receives the agreement, the debtor•.
-5-
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~

. requests funds pursuant to the credit agreement or otherwise uses the
credit offered.
Plaintiff asserts that in 2002, Defendat1t was approved for a card issued in the name of
Allied Office Equipment Inc., with the signing individual's name being the· Defendant. Plaintiff
asserts upon applying, receiving and using the card, Defendant agreed to the tenns and conditions
of the Card Agreement. The tem1s and conditions of the card include acceptance of liability by
the signer. For the purposes of this Motion, the Defendant is a properly named party.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be and hereby is
denied.

Defendant is granted fifteen (1 S) days from the date of this Memorandum Ruling and

Order to file an answer.
~

This Memorandum.Ruling and Order shall stand as the order of the Court on this matter;
no further order is required.
Dated this _11 th day ofMarch, 2013.

~

-6-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of April, 2013, I transmitted copies of the above
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES

via an approved e-filing service provider to the following:
Lester A. Perry, Esq.
HOOLE&KING
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Defendant(s)

Utah a
Attorney for
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CHRISTOPHER C. HILL
FEDERATED CAPITAL CORPORATION

Utah Bar Number 9583
10 Exchange Pl., Ste. 527
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Ph: (248) 737-1300
Fx: (248) 406-8053
chill@fedcap.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FEDERATED CAPITAL
CORPORATION d/b/a FEDERATED
FINANCIAL CORPORATION OF
AMERICA,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STAY
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT AND
APPROVAL OF AMOUNT FOR
SUPERSEDEAS BOND

Plaintiff,
V.

REBECCA M NAZAR
d/b/a BECCAS LITTLE GIFT SHOP,
Defendant(s).

Case No.: 129909968
Judge: D.C.

Pursuant to Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Federated Capital Corporation
d/b/a Federated Financial Corporation of America ("Federated") respectfully submits this
memorandum in support of its Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment and Approval of
Amount for Supersedeas Bond.
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Rule 62(i) permits a party to obtain a stay of a judgment upon the posting of a
"commercial bond having a surety authorized to transact insurance business under Title 3 IA."
The presumptive amount of a commercial bond under Rule 62(j)(2)(A) is the amount of
compensatory damages plus costs and attorney fees and 3 years of interest at the applicable postjudgment rate.
The court entered judgment on May 12, 2014, in the amount of $10,741.03, which
includes compensatory damages plus costs and attorney fees through May 12, 2014. The
judgment includes a post-judgment interest rate of 2.13%, so three years of interest would bring
the total presumptive amount of any bond to $11,427.38.
Federated has already posted a supersedeas bond in the amount of $45,000.00 for the case
entitled Federated Capital Corporation v. Libby, Civil No. 129914062.

The case entitled

Federated Capital Corporation v. Chapa, Civil No. 129911232 and the Libby case were
consolidated, sua sponte, by the Utah Supreme Court because of the similarity of the issues.
Additionally, there are two additional cases which are being appealed, which will most
likely be consolidated with this case, the Chapa case and the Libby case because· the issues are
·nearly identical.

Those cases are Federated Capital Corporation v. Abraham, Civil No.

119901843; and Federated Capital Corporation v. Deutsch, Civil No. 139918085.
The legal research and argument will be virtually identical in each of these cases at the
appellate level. Federated proposes that the supersedeas bond amount in this matter include the
judgment amount of $10,741.03, plus three years worth of interest at 2.13% in the amount of
$686.35, plus $5,000, for a total amount of $16,427.38.
2
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Federated therefore moves this court to enter an order staying the judgment and ordering
~

Federated to post a commercial bond in compliance with Rule 62(i) in the amount of
$16,427.38. Federated requests that this Court enter the order on an expedited basis.
DATED this 20 th day of June, 2014.

Isl CHRISTOPHER C. HILL
CHRISTOPHER C. HILL
Attorney for Plaintiff
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Currentness
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Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes and CoP.sofidated Statutes Currentness .
Title 42 Pa.C.S.A. Judiciary and Judicial Procedw·e (Refs & Annos)
Part VI. Actions, Proceedings and Other Matters Generally
"GJ Chapter 55. Limitation of Time (Refs & Annos)
l<:fEi Subchapter B. CivU A,!)_tj9n,; ap.d Pro,g~~~ings (Refs & Aru10s)
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§ 5525. !our year limitation

(a) General rule. Except as provided for il1 subsection (b), the following actions and proceedings must be commenced within
four years:-

(1) An action upon a contract, under seal or otherwise, for the sale, construction or furnishing of tangible personal properly

or fiictures.

(2) Any action subject to 13 Pa.C.S. § 2725 (relating to statute of limitations in contracts for sale).

•

(3) An action upon an express contract not founded upon an instrwnent in writing.

(4) An action upon a contract implied in law, except an action subject to another limitation specified in this subchapter.
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